In re Kane W. CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. J236505
- Trial judge
- Leo Valentine, Jr.
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- delinquency
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith D. McConnell
Analysis
The juvenile court sustained a petition for misdemeanor vandalism, finding that Kane W. damaged a classmate's car by kicking it or hitting it with his truck door. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that substantial evidence supported the finding despite conflicting testimony regarding the timing of the damage and the credibility of the officer's report.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Sufficiency of evidence supporting the finding of misdemeanor vandalism“We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557 — Establishes the substantial evidence standard of review for sufficiency of evidence challenges.
- relied: People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149 — Appellate courts cannot reweigh evidence or make credibility determinations; they must defer to the trier of fact.
- relied: People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284 — One witness's testimony is substantial evidence unless physically impossible or apparently false.
- relied: People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284 — Supports the principle that credible testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a verdict.
The appellate opinion: sound — sound
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition finding that Kane W. committed misdemeanor vandalism by kicking a classmate's car, crediting the school police officer's account of a student's prior statement over that student's trial recantation and over witnesses who saw no damage in the interim, and placed Kane on probation. On appeal Kane argued the evidence was insufficient, and the Court of Appeal, applying the substantial evidence standard and deferring to the juvenile court's credibility determinations, affirmed the true finding and disposition orders.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
True finding that Kane committed misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594) by kicking Edward's car, based on Officer Fanene's testimony relaying Cole's out-of-court statement“The juvenile court accepted as true Edward's testimony there was damage and accepted Officer Fanene's version of Cole's statement. Accepting that evidence as true, it is sufficient substantial evidence to support the true finding.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court Under Johnson and Young, a reviewing court views the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and does not reweigh credibility; a single witness's believed testimony suffices unless physically impossible or inherently improbable (Scott, Barnes). Cole's prior inconsistent statement, admitted through Fanene, is substantive evidence a trier of fact may credit, and the recantation and intervening-witness testimony presented a credibility conflict for the juvenile court. The result is consistent with People v. Cuevas, which holds that recanted out-of-court statements are evaluated under the ordinary substantial evidence test, though the opinion does not cite it. The opinion's statement that vandalism requires damage of $400 or more misdescribes § 594(b)(1) (that threshold governs punishment level, and this was a misdemeanor petition), but the amount of damage was uncontested and the misstatement does not affect the result. |
Juvenile court's credibility determination crediting Officer Fanene's account over Cole's recantation and over witnesses who saw no damage between the alleged kick and discovery“However, to accept the absence of damage at that time as fact, would require this court to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses who testified to its absence. That determination was for the trial court to make.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court Kane's inherent-improbability argument depended on accepting as true the testimony of witnesses who saw no damage, which would require the appellate court to resolve a credibility conflict in Kane's favor. Young, at page 1181, confines appellate rejection of testimony to that which is physically impossible or inherently improbable on its face, not testimony merely contradicted by other witnesses. Fanene's testimony, while equivocal on cross-examination, affirmatively stated that Cole said he saw the kick and that it caused damage, so it was neither impossible nor facially false. |
Alternative theory that Kane damaged the car by repeatedly opening his truck door into it“However, we need not address this theory, because there is substantial evidence Kane damaged Edward's car by kicking it, which is sufficient to affirm the juvenile court's finding.” | substantial evidence | not reached | agree with court Because a single sufficient theory supports a true finding under the substantial evidence standard, the court properly declined to address whether the car-door theory was inherently improbable. This is a routine and defensible exercise of appellate economy. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557 — On a sufficiency challenge the reviewing court examines the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, deferring to the trier of fact on credibility.
- relied: People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149 — An appellate court does not reweigh evidence or reassess credibility; testimony may be rejected as insubstantial only if physically impossible or inherently improbable.
- relied: People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284 — The testimony of a single witness believed by the trier of fact constitutes substantial evidence unless physically impossible or apparently false without resort to inference.
- relied: People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284 — Uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if credited, is sufficient to support a conviction; appellate courts do not substitute their credibility assessment for the fact finder's.
- missed: People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252 — The sufficiency of a witness's out-of-court statement that is recanted or not confirmed at trial is governed by the ordinary substantial evidence test, overruling the prior rule requiring independent corroboration of such statements.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly applies the substantial evidence standard and the no-reweighing rule from Johnson and Young to a case that turned entirely on credibility, and the result is consistent with controlling authority. It does not, however, address People v. Cuevas, the leading authority on whether a recanted out-of-court statement alone can be substantial evidence, and it misdescribes the elements of vandalism by stating that guilt requires $400 or more in damage when that figure governs only the punishment tier.
Opinion
Filed 6/21/16 In re Kane W. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re KANE W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D068277 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J236505)
v. KANE W., Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Leo Valentine, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Amy Parekh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. A petition was filed with the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that Kane W. committed misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, 1 § 594, subd. (a)(b)(1), a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b)(4)). After an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition, declared Kane a ward of the court, and ordered him to juvenile probation. Kane W. appeals contending insufficient evidence supported the court's finding that he committed misdemeanor vandalism. We reject this contention and affirm.
FACTS
In the morning on the day of the incident in question, Kane's truck was parked next to the car of his classmate, Edward D., in their high school parking lot. Edward left campus for lunch, and when he returned parked so that part of his car was sticking out of the parking space. Later that day, Edward discovered a large dent on the fender of his car. Edward saw two shoe marks on the fender, and saw no other damage on his vehicle.
The next day, Edward reported the damage to the school's police resource officer, Patrick Fanene.
Fanene interviewed several students as part of his investigation. Some of the students told Fanene that they saw Kane open his truck door into Edward's car several times, causing damage. Another student, Cole T., said he saw Kane damage Edward's car in the morning by kicking the front end.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 2 Kane was arrested and charged with vandalism. At the adjudication hearing on the charge, several witnesses testified that they saw Edward's car between the time of the alleged kicking and when Edward discovered the damage. Those witnesses noticed no damage to Edward's car. Cole testified that he lied to Fanene, and had only heard that Kane kicked Edward's car, but did not see it for himself.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found Kane had vandalized Edward's car. The court reconciled its finding with Cole's retraction by stating it did not believe that Officer Fanene was "gravely mistaken or deliberately misrepresenting to the court what took place at the interview," or that Kane's friends "misrepresented to the police as well as the court what took place."
DISCUSSION
It is uncontested that Edward's fender was damaged. Kane contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that he caused the damage to Edward's fender by kicking it or hitting it with his truck door.
I
One is guilty of vandalism if he or she maliciously damages another's property worth $400 or more. (§ 594, subd. (b)(1).) This court evaluates challenges to the sufficiency of evidence under the substantial evidence standard of review. We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576; italics omitted.) This court cannot reweigh the evidence or make credibility decisions. (People v. Young 3 (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 (Young).) One witness's testimony, believed by the trier of fact, is substantial evidence unless physically impossible or apparently false without resorting to inference or deduction. (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296; People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 305-306.)
II
Kane argues that the theory he damaged Edward's vehicle by hitting it with his car door is inherently improbable. However, we need not address this theory, because there is substantial evidence Kane damaged Edward's car by kicking it, which is sufficient to affirm the juvenile court's finding.
Kane argues that the theory he kicked Edward's vehicle at the time alleged is inherently improbable, and that Officer Fanene's testimony to that effect is insubstantial because witnesses who saw the vehicle between the time of the alleged kicking and when Edward discovered the damage, saw no damage. If it were true, that the damage on the fender was not present after the time of the alleged kick, the evidence the kick occurred would be inherently improbable and therefore insubstantial. (Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181.) However, to accept the absence of damage at that time as fact, would require this court to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses who testified to its absence. That determination was for the trial court to make. (Ibid.)
Kane also argues that Officer Fanene's testimony "[w]as undermined by Fanene's admission that he did not recall who said they saw the kick versus who said they only heard rumors." The record of Officer Fanene's testimony does not present as clear an undermining admission as Kane would suggest:
4 "Q: And you included in your report that [Cole] said he observed the kick causing damage. is that because that's what he said?
"A: That's what he said.
"Q: Did he tell you if that was only what he had heard had happened?
"A: I -- I don't recall. I -- I don't recall what he -- what I -- what I recall is that he told me he saw him kick the vehicle.
"Q: Did he tell you if that kick caused damage?
"A: Yes, he did."
Officer Fanene's testimony was equivocal, but could be fairly interpreted to support the juvenile court's finding. From this record, the juvenile court could have reasonably found his testimony credible or not. The trier of fact is present to evaluate the demeanor of witnesses and therefore better equipped to determine their credibility than this court. As a result, the law requires that we defer to the trial court's evaluation of Officer Fanene's credibility and his testimony's weight against contrary evidence.
(Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181; People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 577.) For the same reason, evidence that Cole lied to Fanene or Edward's poor parking job exposed his vehicle to other potential sources of harm is of no consequence on appeal.
The juvenile court accepted as true Edward's testimony there was damage and accepted Officer Fanene's version of Cole's statement. Accepting that evidence as true, it is sufficient substantial evidence to support the true finding.
5 DISPOSITION
The true finding and disposition orders are affirmed.
HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
PRAGER, J.* * Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 6
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Young S018909 · 2005-01-31
- People v. Barnes Crim. 24586 · 1986-07-31
- People v. Johnson Crim. 20710 · 1980-02-29
- People v. Scott Crim. 19905 · 1978-05-16