Skylar v. Saul
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Michael M. Anello (author)
Analysis
The court considered a joint motion by the plaintiff and defendant for attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) following a sentence four remand in a Social Security disability case. The court granted the motion, awarding the plaintiff $2,514.25 in attorney's fees and $400.00 in costs.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Grant of joint motion for attorney's fees and costs“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the parties’ joint motion and AWARDS Plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,514.25 and costs in the amount of $400.00.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the EAJA framework. It established that the plaintiff was a prevailing party due to the sentence four remand, cited *Akopyan v. Barnhart* for this proposition. It determined the motion was timely by applying the 60-day appeal period for cases involving the United States, citing *Hoa Hong Van v. Barnhart*. It verified the hourly rate did not exceed the Ninth Circuit's 2019 statutory maximum of $205.25 and found the total hours reasonable given the work performed. The decision follows logically from the cited authorities and the stipulated facts. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally and substantively sound. It correctly identifies the plaintiff as a prevailing party, applies the correct timeliness standard for EAJA claims in Social Security cases, and verifies the fee amount against the statutory maximum. The reasoning is concise but complete for a stipulated fee motion.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HELEN SKYLAR, Case No. 19cv1581-MMA (NLS)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING JOINT 13 v. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL 14 ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT Social Security, 15 Defendant. [Doc. No. 22] 16 17 18 19 20 21 On August 22, 2019, Plaintiff Helen Skylar filed a complaint against the 22 Commissioner of Social Security, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision 23 denying her application for disability benefits. See Doc. No. 1. The parties jointly 24 moved to remand the action to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings 25 pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Doc. No. 20. The Court granted the 26 motion and remanded the action to the Social Security Administration for further 27 administrative proceedings consistent with the terms set forth in the parties’ joint motion. 28 See Doc. No. 21. The parties now stipulate to and jointly move for an award to Plaintiff 1 of attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,514.25 under the Equal Access to Justice Act 2 (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), and costs in the amount of $400.00 pursuant to 28 3 U.S.C. § 1920. See Doc. No. 22. 4 The EAJA allows a prevailing party to seek attorney’s fees from the United States 5 within thirty days of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). “A plaintiff who obtains a 6 sentence four remand is considered a prevailing party for purposes of attorneys’ fees.” 7 Akopyan v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 2002). Therefore, Plaintiff is the 8 prevailing party in this action for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees. “A sentence four 9 remand becomes a final judgment, for purposes of attorneys’ fees claims brought 10 pursuant to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), upon expiration of the time for appeal.” Id. 11 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(B) provides for a sixty-day appeal period in 12 cases in which the United States is a party or a United States officer or employee is sued 13 in an official capacity. As such, there is a “final judgment” and the parties’ joint motion 14 is timely. See Hoa Hong Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600, 608 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding 15 that “a successful disability applicant may file for attorneys’ fees 30 days after the 60– 16 day appeal period provided for in Rule 4(a) has run, regardless of the specific form of the 17 court’s judgment, or the particular nature of the government’s non-opposition to or 18 acquiescence in an award of benefits.”). 19 The amount of fees awarded are based upon prevailing market rates for the kind 20 and quality of the services provided. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The hourly rate 21 may not exceed $125 per hour “unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of 22 living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the 23 proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). The Ninth 24 Circuit’s 2019 statutory maximum hourly rate under the EAJA, adjusted for increases in 25 the cost of living, was $205.25. See “Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access 26 to Justice Act,” https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000039 (last 27 accessed 4/27/2020) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(2)(A); Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 28 F.3d 870, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2005); Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6). 1 At an hourly rate of $205.25, the requested fee award represents compensation for 2 approximately 12.25 hours of work performed by Plaintiff’s counsel. The Court finds the 3 || fee request reasonable, particularly in light of the fact that counsel prepared and filed a 4 || motion for summary judgment prior to the government stipulating to remand the action to 5 Commissioner for further administrative proceedings. See Doc. Nos. 16, 20. 6 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the parties’ joint motion and AWARDS 7 || Plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,514.25 and costs in the amount of $400.00. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 DATE: April 28, 2020 Lhd at as attr 10 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28