Valdez v. Zhang
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- William v. Gallo (author)
Analysis
The court considered a pro se prisoner's motion to appoint counsel or, in the alternative, an interpreter for a civil rights action. The court denied the motion without prejudice, finding no exceptional circumstances for counsel and no statutory authority to fund an interpreter.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to appoint counsel denied“Plaintiff’s request for an attorney in this civil case is denied.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard from Rand v. Rowland and Agyeman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., which requires a showing of exceptional circumstances, including the complexity of the case and the plaintiff's ability to articulate claims. The court found that the plaintiff's limited English proficiency did not constitute an exceptional circumstance, consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent. The denial without prejudice is appropriate as it allows the plaintiff to refile if circumstances change. |
Motion to appoint interpreter denied“Accordingly, the Court will also deny plaintiff’s request for an interpreter.” | agree with court The court correctly identified that there is no statutory authority for the expenditure of public funds to appoint an interpreter in a civil action. This is a well-established principle in federal courts, which generally do not have the budget or statutory mandate to provide interpreters for civil litigants, unlike in criminal cases where the right to an interpreter is more clearly defined. |
The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly identifies the lack of a constitutional right to counsel in civil § 1983 cases and the high bar for appointment under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). It properly applies the 'exceptional circumstances' test from Rand and Agyeman, concluding that the plaintiff's language barrier alone does not meet this threshold. The denial of the interpreter request is also legally correct, as federal courts generally lack the statutory authority and funding to provide interpreters in civil litigation. The order cites sufficient authority to support its conclusions.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RICARDO VALDEZ, Case No.: 20-CV-736-JLS(WVG)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 13 v. PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 14 DR. ZHANG, 15 Defendant. [Doc. No. 20] 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks appointment of an attorney or, in 18 the alternative, an interpreter. Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. 19 I. APPLICABLE LAW 20 “There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action.” Rand v. 21 Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (partially overruled en banc on other 22 grounds). Thus, federal courts do not have the authority “to make coercive appointments 23 of counsel.” Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United States v. 24 $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995). 25 Districts courts do have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 26 1915(e)(1), to request that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of 27 exceptional circumstances. See Agyeman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th 28 Cir. 2004). “A finding of the exceptional circumstances of the plaintiff seeking assistance 1 requires at least an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and 2 an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of 3 the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 4 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th 5 Cir. 1991). 6 The Court agrees that any pro se litigant “would be better served with the assistance 7 of counsel.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. However, so long as a pro se litigant, like Plaintiff in 8 this case, is able to “articulate his claims against the relative complexity of the matter,” the 9 exceptional circumstances which might require the appointment of counsel do not exist. 10 Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (finding no abuse of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when 11 district court denied appointment of counsel despite fact that pro se prisoner “may well 12 have fared better-particularly in the realms of discovery and the securing of expert 13 testimony”). 14 II. DISCUSSION 15 Plaintiff’s motion states: “[These] Proceedings has been Litigated by the help of 16 another prisoner. Plaintiff dont speak English well. His Primary language is Spanish 17 (Cuban). Plaintiff would Preferred to be Assigned Attorney. But if He cant Get attorney he 18 would then ask to be appointed a Translator.” (Doc. No. 20 at 1 (all errors in original).) 19 However, limited English proficiency is “not an exceptional circumstance.” Jongpil Park 20 v. Kitt, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54998, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2021); Reyes v. Ortega, 21 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165542, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2016); Garces v. Degadeo, 22 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40582, 2007 WL 1521078, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2007). 23 Plaintiff’s request for an attorney in this civil case is denied. 24 Additionally, the Court is unaware of any statute authorizing the expenditure of 25 public funds for a court-appointed interpreter in a civil action. See Ruiz v. Shearer, 2021 26 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41075, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2021); Loyola v. Potter, 2009 U.S. Dist. 27 LEXIS 36179, 2009 WL 1033398, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2009) (“The court is not 28 authorized to appoint interpreters for litigants in civil cases, and, moreover, has no funds 1 || to pay for such a program.”’). Accordingly, the Court will also deny plaintiff’s request for 2 || an interpreter. 3 Petitioner’s request for appointment of counsel and interpreter is DENIED without 4 || prejudice. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: April 6, 2021 : Se 7 Hon. William V. Gallo 9 United States Magistrate Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28