Hairston v. Strayhorn
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- William v. Gallo (author)
Analysis
The court considered a pro se state prisoner's motion to appoint counsel in a federal habeas corpus action. The court denied the motion without prejudice, finding that the petitioner's inability to afford counsel and lack of legal training did not constitute the 'exceptional circumstances' required for appointment.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to Appoint Counsel denied without prejudice“Petitioner’s Motion to Appoint Counsel is DENIED without prejudice.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard from the Ninth Circuit that there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in federal habeas proceedings. The court properly identified that appointment is discretionary and requires 'exceptional circumstances' or a showing that counsel is necessary to prevent due process violations. The petitioner's cited grounds (poverty, limited library access, lack of legal knowledge) are standard pro se difficulties that do not meet the high threshold for appointment. The denial without prejudice is appropriate as it allows the petitioner to refile if circumstances change or if the case becomes more complex (e.g., if an evidentiary hearing is required). |
The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the applicable legal standard from binding Ninth Circuit precedent (no constitutional right to counsel in habeas, discretionary appointment only in exceptional circumstances). It applies this standard to the specific facts presented (poverty, lack of training, limited library access) and correctly concludes that these are common pro se difficulties that do not rise to the level of 'exceptional circumstances.' The citation to LaMere v. Risley is slightly imprecise as the order does not explicitly state that the petitioner's pleadings show an ability to present contentions, but the general principle that pro se difficulties are not enough is well-supported by the other citations. The denial without prejudice is a standard and appropriate procedural outcome.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KEVIN TYRONE IZAL HAIRSTON, Case No.: 23-CV-153-GPC-WVG CDCR #BF-2040, 12 ORDER ON PETITIONER’S Plaintiff, 13 MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL v. 14 D. STRAYHORN, 15 Defendant. 16 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Before the Court is Kevin Tyrone Izal Hairston’s (“Petitioner”) Motion to Appoint 19 Counsel (“Motion”). (Doc. No. 9.) Petitioner moves the Court for an order appointing 20 counsel to act on his behalf and cites to his inability to afford counsel, limited access to the 21 law library due to his incarceration, and limited knowledge of the law as grounds for relief. 22 (Id., ¶¶1-2.) 23 II. APPLICABLE LAW 24 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to federal habeas corpus 25 actions by state prisoners. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Chaney v. 26 Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986); Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 27 (9th Cir. 1986). However, financially eligible habeas petitioners seeking relief pursuant to 28 1 28 U.S.C. section 2254 may obtain representation whenever the court “determines that the 2 interests of justice so require.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) (West 2000); Terrovona v. 3 Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 4 (9th Cir. 1984). 5 In the Ninth Circuit, “[i]ndigent state prisoners applying for habeas relief are not 6 entitled to appointed counsel unless the circumstances of a particular case indicate that 7 appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due process violations.” Chaney, 801 F.2d at 8 1196; Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728-29. Unless an evidentiary hearing is necessary, courts 9 maintain discretion to determine whether to appoint counsel. Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1177; 10 Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728-30. To that end, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 1915(e)(1), courts 11 may exercise their discretion to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants only in 12 “exceptional circumstances.” Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 13 2004) (internal citations omitted). In general, there is no right to appointed counsel in a 14 civil action. United States v. McQuade, 579 F.2d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir. 1978). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Petitioner’s Motion to Appoint Counsel is DENIED without prejudice. The grounds 17 to which Petitioner cites in support of his Motion do not constitute grounds for relief. Taa 18 v. Chase Home Fin., 2012 WL 507430, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2012) (noting a pro se 19 litigant’s lack of legal training and poverty do not constitute exceptional circumstances, 20 because many other litigants face similar difficulties when proceeding pro se); Wood v. 21 Houseright, 900 F.2d 1332-1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990) (“difficulties in which any litigant 22 would have in proceeding pro se… do not indicate exceptional factors”); LaMere v. Risley, 23 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming district court’s denial of request for 24 appointment of counsel, where pleadings demonstrated petitioner had “a good 25 understanding of the issues and the ability to present forcefully and coherently his 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 || contentions.”). Accordingly, the Court DENIES without prejudice Petitioner’s Motion to 2 || Appoint Counsel. 3 IT ISSO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: June 9, 2023 Se LJ Ss Hon. William V. Gallo 6 United States Magistrate Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28