People v. Stonebreaker CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCN349682
- Trial judge
- Michael J. Popkins
- Outcome
- modified — Affirmed as modified and remanded with directions.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith D. McConnell, Cynthia Aaron
Analysis
The trial court imposed probation conditions requiring the defendant to obtain probation officer approval for her residence and employment without discussion or factual basis. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment as modified, striking the conditions as unconstitutionally overbroad and remanding for correction.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of probation condition requiring P.O. approval of residence and employment“we find Stonebraker has not forfeited the challenge to the two probation conditions and that the conditions are impermissibly overbroad as they limit protected rights without any demonstrated nexus to either the crime or the defendant's rehabilitation.” | de novo | error | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 — Failure to object to a probation condition is not forfeited if the condition is unconstitutional and correctable without reference to factual findings in the record.
- relied: People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889 — Challenges to the constitutionality of probation conditions are reviewed independently by the appellate court.
- relied: People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228 — Ordinarily, failure to object to a proposed condition of probation amounts to a forfeiture of the issue on appeal.
- relied: People v. Burden (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1277 — A probation condition restricting employment is improper if it bears no relationship to the crime or the defendant's rehabilitation.
- relied: People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 — Courts may impose probation conditions unless they have no relationship to the crime, relate to non-criminal conduct, and are not reasonably related to future criminality.
- relied: People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937 — A probation condition requiring P.O. approval of residence is an improper restriction on the right to travel and freedom of association if not narrowly drawn to prevent recidivism.
- relied: People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238 — Probation officers need substantial discretion to supervise persons placed on probation.
- relied: People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615 — Probation officer discretion can, in appropriate cases, limit otherwise lawful activity that might lead to continued criminal conduct.
The appellate opinion: sound — sound
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court placed Stonebraker on probation after her guilty plea to corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and, without objection or discussion, imposed condition 10g requiring probation officer approval of her residence and employment. The Court of Appeal held the unobjected-to challenge was not forfeited under In re Sheena K., found the condition overbroad because nothing in the record tied residence or employment to the offense or rehabilitation, struck the condition, and otherwise affirmed with directions to modify the probation order.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Whether Stonebraker's failure to object in the trial court forfeited her appellate challenge to the residence and employment approval condition“Since there are no factual findings, or even discussion of the challenged conditions in the record, we believe we are bound to follow In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th 875, and find the challenge to the residence and employment approval has not been forfeited.” | de novo | not reached | unsure Sheena K. excuses forfeiture only for facial constitutional challenges presenting pure questions of law resolvable without reference to the sentencing record, and it expressly cautioned that not every constitutional challenge qualifies. The court here treated the absence of findings as the reason the exception applies, and then decided the merits by examining the probation report, the defendant's disability and unemployment, and the restraining order. That is a record-dependent Lent/nexus inquiry of the type Welch holds is forfeited without objection, so the forfeiture reasoning is in tension with the very authorities cited, though the ultimate question is debatable. |
Imposition of probation condition 10g requiring probation officer approval of residence and employment“In the present case there is nothing in the record, including the probation officer's report, which could justify restriction on employment or residence.” | de novo | error (discretion) | agree with court Residence and employment approval conditions burden the rights to travel, associate, and pursue lawful work, and Burden and Bauer struck comparable conditions lacking any connection to the offense or rehabilitation. On this record the condition was a checked box with no explanation, the victim-contact concern was addressed by an unchallenged restraining order, and the defendant was disabled and unemployed, so striking the condition is a defensible result. The court did not, however, engage People v. Olguin, which holds that conditions facilitating probation supervision can be reasonably related to future criminality and presumes the officer will exercise discretion reasonably; addressing it would have strengthened the analysis. |
Authorities
- misapplied: In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 — Failure to object does not forfeit a facial constitutional challenge to a probation condition that presents a pure question of law correctable without reference to the sentencing record; the court cautioned that not all constitutional challenges fit this exception. The opinion invoked the exception but resolved the merits by reference to record facts.
- relied: People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228 — Failure to object to a probation condition as unreasonable under Lent forfeits the claim on appeal.
- relied: People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 — A probation condition is invalid if it has no relationship to the crime, relates to conduct not itself criminal, and is not reasonably related to future criminality.
- relied: People v. Burden (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1277 — An employment restriction bearing no relationship to the crime or to rehabilitation is an improper limitation on the right to engage in lawful employment.
- relied: People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937 — A condition requiring probation officer approval of residence that is not narrowly drawn impermissibly restricts the right to travel and freedom of association.
- relied: People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889 — Constitutional challenges resting on undisputed facts are reviewed independently.
- relied: People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238 — Probation officers need substantial discretion to supervise probationers and a condition requiring compliance with the officer's reasonable directives is valid.
- missed: People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 — A probation condition that enables the probation officer to supervise compliance with other conditions is reasonably related to future criminality under Lent, and courts presume the officer will exercise discretion in a reasonable manner.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The result—striking an unexplained check-the-box condition burdening residence and employment choices on a record showing no nexus to the offense—is defensible under Burden and Bauer. The opinion is thin, however, in treating the lack of trial court findings as the reason Sheena K. applies while deciding the merits on record facts, and it does not address the Supreme Court's decision in Olguin on supervisory conditions and probation officer discretion.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
inconsistent with cited authorityOpinion
Filed 7/26/16 P. v. Stonebreaker CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D069260
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN349682)
JENNIFER STONEBRAKER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael J.
Popkins, Judge. Affirmed as modified and remanded with directions.
Stephen M. Vasil, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Annie Featherman Fraser, and Christine Levingston Bergman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. As part of a plea agreement, Jennifer Stonebraker entered a guilty plea to one count of corporal injury to a cohabitant (Pen. Code,1 § 273.5, subd. (a)). The remaining counts and allegations were dismissed.
Stonebraker was granted probation subject to a number of terms and conditions.
Stonebraker's application for a certificate of probable cause was denied. (§ 1237.5.) She thereafter filed a notice of appeal challenging her sentence.
Although she did not object to any of the proposed conditions of probation Stonebraker now contends two conditions are unconstitutionally overbroad. On appeal she contends the condition requiring her to get the probation officer's approval of her residence and her employment improperly restrict her rights of freedom of movement and association. Stonebraker further contends that her failure to object in the trial court does not amount to forfeiture because the conditions restrict a constitutional right and can be reviewed on the record without reference to the facts of the case. (In re Sheena K. (2007)
After reviewing the record, we find Stonebraker has not forfeited the challenge to the two probation conditions and that the conditions are impermissibly overbroad as they limit protected rights without any demonstrated nexus to either the crime or the defendant's rehabilitation.2 Accordingly, we will modify the judgment to strike the 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
2 Appellant also argues that if we find forfeiture, we must find trial counsel was ineffective. Since we do not apply forfeiture here, we will not discuss the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 2 challenged conditions. We will remand the case to the superior court with directions to modify its order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 1, 2015, Stonebraker and her boyfriend, Wayne Bowling, were in their apartment. Stonebraker began pushing Bowling, which caused him to fall over backwards and hit his head. Bowling was unconscious for an unknown period of time.
DISCUSSION
Without objection, the trial court imposed a condition of probation that Stonebraker get approval from the probation officer of her employment and her residence. The challenged condition was not discussed by the court, and it is not addressed in the body of the probation report. What we can glean from the probation report is that Stonebraker is disabled due to her mental condition, receives disability payments and has not been employed since 2013. There is no discussion in the report about concerns regarding any choice of residence she might make. The court did issue a restraining order to prevent the defendant from contacting the victim.
A. Legal Principles We independently review a challenge to the constitutionality of probation conditions. (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 899-902; In re Shaun R. (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143.)
Ordinarily, failure to object to a proposed condition of probation amounts to a forfeiture of the issue on appeal. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234-235.) The court has recognized an exception to forfeiture in cases where the imposition of an 3 unconstitutional probation condition is "correctable without referring to factual findings in the record or remanding for further findings . . . ." (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 887.)
Since there are no factual findings, or even discussion of the challenged conditions in the record, we believe we are bound to follow In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th 875, and find the challenge to the residence and employment approval has not been forfeited.
Turning to the validity of the current restrictions, several cases have addressed the issues. In People v. Burden (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1277, 1281 (Burden), this court addressed a restriction that limited certain types of employment for the defendant. We observed that People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, permits courts to impose probation conditions unless they have no relationship to the crime for which the defendant was convicted, relates to conduct that is not itself criminal, and requires or forbids conduct that is not reasonably related to future criminality. (Burden, supra, at p. 1279.)
In Burden, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d 1277, we determined that the restriction on employment was an improper limitation on the right of the defendant to engage in lawful employment as it bore no relationship to the crime or the defendant's rehabilitation. (Id.
at p. 1280.)
In People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937, 944, the court found a probation condition, which required the defendant to seek the probation officer's approval of residence, was an improper restriction on the right to travel and freedom of association.
4 The court held the condition was not narrowly drawn to balance the need to prevent recidivism as opposed to the exercise of the right to engage in otherwise lawful behavior.
B. Analysis We recognize probation officers need substantial discretion in order to supervise persons who have been placed on probation following conviction. (People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238.) Such discretion can, in an appropriate case, limit otherwise lawful activity that might lead the probationer to continue criminal conduct. (People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 626.)
In the present case there is nothing in the record, including the probation officer's report, which could justify restriction on employment or residence. Certainly if a probationer is required to seek approval from the probation officer, that implies the officer could refuse. In this case, there would be no guidance to the probation officer, or to a reviewing court as to why the condition was imposed. Certainly nothing in the record before the trial court would explain the limitation. From all that appears in the record the boxes were checked on the set of conditions without discussion or explanation.
Stonebraker has apparently not been employed for some time. She suffers from a mental disability for which she receives monthly income. As to her residence, the only concern, which would be apparent from the record, would be a possible proximity to the victim. However, the court issued a restraining order preventing contact, which is not challenged on this appeal.
Since location of residence and choice of employment are otherwise lawful activities, treated as fundamental rights, we cannot uphold mere "check-the-box"
5 limitations on such rights without something in the record that justifies limiting otherwise lawful activity.
DISPOSITION
The formal probation order is modified to strike condition 10g. which requires the defendant to "Obtain P.O. approval as to residence [and] employment . . . ." The case is remanded to the trial court with directions to modify the formal probation order consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
AARON, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Shaun R. H035112 · 2010-09-29
- People v. Cromer S076444 · 2001-01-22
- People v. Kwizera No. D033130 · 2000-02-09
- People v. Lopez F028223 · 1998-08-26
- People v. Welch No. S025387 · 1993-05-27
- People v. Bauer A040940 · 1989-06-23
- People v. Burden D006990 · 1988-11-15
- People v. Lent Crim. 17984 · 1975-10-30