Goodwyn v. Belly Up Tavern CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. 37-2009-00061977-CU-PO-NC
- Trial judge
- Jacqueline M. Stern
- Outcome
- reversed — Reversed with directions.
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Judith D. McConnell (author), O'Rourke, Joan K. Irion
Analysis
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), finding insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of causation in a negligence claim. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that substantial evidence supported the jury's conclusion that the defendant's failure to timely respond to a fight was a substantial factor in the plaintiff's injuries.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Granting of Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV) on the element of causation“The trial court agreed that no substantial evidence was presented to support the jury's verdict on the element of causation, granted Belly Up's motion for JNOV and entered judgment in favor of Belly Up.” | de novo | error | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the standard for JNOV, which requires viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and determining if any substantial evidence supports the verdict. The court properly identified that conflicting evidence regarding the duration of the fight and the security response created a factual dispute for the jury, not a matter of law. By relying on the testimony of three witnesses who stated the fight lasted 10 minutes without security intervention, and noting that the defendant's witnesses did not refute the duration of the fight before they arrived, the court correctly found that a reasonable jury could infer causation. The distinction from Saelzler and Nola M. is valid because those cases involved speculative possibilities of prevention, whereas here the evidence supported a direct inference that timely intervention would have lessened the injury. |
Authorities
- relied: Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764 — Establishes the standard for JNOV: the court may grant it only if there is no substantial evidence in support of the verdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict.
- relied: Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62 — Supports the standard of review for JNOV motions, emphasizing that the trial court cannot weigh evidence or judge credibility.
- relied: Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal.3d 104 — Clarifies that if evidence is conflicting or several reasonable inferences may be drawn, a motion for JNOV should be denied.
- relied: Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200 — Defines the elements of negligence, including duty, breach, and causation.
- relied: Saatzer v. Smith (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 512 — Establishes that a tavern keeper has a duty to stop a fight as soon as possible after it starts.
- relied: Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763 — Defines causation as a 'substantial factor' and distinguishes cases where the causal link is speculative versus substantial.
- relied: Noble v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 912 — States that more than 'abstract negligence unconnected to the injury' is required to establish causation.
- relied: Lucas v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 277 — Explains that causation is generally a question for the jury unless reasonable persons could not dispute its absence.
- relied: Nola M. v. University of Southern California (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 421 — Used to distinguish the present case; in Nola M., the causal link between security measures and prevention of assault was found to be speculative.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the high bar for JNOV, recognizing that conflicting evidence regarding the timeline of the security response creates a triable issue of fact. It effectively distinguishes prior cases involving speculative causation by highlighting the specific testimony that the fight continued for a significant duration without intervention, supporting a reasonable inference of causation.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionAfter a jury found Belly Up Tavern 75 percent liable for injuries Goodwyn suffered in a fight at its venue and awarded $90,000, the trial court granted Belly Up's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict for lack of substantial evidence of causation, entered judgment for Belly Up, and denied Belly Up's alternative new trial motion as moot. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that testimony that the fight lasted about 10 minutes with no security response, combined with Belly Up's own expert's concession that a response should have come within 60 seconds, was substantial evidence from which the jury could infer causation, and directed reinstatement of the verdict.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that no substantial evidence supported the jury's finding of causation“It was reasonable for the jury to find that had Belly Up's staff intervened (at all, or earlier) the injuries would have been lessened or prevented altogether. The trial court erred by overturning the jury's verdict.” | substantial evidence | error (fact finding unsupported) | agree with court Under Cabral and Hauter, JNOV is proper only when, viewing the evidence most favorably to the verdict, no substantial evidence supports it, and the trial court may not weigh evidence or resolve credibility. Three witnesses testified the fight lasted roughly 10 minutes and that security never responded; Belly Up's witnesses did not establish how long the fight had gone on before they noticed it; and Belly Up's own expert conceded an adequate response would occur within one minute and that on plaintiff's version staff was 'laying down on the job.' That evidence supports a reasonable inference that earlier intervention would have reduced or prevented the beating, which is more than the speculative links rejected in Saelzler and Nola M. The appellate court correctly applied the substantial-factor standard and the rule that causation is ordinarily a jury question. |
Denial of Belly Up's alternative motion for new trial as moot in light of the JNOV ruling; Belly Up's request that the appellate court direct reconsideration of that motion“Belly Up, however, has not appealed the court's ruling.” | unclear | not reached | unsure The court declined in a footnote to direct reconsideration of the new trial motion because Belly Up did not appeal, and the disposition directs entry of judgment on the verdict. The opinion does not discuss Code of Civil Procedure section 629's requirement that the trial court rule on both the JNOV and new trial motions at the same time, nor whether a 'moot' denial satisfies that requirement or whether a respondent must cross-appeal to preserve a conditional new trial ruling. Without that analysis, and without the briefing, I cannot say whether the court's refusal to remand for a ruling on the new trial motion (which raised excessive damages) was correct. |
Authorities
- relied: Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764 — JNOV may be granted only if, viewing the evidence most favorably to the verdict winner, there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict; the same standard governs on appeal.
- relied: Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62 — Source of the substantial-evidence standard for JNOV quoted in Cabral.
- relied: Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal.3d 104 — On a JNOV motion the trial court cannot weigh evidence or judge credibility; if evidence conflicts or several reasonable inferences may be drawn, the motion should be denied.
- relied: Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200 — Elements of negligence: duty, breach, and causation of injury.
- relied: Saatzer v. Smith (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 512 — A tavern keeper's duty to protect patrons from third parties includes the duty to stop a fight as soon as possible after it starts.
- relied: Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763 — Plaintiff must show defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury; evidence showing only a speculative possibility that additional security would have prevented an assault is insufficient.
- relied: Noble v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 912 — Abstract negligence unconnected to the injury does not establish causation.
- relied: Lucas v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 277 — Causation is generally a jury question unless reasonable persons could not dispute the absence of causation.
- relied: Nola M. v. University of Southern California (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 421 — Causation is too speculative where plaintiff fails to show that increased security measures could have prevented the assault; distinguished here.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly applied the deferential JNOV standard from Cabral and Hauter, identified specific testimony (10-minute fight, no response, expert concession of a 60-second response standard) supporting an inference of causation, and properly distinguished Saelzler and Nola M. as involving far more speculative causal links. It disposed of the new trial issue in a footnote without addressing Code of Civil Procedure section 629's requirement of simultaneous rulings or the status of a new trial motion denied only as moot, leaving the excessive-damages claim unaddressed.
Opinion
Filed 3/18/13 Goodwyn v. Belly Up Tavern CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
KOREY GOODWYN, D060680
Plaintiff and Appellant, v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2009-00061977- CU-PO-NC) BELLY UP TAVERN, LLC, Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Jacqueline M. Stern, Judge. Reversed with directions.
After a four-day trial, a jury found Belly Up Tavern, LLC (Belly Up) negligent in failing to prevent injuries sustained by Kory Goodwyn in a fight at Belly Up's concert venue and bar in Solana Beach, California. Belly Up moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), contending there was insufficient evidence to support the element of causation in Goodwyn's negligence claim. The trial court granted the motion, reversing the jury's verdict, and entered judgment in favor of Belly Up. Goodwyn appeals, contending there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the jury's finding that Goodwyn's injuries were caused by Belly Up's breach of duty. We agree and reverse the judgment.
BACKGROUND
On August 10, 2009, Goodwyn and Eddie Haynes attended a hip-hop concert at Belly Up. During one of the opening acts, Goodwyn and Haynes were standing near the bar and were approached by a group of seven other concertgoers. A man in the group (the aggressor) looked at Haynes and without provocation said, "What you looking at, nigger?" Haynes responded, "You need to go on with this stuff. I'm not here for this."
After this exchange, a companion of the aggressor intervened to diffuse the situation and he and the aggressor stepped away from Haynes and Goodwyn. Goodwyn looked for a security guard or bartender to intervene. He saw the only bartender on duty that night at the other end of the bar, but could not get his attention. Another concertgoer, Kimberly Handy, who met Haynes and Goodwyn for the first time at the concert and witnessed the exchange, also unsuccessfully attempted to flag down the bartender.
A total of 10 security guards were on duty the night of the incident, three of whom were employed by an outside security company and stationed in the parking lot. Of the seven guards inside, two manned the entrance to check tickets and identification, one monitored the VIP section and one was responsible for the smoking section. One of the remaining three guards, James Phillips, was stationed at the bar where the initial exchange involving Haynes occurred. Near the time of that initial exchange, however, 2 Phillips had moved away from the bar and was positioned near the stage to assist with a verbal altercation between a performer and members of the audience.
A minute or so after the initial exchange with Haynes, the aggressor and his companions returned and the aggressor instigated another argument with Haynes. The aggressor threw a punch at Haynes and the two fell into a brawl on the floor. Goodwyn attempted to come to Haynes's aid but was grabbed from behind, held to the ground and repeatedly punched and kicked by the aggressor's friends. Haynes testified that the attack seemed to last "an eternity," and Goodwyn testified that the fight seemed to last for eight to 10 minutes. Handy similarly recalled the entire incident lasting about 10 minutes.
Goodwyn and Handy testified that the fight was not broken up by security guards and ended only when the aggressor and his companions walked away. Haynes testified the fight was broken up by bystanders and that Belly Up's security guards did not respond to the altercation.
In contrast to the testimonies of Goodwyn, Haynes and Handy, the bartender testified that once he saw the fight he signaled to Phillips, who made his way over and broke up the fight with the assistance of three other security guards. The bartender believed it took Phillips less than 50 seconds to move from his position near the stage to the fight. Phillips testified that once he saw the fight from his position near the stage, he immediately made his way to the location of the fight and broke it up. Another Belly Up employee who was not working but was attending the concert witnessed the fight and also testified Belly Up security ended the altercation.
3 After the incident ended, Haynes and Goodwyn left the building and asked security guards stationed outside to call the police. Haynes and Goodwyn went to their cars in the parking lot, assessed the situation and their injuries and left. Goodwyn sustained physical injuries including large red lumps on the back of his skull, a black eye, and swelling over the majority of his head, as well as ongoing headaches and difficulty sleeping. Goodwyn, his mother and sister, and Haynes testified Goodwyn's demeanor after the incident changed from a young man who enjoyed concerts to someone scared and uncomfortable to be in crowded places.
Both parties presented expert testimony on the standard of care applicable to Belly Up. Goodwyn's expert opined the venue was understaffed with respect to security personnel the night of the incident, there was inadequate supervision of the security staff and the security staff was not properly trained. Goodwyn's expert also testified he believed Goodwyn's and Haynes's estimate of the length of time the fight lasted was overstated, and estimated the fight probably lasted between two and four minutes. Belly Up's rebuttal expert testified that the venue was adequately staffed, but conceded that if the version of events presented by Goodwyn was accepted, the conduct of Belly Up's security staff fell below the acceptable standard of care. He also testified that an adequate response to a fight would have occurred within one minute of its start.
After a four-day trial, the jury found in Goodwyn's favor, awarding him $90,000 in general damages and attributing 75 percent of the liability to Belly Up and 25 percent to the unknown assailants. Belly Up moved for JNOV, arguing Goodwyn failed to 4 introduce any evidence showing Belly Up's conduct caused the harm to Goodwyn. 1 The trial court agreed that no substantial evidence was presented to support the jury's verdict on the element of causation, granted Belly Up's motion for JNOV and entered judgment in favor of Belly Up.
DISCUSSION
The court may grant a JNOV " 'only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there is no substantial evidence in support.' " (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 770, quoting Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62, 68.) The trial court "cannot weigh the evidence [citation], or judge the credibility of witnesses. [Citation.] If the evidence is conflicting or if several reasonable inferences may be drawn, the motion for [JNOV] should be denied." (Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal.3d 104, 110.) " 'As in the trial court, the standard of review [on appeal] is whether any substantial evidence— contradicted or uncontradicted—supports the jury's conclusion.' [Citation.]" (Cabral, at p. 770.)
To establish Belly Up's negligence, Goodwyn was required to show Belly Up owed a duty to Goodwyn, breached that duty and the breach was the cause of that injury.
(Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205.) The duty of a tavern keeper to protect its patrons from injury by third parties arises in a number of circumstances, 1 Belly Up also moved in the alternative for a new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficent to justify the jury's verdict and that the award of damages was excessive. The trial court denied the motion as moot in light of its ruling on the JNOV. 5 including the tavern keeper's failure to " 'stop a fight as soon as possible after it start[s].' "
(Saatzer v. Smith (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 512, 518.) Belly Up does not dispute that it owed a duty to Goodwyn and that Goodwyn presented adequate evidence of a breach of this duty. Belly Up argues only that Goodwyn did not present sufficient evidence that its breach—including failure to timely respond to the fight once it began—caused Goodwyn's injuries.
A plaintiff is not required to establish causation with certainty. Instead, the plaintiff must show that that the defendant's conduct was a " 'substantial factor' in bringing about the injury." (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 774 (Saelzler).) More than "abstract negligence unconnected to the injury" is required.
(Noble v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 912, 916.) The question of what would have happened had the defendant acted otherwise, however, by its nature involves an element of assumption. "Causation is generally a question for the jury unless reasonable persons could not dispute the absence of causation, in which case it may be treated as a question of law." (Lucas v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 277, 289.)
Although there was contradictory evidence presented with respect to Belly Up's response to the altercation, the jury heard testimony from which it could reasonably conclude that Belly Up staff was aware, or should have been aware, of the fight but failed to timely respond. Three witnesses stated that the fight lasted approximately 10 minutes and that Belly Up's security guards never responded, with the fight ending only when the perpetrators eventually walked away. Although Belly Up presented evidence that its staff 6 broke up the fight, its witnesses did not directly refute Goodwyn's evidence concerning the length of the fight. While the bartender stated Phillips responded to the fight less than one minute after the bartender noticed the physical altercation, neither the bartender nor Phillips testified as to how long the altercation had been going on when they noticed it.
Belly Up's own expert testified that if Goodwyn's, Haynes's and Handy's versions of events were believed, then Belly Up was "laying down on the job," and security should have responded to the fight within 60 seconds of it erupting.
Unlike Saelzler and Nola M. v. University of Southern California (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 421 (Nola M.), where causation was held to be tenuous or speculative, the facts here provide the requisite "substantial evidence" of causation.2 Belly Up's failure to respond at all to the fight, or failure to respond in a timely manner, supports an inference that this conduct was a substantial factor resulting in Goodwyn's injuries. It was reasonable for the jury to find that had Belly Up's staff intervened (at all, or earlier) the 2 In Saelzler, the California Supreme Court held that summary judgment was proper where the plaintiff failed to adequately show that an apartment complex owner's failure to provide certain security measures was a substantial cause of her assault by unknown assailants. The court concluded the plaintiff's evidence "merely shows the speculative possibility that additional daytime security guards and/or functioning security gates might have prevented the assault." (Saelzler, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 781, italics added.) Likewise, in Nola M., the court found the plaintiff failed to present evidence that increased security measures by the defendant university could have prevented a sexual assault of the plaintiff that occurred on campus. (Nola M., supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at pp. 436-439.) In both of these cases, the causal link between the injury and the property owner's breach of duty was more speculative than the link between Belly Up's conduct (i.e., failing to stop the fight as soon as possible) and Goodwyn's injuries.
7 injuries would have been lessened or prevented altogether. The trial court erred by overturning the jury's verdict.3
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed with directions to reinstate the jury verdict and enter judgment accordingly. Plaintiff is awarded costs on appeal.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE, J.
IRION, J.
3 In its respondent's brief, Belly Up requests we direct the trial court to reconsider its motion for a new trial, which was denied as moot in light of the trial court's ruling on the JNOV. Belly Up, however, has not appealed the court's ruling. 8
Cites, in this corpus
- Ortega v. Kmart Corp. No. S091888 · 2001-12-20
- Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 S085736 · 2001-05-31
- Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs S086696 · 2001-03-08
- Lucas v. County of Los Angeles B091484 · 1996-07-09
- NOLA M. v. University of Southern California B059833 · 1993-06-09
- Noble v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc. B009809 · 1985-05-30
- Saatzer v. Smith Civ. 60899 · 1981-08-12
- Hauter v. Zogarts L.A. 30216 · 1975-04-28