J.K.J. v. City of San Diego
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- On appeal
- J. J. v. City of San Diego (2021-11-15); J. J. v. City of San Diego (2022-08-02); J. J. v. City of San Diego (2023-02-17); J. J. v. City of San Diego (2024-11-27) — the Ninth Circuit's later ruling on this docket
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
The court considered a petition by Jeremy Hillyer to be appointed as guardian ad litem for minor plaintiff J.K.J. The court denied the petition without prejudice, finding the petition insufficient to establish Hillyer's qualifications or lack of conflict of interest, and directing counsel to either refile with sufficient evidence or demonstrate that Hillyer is a general guardian authorized to sue under Rule 17(c)(1)(A).
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Petition for appointment of Jeremy Hillyer as guardian ad litem for J.K.J. denied without prejudice“Accordingly, the Petition to appoint Jeremy Hillyer as the guardian ad litem for Plaintiff J.K.J. is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.” | agree with court The court correctly identified that a guardian ad litem appointment is a substantive determination requiring evidence of the proposed guardian's suitability and lack of conflict. The petition contained only bare assertions of relationship and residency without supporting declarations or evidence of custody or role in the child's life. The court also correctly noted the potential conflict of interest given the nature of the lawsuit (involving the death of Aleah Jenkins, potentially related to Hillyer). The denial without prejudice, with specific instructions for what is needed to refile, is a procedurally sound and legally appropriate response to an insufficient petition. |
The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly distinguishes between a general guardian and a guardian ad litem, cites appropriate authority for the proposition that GAL appointment is substantive, and identifies specific deficiencies in the petition (lack of evidence, potential conflict of interest). It also correctly identifies the alternative path under Rule 17(c)(1)(A) if the petitioner is actually the general guardian. The reasoning directly addresses the motion and provides clear guidance for the next step.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 J.K.J., individually, and successor in Case No.: 19-CV-2123-CAB-RBB interest to the Deceased, ALEAH 12 JENKINS, by and through his guardian- ORDER REGARDING PETITION 13 ad-litem, JEREMY HILLYER, FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM 14 Plaintiff, 15 v. [Doc. No. 3] 16 CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al., 17 Defendants. 18 19 This matter is before the Court on a petition by Jeremy Hillyer to be appointed as 20 guardian ad litem for minor plaintiff J.K.J. As one district court explained: 21 [A] guardian ad litem is not a general guardian. See, e.g., Bacon v. Mandell, No. 10–5506, 2012 WL 4105088, at *14 n. 21 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2012). A 22 general guardian is “[a] guardian who has general care and control of the 23 ward’s person and estate.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). A guardian ad litem, on the other hand, is “[a] guardian, [usually] a lawyer, 24 appointed by the court to appear in a lawsuit on behalf of an incompetent or 25 minor party.” Id. “Ad litem” means “[f]or the purposes of the suit; pending the suit.” Id.; cf., e.g., Brown v. Alexander, No. 13–01451, 2015 WL 1744331, 26 at *7 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 15, 2015) (“[T]he rules permitting a court to appoint a 27 guardian ad litem exist for precisely the situation in which the child’s interests 28 1 are best served if he or she is represented by someone other than a custodial parent or other general guardian.”). 2 AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Yeager, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1051-52 (E.D. Cal. 2015). The 3 appointment of a guardian ad litem, therefore, “is more than a mere formalism.” Id. 4 (quoting United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Klickitat Cty., 5 State of Wash., 795 F.2d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 1986)). The cursory petition currently before 6 the court, meanwhile, treats it as such and is therefore denied. 7 The sole grounds stated in the petition for Mr. Hillyer’s appointment are that he is 8 J.K.J.’s father, is a resident of San Diego County, and is a responsible adult. Conspicuously 9 absent from the petition is any supporting evidence such as, without limitation, a 10 declaration from Hillyer supporting these statements, or any indication in the petition itself 11 that Hillyer actually has custody of J.K.J. or plays any other role in J.K.J.’s life. The mere 12 fact that Hillyer is J.K.J.’s biological father (assuming that to be the case in the absence of 13 any evidence to the contrary) is not, without more, enough for the Court to find that he is 14 qualified to be J.K.J.’s guardian ad litem. Indeed, the allegations in the complaint raise the 15 prospect that Hillyer, though not himself a party to this lawsuit, conceivably could have a 16 conflict of interest with J.K.J. depending on Hillyer’s relationship with the decedent at the 17 time of her death, which is not clear from the complaint or petition. See generally J. M. v. 18 Liberty Union High Sch. Dist., No. 16-CV-05225-LB, 2016 WL 4942999, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 19 Sept. 16, 2016) (“[I]f the parent has an actual or potential conflict of interest with his [or 20 her] child, the parent has no right to control or influence the child’s litigation.”) (citation 21 omitted). In any event, the Court lacks sufficient information to determine whether Hillyer 22 would be an appropriate guardian ad litem for J.K.J. in this case. 23 Moreover, if Hillyer does have custody of and in fact cares for J.K.J.’s needs, it is 24 unclear why it would be necessary to appoint Mr. Hillyer as guardian ad litem because he 25 therefore would be J.K.J.’s general guardian and could sue on J.K.J.’s behalf under Federal 26 Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)(1)(A). See Doe ex rel. Sisco v. Weed Union Elementary Sch. 27 Dist., No. 2:13-CV-01145-GEB, 2013 WL 2666024, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 12, 2013) 28 1 || (holding that parents’ application for appointment as guardian ad litem was unnecessary, 2 || noting that “Rule 17(c)(1)(A) permits a ‘general guardian’ to sue in federal court on behalf 3 ||of a minor, and a parent is a guardian who may so sue.”) (internal quotation marks and 4 citation omitted); see also Yeager, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 1051-52. 5 Accordingly, the Petition to appoint Jeremy Hillyer as the guardian ad litem for 6 || Plaintiff J.K.J. is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. On or before December 5, 2019, 7 ||counsel for Plaintiff must either: (1) re-file a petition for appointment of Mr. Hillyer or 8 another appropriate adult as guardian ad litem for J.K.J., including sufficient information 9 ||and evidence for the Court to determine the propriety of such an appointment; or (2) file 10 ||sufficient evidence demonstrating that Mr. Hillyer is J.K.J.’s general guardian and 11 |/therefore is authorized to sue on J.K.J.’s behalf under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 17(c)(1)(A). 13 It is SO ORDERED. 14 ||Dated: November 26, 2019 (GR 15 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28