gno.law

Windy Cove, Inc. v. Circle K Stores, Inc.

District Court, S.D. California · 3:21-cv-01416 · 2023-03-02 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
On appeal
Windy Cove, Inc. v. Circle K Stores Inc. (2024-12-03) — the Ninth Circuit's later ruling on this docket
Panel
Michael M. Anello (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T22:07Z · confidence high

The parties jointly moved to dismiss four of Circle K's counterclaims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). The court denied the motion in its entirety without prejudice, ruling that Rule 41 is inapplicable because the dismissal would not release any defendant from the action.

What the court decidedThe model
Denial of the joint motion to dismiss counterclaims
“Accordingly, the Court DENIES the parties’ joint motion in its entirety without prejudice.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the distinction between Rule 41 and Rule 15. Rule 41(a) governs the voluntary dismissal of an 'action' (or a claim against a specific defendant resulting in their release), whereas Rule 15(a) governs the amendment of pleadings to drop specific claims while the action continues against the defendant. Because Circle K's sixth counterclaim remained pending against the defendants, the dismissal of the other four counterclaims did not result in the release of any defendant. Therefore, Rule 41 was the wrong procedural vehicle, and the denial was legally sound.

The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound. It correctly identifies the legal distinction between dismissing an action (Rule 41) and amending pleadings to drop specific claims (Rule 15). The court relied on binding Ninth Circuit precedent to support its conclusion that because the defendants were not released from the action (due to the remaining sixth counterclaim), Rule 41 was inapplicable. The reasoning is concise and directly addresses the procedural error in the motion.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 W coI rpN oD raY ti onC ;O V AE A, AI N AC B., LEa , C Ia Nli Cfo .,r nia a Case No. 3:21-cv-01416-MMA (DEB) California corporation, dba 12 UNIVERSITY CITY MOBIL AND SOUTH BAY; S & G ZAVARO, INC., ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION 13 a California corporation, dba TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM MIRAMAR MOBIL; NEWKIRK’S NOS. 1, 3, 4, AND 5 PURSUANT TO 14 SANTA FE SERVICE, INC., a FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL California corporation; OCEANSIDE PROCEDURE 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) 15 AKAM OIL, INC., a California 16 c Mo Arp Nor Aat Gio En M; ENTS T GA RFF OI UN PG , INCA .,N D a [Doc. No. 110] California corporation, dba KAZMO, 17 LLC.; and HB FUEL, INC., a California corporation, 18 19 Plaintiffs, vs. 20 21 CIRCLE K STORES, INC., a Texas corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, 22 inclusive, Defendants. 23 AND RELATED COUNTER CLAIM 24 25 26 27 28 1 Plaintiffs and Counterclaim-Defendants Windy Cove, Inc. (“Windy Cove”), 2 Staffing & Management Group, Inc. (“Staffing”) and HB Fuel, Inc. (“HB Fuel”); 3 and Counterclaim-Defendants KAZMO, LLC (“KAZMO”), Sun Rise Property, 4 LLC, (“Sun Rise”), Mohammad Bahour, and Hamid Kalhor (collectively, the 5 “Remaining Dealers”), and Defendant and Counter-Complainant Circle K Stores 6 Inc. (“Circle K”), jointly move to dismiss Circle K’s first, third, fourth, and fifth 7 counterclaims for (1) Declaratory Relief – Brand Covenant Within Circle K Grant 8 Deeds; (3) Declaratory Relief – Brand Covenant Within ExxonMobil Grant Deed 9 (Windy Cove); (4) Declaratory Relief – Use Covenant Agreements; and 10 (5) Injunctive Relief against Windy Cove, Staffing, HB Fuel, KAZMO, Sun Rise, 11 Mohammad Bahour, and Hamid Kalhor. Doc. No. 110. The parties cite Federal 12 Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) as the basis for dismissal. See id. 13 Rule 41(a) applies only to voluntary dismissal of “an action,” not to certain 14 claims within an action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). “Federal Rule of Civil 15 Procedure 15(a) is the appropriate mechanism where a plaintiff desires to eliminate 16 an issue, or one or more but less than all of several claims, but without dismissing 17 as to any of the defendants.” Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1392 18 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hells 19 Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005) 20 (“[W]ithdrawals of individual claims against a given defendant are governed by 21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, which addresses amendments to pleadings.”) (citation omitted); 22 Gen. Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 1513 (9th Cir. 23 1995) (“[W]e have held that Rule 15, not Rule 41, governs the situation when a 24 party dismisses some, but not all, of its claims.”) (citations omitted). Here, 25 dismissal of Circle K’s first, third, fourth, and fifth counterclaims would not 26 dismiss all of Circle K’s claims against all Remaining Dealers: Circle K’s sixth 27 counterclaim for declaratory relief would remain against Windy Cove, Staffing, 28 Mohammad Bahour, Hamid Kalhour, and HB Fuel. See Doc. No. 28 4] 109-15; 2!) Doc. No. 110 at 3; see also Doc. Nos. 72, 84. Thus, dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule 41(a) is improper as to Windy Cove, Staffing, Mohammad Bahour, Hamid 4] Kalhour, and HB Fuel. See Gen. Signal Corp., 66 F.3d at 1513 (“Rule 41 is reserved for circumstances in which the result of the alleged dismissal is that one or all of the defendants are released from the action.”). Accordingly, the Court 7 DENIES the parties’ joint motion in its entirety without prejudice. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. ?|| Dated: March 2, 2023 10 a LN, hk Le □□ tol HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28