People v. Tyler CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD278227
- Trial judge
- Polly H. Shamoon
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed and remanded with directions.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Cynthia Aaron, Truc T. Do
Analysis
The trial court accepted a plea agreement resulting in an 11-year sentence based on the upper term, imposed a criminal justice administration fee, and failed to dismiss remaining charges as stipulated. The Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence, rejecting the argument that Senate Bill 567 required reconsideration of the upper term in a stipulated plea, but remanded to vacate the fee and dismiss the remaining charges.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Sentence based on upper term under plea agreement“The trial court had discretion to accept or reject the agreement but did not have discretion to modify it. Thus, Senate Bill 567 does not provide relief for this case.” | unclear | correct | agree with court agree with court |
Imposition of $154 criminal justice administration fee“We agree with the parties that the appropriate remedy is to vacate any balance of the fee that remains unpaid as of July 1, 2021 and amend the judgment.” | de novo | error | agree with court agree with court |
Failure to dismiss remaining charges per plea agreement“We will accept the agreement and remand with directions.” | de novo | error | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 — Retroactive application of ameliorative legislation to pending appeals.
- relied: People v. Blount (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 992 — Trial court has discretion to accept or reject a plea agreement but not to modify it.
- relied: People v. King (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 783 — Trial court has discretion to accept or reject a plea agreement but not to modify it.
The appellate opinion: sound — sound
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe San Diego Superior Court accepted a plea agreement under which Tyler pleaded guilty to arson and admitted a strike and a serious felony prior, imposed the stipulated 11-year sentence built on the upper term, imposed a $154 criminal justice administration fee under Government Code section 29550.1, and left the remaining charges undismissed. The Court of Appeal held Senate Bill 567 afforded no relief because the upper term was a stipulated plea term the court could only accept or reject, vacated the unpaid balance of the repealed fee, remanded with directions to dismiss the remaining charges and allegations, and otherwise affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of the stipulated upper-term-based 11-year sentence under the plea agreement, challenged on appeal under retroactive Senate Bill 567 (section 1170, subdivision (b)(2))“The trial court had discretion to accept or reject the agreement but did not have discretion to modify it.” | de novo | correct | unsure The court reasoned that SB 567 limits a sentencing court's discretion to select the upper term, and no such discretion was exercised where the upper term was a stipulated term the court could only accept or reject (citing Blount and King). The result is defensible, and the defendant's admitted prior conviction and stipulation arguably satisfy section 1170(b)(2)-(3) in any event, but the court did not address People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, in which the Supreme Court held Estrada retroactivity reaches stipulated plea sentences and fashioned a remand remedy that lets the People withdraw from the bargain. Because the question whether SB 567 applies to stipulated upper terms was unsettled and the opinion did not engage the leading Supreme Court authority, I cannot say the ruling is clearly correct or clearly wrong. |
Imposition of the $154 criminal justice administration fee under Government Code section 29550.1“We agree with the parties that the appropriate remedy is to vacate any balance of the fee that remains unpaid as of July 1, 2021 and amend the judgment.” | de novo | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court The fee was lawful when imposed, but Assembly Bill No. 1869 repealed the authorizing statute and made any unpaid balance uncollectible as of July 1, 2021; the parties agreed and the court vacated the unpaid balance. This is a supervening legislative change rather than a trial court mistake, and the remedy matches the statute's terms. |
Failure to dismiss the remaining charges and allegations as required by the plea agreement“The final claim Tyler makes is that the remaining charges should be dismissed in accordance with the plea agreement. Once again, the People agree.” | unclear | error (procedure) | agree with court The plea agreement called for dismissal of the remaining counts, the record as described shows they were not dismissed, and the People conceded. Remand with directions to dismiss and amend the abstract is the appropriate remedy to enforce the bargain. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 — Ameliorative sentencing legislation applies retroactively to cases not yet final on appeal absent a contrary legislative intent.
- relied: People v. Blount (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 992 — A trial court may accept or reject a negotiated plea agreement but may not unilaterally modify its terms.
- relied: People v. King (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 783 — A stipulated sentence under a plea agreement is not a product of the court's sentencing discretion and cannot be altered by the court without the parties' consent.
- missed: People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 — Estrada retroactivity extends to defendants sentenced under plea agreements with stipulated terms; the proper remedy is remand to allow the defendant to seek relief under the new law, with the prosecution free to withdraw from the plea if the court grants it.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion reaches a defensible result on SB 567 by reasoning that the new limits on upper-term discretion do not reach a stipulated term the court could only accept or reject, and it correctly resolves the conceded fee and dismissal issues. It does not, however, address People v. Stamps, the controlling Supreme Court decision on applying retroactive ameliorative legislation to stipulated plea sentences, and does not acknowledge the then-developing split on SB 567 and stipulated sentences.
Opinion
Filed 7/15/22 P. v. Tyler CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D078771
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD278227)
ERIC LEWIS TYLER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions. Deanna L. Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christine Y. Friedman, and Eric A. Swenson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Eric Lewis Tyler entered into a plea agreement under which he pleaded guilty to one count of arson (Pen. Code,1 § 451 subd. (d)). Tyler also admitted one serious felony prior conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and one strike prior (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The plea agreement included a stipulated sentence of 11 years. The agreed sentence was comprised of the upper term of three years for arson, doubled by the strike prior plus five years for the serious felony prior. The remaining charges were to be dismissed. The court sentenced Tyler to an 11-year term consistent with the plea agreement. The court also imposed various fines and fees. One of the fees was a $154 criminal justice administration fee under Government Code section 29550.1. Tyler filed a timely notice of appeal and requested a certificate of probable cause. The request was denied. In his opening brief, Tyler challenged the criminal justice administration fee (which has already been repealed) and argued the remaining charges should be dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. The People responded essentially agreeing with Tyler. While this case has been pending, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 567 (Senate Bill 567), which amended section 1170 by making the middle term the presumptive term and restricted the trial court’s discretion in selecting the upper term. Because the sentence in this case is based on the upper term for the offense, we ordered supplemental briefing on the effect of Senate Bill 567 on this appeal. Tyler argues we should remand the case to reconsider the upper term sentence. We will decline to remand because this stipulated sentence was 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal code unless otherwise specified. 2 part of a plea agreement. The trial court had discretion to accept or reject the agreement but did not have discretion to modify it. Thus, Senate Bill 567 does not provide relief for this case. We will remand the case to allow the trial court to dismiss the remaining charges and vacate the criminal justice administration fee. In all other respects, we will affirm the judgment.2 DISCUSSION A. Senate Bill 567 Senate Bill 567 became effective January 1, 2022. It placed limitations on the trial court’s discretion to select an upper term sentence by adding section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). The parties agree the legislation applies retroactively to Tyler’s case. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.) The People contend Senate Bill 567 does not aid Tyler. His sentence was not a result of the trial court’s discretion in selecting the upper term. Instead, the sentence was the product of a plea agreement with a stipulated sentence, which the court could either accept or reject, but not modify. (People v. Blount (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 992, 997; People v. King (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 783, 789-791.) The limitations on discretion in Senate Bill 567 are not directed to the trial court’s discretion to accept or reject a plea agreement with a stipulated sentence, thus the modifications to sentencing discretion are not relevant to Tyler’s agreed sentence. B. Remaining contentions Tyler first contends the $154 criminal justice administration fee the court imposed must be vacated due to a legislative change made since the 2 The facts of the offense are not relevant to the issues raised on this appeal. We will omit a statement of facts. 3 sentencing. The People agree the fee must be vacated in light of Assembly Bill No. 1869, which repealed this fee and found no uncollected balance can now be collected. We agree with the parties that the appropriate remedy is to vacate any balance of the fee that remains unpaid as of July 1, 2021 and amend the judgment.
4 The final claim Tyler makes is that the remaining charges should be dismissed in accordance with the plea agreement. Once again, the People agree. We will accept the agreement and remand with directions. DISPOSITION The portion of the sentence that imposed a criminal justice administration fee of $154 that remains unpaid as of July 1, 2021 is vacated. The trial court is directed to dismiss any charges or allegations, which were not admitted as part of the plea agreement. The superior court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the changes and forward the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
AARON, J.
DO, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Blount D052147 · 2009-07-14
- In Re Estrada Crim. 8524 · 1965-12-23