Stroud v. Neuschmid
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- William v. Gallo (author)
Analysis
The court considered a pro se state prisoner's motion to appoint counsel in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. The court denied the motion without prejudice, finding that the petitioner had not demonstrated the exceptional circumstances required for appointment, specifically noting the lack of a showing of likelihood of success on the merits.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to Appoint Counsel Denied Without Prejudice“Petitioner’s request for appointment of counsel is DENIED without prejudice.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard from *Agyeman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am.* and *Rand v. Rowland*, which requires a showing of exceptional circumstances, including an evaluation of the likelihood of success on the merits and the complexity of the legal issues. The court explicitly stated it reviewed the petition and found an insufficient basis to find the petitioner likely to succeed. This is a valid exercise of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. Denying without prejudice is appropriate as the petitioner may refile if circumstances change or if the case progresses to a stage where complexity or merit becomes clearer. |
The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies that there is no constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings and applies the correct statutory and circuit standards for discretionary appointment. The court explicitly applies the *Agyeman*/*Rand* factors, specifically focusing on the likelihood of success on the merits, which is a required component of the 'exceptional circumstances' test. The conclusion that the petitioner failed to meet this burden is supported by the court's review of the petition. The denial without prejudice is procedurally appropriate.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 COLERIDGE B. STROUD, Case No.: 19-CV-924-JLS(WVG) 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 13 v. PREJUDICE PETITIONER’S MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 14 ROBERT NEUSCHMID, Warden, 15 Respondent. [Doc. No. 3.] 16 17 Petitioner moves for appointment of counsel. However, because there is insufficient 18 basis to appoint counsel at this time, Petitioner’s motion is DENIED. 19 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to federal habeas corpus 20 actions by state prisoners. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Chaney v. 21 Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986); Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 22 (9th Cir. 1986). However, financially eligible habeas petitioners seeking relief pursuant to 23 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may obtain representation whenever the court “determines that the 24 interests of justice so require.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) (West 2000); Terrovona v. 25 Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 26 (9th Cir. 1984). In the Ninth Circuit, “[i]ndigent state prisoners applying for habeas relief 27 are not entitled to appointed counsel unless the circumstances of a particular case indicate 28 | || that appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due process violations.” Chaney, 801 F.2d 2 1196; Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728-29. 3 Districts courts do have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 4 ||1915(e)(1), to request that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of 5 || exceptional circumstances. See Agyeman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th 6 || Cir. 2004). “A finding of the exceptional circumstances of the plaintiff seeking assistance 7 requires at least an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff's success on the merits and 8 evaluation of the plaintiffs ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of 9 || the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 10 || 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th 11 1991). 12 The Court agrees that any pro se litigant “would be better served with the assistance 13 counsel.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. However, so long as a pro se litigant, like Plaintiff 14 || in this case, is able to “articulate his claims against the relative complexity of the matter,” 15 || the exceptional circumstances which might require the appointment of counsel do not exist. 16 || Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (finding no abuse of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when 17 || district court denied appointment of counsel despite fact that pro se prisoner “may well 18 ||have fared better-particularly in the realms of discovery and the securing of expert 19 ||/testimony”). The Court has reviewed the Petition and finds there is insufficient basis to 20 ||find that Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits. Accordingly, exceptional 21 ||circumstances for appointment of counsel do not exist. Petitioner’s request for 22 appointment of counsel is DENIED without prejudice. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 Dated: September 4, 2019 Se 25 LA Ss 6 Hon. William V. Gallo United States Magistrate Judge 27 28