LBF Travel Management Corp. v. DeRosa
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Michael M. Anello (author)
Analysis
The court issued a Notice and Order providing tentative rulings on Third-Party Defendants' motion to dismiss, motion to strike, and Counter-Defendants' notice of joinder. The court tentatively granted the motion to strike Claim 9, granted the motion to dismiss Claims 12 and 13 and the 'usurping a corporate opportunity' theory of Claim 6, and denied the remaining motions and requests to dismiss.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Tentatively denies the motion to strike Claims 7, 9, and 12-14 as procedurally improper.“The Court tentatively DENIES the motion to strike Claims 7, 9, and 12–14 as procedurally improper.” | agree with court The court relies on its own prior order (Doc. No. 52) to determine that the amendment was timely and not limited to existing claims. This is a procedural determination based on the court's own docket history. |
Tentatively grants the motion to strike Claim 9 as waived.“The Court tentatively GRANTS the motion strike Claim 9 as waived under Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012).” | agree with court The court applies the waiver doctrine from Lacey v. Maricopa County, a Ninth Circuit case, to strike a claim. While the specific facts leading to waiver are not detailed in this order, the application of the cited authority is standard for this procedural mechanism. |
Tentatively denies the request to dismiss Claims 2 and 4.“The Court tentatively DENIES the request to dismiss Claims 2 and 4.” | agree with court The court finds that the 'not-a-stranger' principle and manager's privilege are complex issues better suited for summary judgment rather than resolution at the motion to dismiss stage. This is a common judicial practice to avoid deciding difficult legal questions on a bare pleading. |
Tentatively grants the motion to dismiss Claim 6 only as to the 'usurping a corporate opportunity' theory.“The Court tentatively GRANTS the motion to dismiss Claim 6 only as to the “usurping a corporate opportunity” theory” | agree with court The court determines that any usurped corporate opportunity belongs to the corporate entity (LBF Travel Management Corp.) and not to DeRosa individually. This aligns with general corporate law principles regarding the ownership of corporate opportunities. |
Tentatively denies the motion to dismiss Claim 6 as to the remaining theories.“tentatively DENIES the motion to dismiss Claim 6 as to the remaining theories.” | agree with court The court relies on Neilson v. Union Bank of California to hold that a party need not owe a duty to the plaintiff to be liable as an aider and abettor of a breach of fiduciary duty, and that an underlying cause of action for concealment is not required. This follows the cited district court authority. |
Tentatively grants the motion to dismiss Claim 12.“The Court tentatively GRANTS the motion to dismiss Claim 12.” | agree with court The court finds that the allegations do not rise to the level of 'extreme and outrageous' conduct required for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under California law, citing Hughes v. Pair. |
Tentatively grants the motion to dismiss Claim 13.“The Court tentatively GRANTS the motion to dismiss Claim 13.” | agree with court The court applies the rule from Neilson v. Union Bank of California that a conspiracy claim cannot be asserted against one who did not owe the injured party a duty. Since DeRosa did not allege the defendants owed him a duty, the claim fails. |
Tentatively denies the motion to dismiss Claim 7.“The Court tentatively DENIES the motion to dismiss Claim 7.” | agree with court The court finds that DeRosa adequately alleged property interests and wrongful conduct sufficient to state a fraudulent conveyance claim under California law. |
Tentatively denies the motion to dismiss Claim 9 as moot.“The Court tentatively DENIES AS MOOT the motion to dismiss Claim 9 in light of the tentative ruling on the motion to strike.” | agree with court Because the court tentatively granted the motion to strike Claim 9, the motion to dismiss that same claim is rendered moot. |
Tentatively denies the motion to dismiss Claim 11.“The Court tentatively DENIES the motion to dismiss Claim 11.” | agree with court The court rejects the argument that the claim is derivative of failed claims because other claims against various defendants are tentatively surviving. |
Tentatively denies the motion to dismiss Claim 14.“The Court tentatively DENIES the motion to dismiss Claim 14.” | agree with court The court finds the law unsettled regarding whether unjust enrichment is a standalone cause of action and declines to address the issue at this stage, leaving it for the merits. |
The order itself: sound with gaps — The order is a tentative ruling, meaning it is not a final judgment. The reasoning is generally sound, applying established legal principles to the pleadings. The court correctly identifies issues that are better suited for summary judgment (manager's privilege, not-a-stranger principle) and applies the correct standards for the claims it dismisses (IIED, conspiracy, corporate opportunity). The reliance on Neilson, a district court case, is permissible but less authoritative than a published appellate decision; however, it is consistent with California law.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionOpinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 LBF TRAVEL MANAGEMENT CORP. Case No.: 20-cv-2404-MMA (AGS) and MICHAEL THOMAS, 11 NOTICE AND ORDER PROVIDING Plaintiffs, 12 TENTATIVE RULINGS RE: v. MOTION TO DISMISS AND 13 MOTION TO STRIKE AND NOTICE THOMAS DEROSA, 14 OF JOINDER Defendant. 15 [Doc. Nos. 80, 81] THOMAS DEROSA, 16 Counter-Claimant, 17 v. 18 LBF TRAVEL MANAGEMENT CORP. 19 and MICHAEL THOMAS, 20 Counter-Defendants.
21 22 THOMAS DEROSA, Third-Party Plaintiff, 23 v. 24 25 LBF TRAVEL, INC.; LBF TRAVEL HOLDINGS, LLC; MONDEE 26 HOLDINGS, LLC; MONDEE, INC.; and 27 PRASAD GUNDUMOGULA Third-Party Defendants. 28 1 On August 15, 2022, the parties in this action will appear before the Court for a 2 hearing on Third-Party Defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion to strike, along with 3 Counter-Defendants’ notice of joinder. See Doc. Nos. 80, 81. In anticipation of the 4 hearing, the Court issues the following tentative rulings: 5 MOTION TO STRIKE 6 1. The Court tentatively DENIES the motion to strike Claims 7, 9, and 12–14 7 as procedurally improper. The Court tentatively finds that amendment is timely and that 8 the Court’s prior order, see Doc. No. 52, did not limit amendment to existing claims. 9 2. The Court tentatively GRANTS the motion strike Claim 9 as waived under 10 Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012). 11 MOTION TO DISMISS 12 1. The Court tentatively finds that Counter-Defendants’ request to dismiss 13 Claims 2 and 4 is not properly raised in a noticed motion to dismiss. Nonetheless, the 14 Court tentatively DENIES the request to dismiss Claims 2 and 4. The Court tentatively 15 finds that California’s “not – a – stranger” principle is in flux and its application in this 16 case is not appropriate for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage. See Fresno Motors, 17 LLC v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 771 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2014). Similarly, the 18 Court tentatively finds that the applicability of the manager’s privilege under California 19 law is an argument better suited to summary judgment. 20 2. The Court tentatively GRANTS the motion to dismiss Claim 6 only as to 21 the “usurping a corporate opportunity” theory and tentatively DENIES the motion to 22 dismiss Claim 6 as to the remaining theories. As to the “usurping a corporate 23 opportunity” theory, the Court tentatively finds any “usurped corporate opportunity” 24 belongs to LBF Travel Management Corp. and not DeRosa as an individual. As to 25 DeRosa’s remaining theories, the Court tentatively finds that, under California law, a 26 party need not owe a plaintiff a duty before it can be held liable as an aider and abettor of 27 a breach of fiduciary duty. See Neilson v. Union Bank of California, N.A., 290 F. Supp. 28 2d 1101, 1133–34 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Additionally, the Court tentatively finds that 1 DeRosa does not need to allege an underlying cause of action for concealment in order to 2 state a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. 3 3. The Court tentatively GRANTS the motion to dismiss Claim 12. The Court 4 tentatively finds that DeRosa fails to allege facts that rise to the level of “extreme and 5 outrageous” conduct under California law. See Hughes v. Pair, 209 P.3d 963, 976 (Cal. 6 2009). 7 4. The Court tentatively GRANTS the motion to dismiss Claim 13. The Court 8 tentatively finds that, under California law, “a conspiracy claim may not be asserted 9 against one who did not owe the injured party a duty[,]” Neilson, 290 F. Supp. at 1127 10 (citations omitted), and that the claim therefore fails because DeRosa does not allege 11 Third-Party Defendants owed him any duty. 12 5. The Court tentatively DENIES the motion to dismiss Claim 7. The Court 13 tentatively finds that DeRosa adequately alleges property interests that can serve as the 14 basis for a fraudulent conveyance claim under California law. Additionally, the Court 15 tentatively finds that DeRosa sufficiently pleads wrongful conduct. 16 6. The Court tentatively DENIES AS MOOT the motion to dismiss Claim 9 in 17 light of the tentative ruling on the motion to strike. 18 7. The Court tentatively DENIES the motion to dismiss Claim 11. The Court 19 tentatively finds the argument that the claim fails because it is derivative of DeRosa’s 20 prior failed claims unpersuasive given that claims tentatively survive as to Thomas 21 (Claims 1–5, 7, 8, and 10), Mondee Inc. (Claims 6 and 7), Mondee LLC (Claims 6 and 22 7), and LBF Travel, Inc. (Claim 7). 23 8. The Court tentatively DENIES the motion to dismiss Claim 14. The Court 24 tentatively finds that the law is unsettled as to whether unjust enrichment is a standalone 25 cause of action and therefore tentatively rejects Third-Party Defendants’ argument at this 26 time. However, the Court tentatively finds that this particular ruling should be without 27 prejudice to raising the issue at a later stage of the litigation. For that reason, the Court 28 tentatively declines to address the parties’ remaining arguments regarding quasi-contract 1 || and intentional misrepresentation as they too are more appropriately addressed at the 2 || merits stage. 3 The Court tentatively finds that dismissal should be with prejudice and therefore 4 || without leave to amend as to the following claims: Claim 6 to the extent it 1s premised on 5 || the “usurping a corporate opportunity” theory, Claim 12 in its entirety, and Claim 13 in 6 entirety. 7 As these rulings are tentative, the Court looks forward to the oral arguments of 8 || counsel. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || Dated: August 10, 2022 12 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Cites, in this corpus
- Hughes v. Pair S157197 · 2009-07-02