gno.law

In re Field CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D063227 · 2013-12-18 · Unpublished

Proceeding
original
Outcome
writ denied — The order to show cause is discharged and the petition is dismissed.
Area
criminal
Panel
Alex C. McDonald (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., McINTYRE

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:47Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Field's petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the Board of Parole Hearings' summary denial of his request to advance his next parole suitability hearing. The Court of Appeal discharged the order to show cause and dismissed the petition as moot because the BPH subsequently granted Field's request for an advanced hearing date.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Superior court's denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the BPH's summary denial of the request to advance the parole suitability hearing.
“The superior court denied the petition, and Field then filed the instant petition.”
unclearnot reachedagree with court
The appellate court did not review the merits of the trial court's denial because it found the case moot. The court noted that even if it were to find a manifest abuse of discretion by the BPH, the relief sought (an advanced hearing date) had already been granted by the BPH on August 1, 2013, rendering any judicial decision without practical effect.

Authorities

  • relied: In re Vicks (2013) 56 Cal.4th 274 — Upheld Marsy's Law against a facial ex post facto challenge, foreclosing Field's ex post facto argument.
  • relied: National Assn. of Wine Bottlers v. Paul (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 741 — Courts do not review questions that have become moot.
  • relied: Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129 — Courts must decide actual controversies and dismiss appeals when subsequent events render effectual relief impossible.
  • relied: Finnie v. Town of Tiburon (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1 — Appeals are dismissed as moot when the underlying event (e.g., an election) has already occurred.
  • relied: Bell v. Board of Supervisors (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 629 — Appeals are dismissed as moot when the challenged legislation has been repealed and replaced.
  • relied: Fleming v. Bennett (1941) 18 Cal.2d 888 — The policy of dismissing moot proceedings applies to writ proceedings.
  • relied: Lay v. Pacific Perforating Co. (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 452 — The policy of dismissing moot proceedings applies to writ proceedings.
  • relied: Consol. etc. Corp. v. United A. etc. Workers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859 — Courts should not give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions.
  • relied: MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204 — A case is moot when the decision of the reviewing court can have no practical impact or provide effectual relief.
  • relied: Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536 — Courts dismiss appeals when subsequent events make it impossible to grant effectual relief.
  • relied: In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313 — Courts dismiss proceedings when effectual relief is no longer possible.
  • relied: In re Kristin B. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 596 — The question of mootness must be decided on a case-by-case basis.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound because it correctly applies the well-established mootness doctrine to a habeas corpus petition where the specific relief sought (an advanced parole hearing date) was granted by the administrative body during the pendency of the appeal. The court properly cited binding authority to support the conclusion that a reversal would be without practical effect.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The San Diego Superior Court denied John Field's habeas corpus petition challenging the Board of Parole Hearings' summary denial, under Penal Code section 3041.5, subdivision (d)(2), of his request to advance his next parole suitability hearing after a five-year Marsy's Law deferral. The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause but, after the Supreme Court decided In re Vicks and the BPH itself granted Field an advanced hearing date on August 1, 2013, discharged the order to show cause and dismissed the petition as moot without reaching the merits.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Superior court's denial of habeas relief from the BPH's summary denial of Field's section 3041.5, subdivision (d)(1) petition to advance his parole suitability hearing (claimed manifest abuse of discretion and due process violation)
“the only relief we could have granted under Field's petition would be to order the BPH to conduct a suitability hearing for a date earlier than the "due course" suitability hearing set by the BPH in its 2009 order.”
unclearnot reachedagree with court
The court correctly identified that the only available remedy was an order compelling an advanced hearing, and the parties informed it that the BPH had already approved an advanced hearing date. Under Paul v. Milk Depots and Eye Dog Foundation, a reviewing court dismisses when it can grant no effectual relief, and that rule extends to writ proceedings. The court did not discuss the discretionary exceptions to mootness (issues of broad public interest likely to recur), but nothing in the opinion indicates Field invoked them, and the fact-bound nature of a summary-denial challenge makes the exceptions a poor fit.
Implicit denial of Field's ex post facto challenge to the application of Marsy's Law's five-year deferral period to his 1992 offense
“to the extent Field's habeas corpus petition sought relief under ex post facto principles, that relief is now foreclosed.”
de novocorrectagree with court
In re Vicks rejected a facial ex post facto challenge to Marsy's Law, so the court was right that facial relief was foreclosed. The opinion does not separately address whether Field pressed an as-applied claim, which Vicks left open, but because the BPH granted the advanced hearing that any ex post facto ruling could have produced, the omission has no practical consequence here.

Authorities

  • relied: In re Vicks (2013) 56 Cal.4th 274 — Marsy's Law's lengthened parole deferral periods do not facially violate ex post facto principles.
  • relied: Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129 — When an event pending appeal makes it impossible to grant effectual relief, the court will dismiss rather than render judgment on a moot question.
  • relied: Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536 — An appeal is dismissed as moot when the reviewing court cannot grant the appellant any effectual relief.
  • relied: Consol. etc. Corp. v. United A. etc. Workers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859 — Courts decide actual controversies and do not give opinions on moot or abstract questions.
  • relied: National Assn. of Wine Bottlers v. Paul (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 741 — Appellate courts ordinarily do not review questions that have become moot; appeal dismissed where challenged order had terminated.
  • relied: MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204 — A case is moot when the reviewing court's decision can have no practical impact or provide effectual relief.
  • relied: Finnie v. Town of Tiburon (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1 — Appeal from denial of injunction to stop an election dismissed as moot after the election occurred.
  • relied: Bell v. Board of Supervisors (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 629 — Appeal dismissed as moot where challenged legislation was repealed and replaced.
  • relied: In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313 — Appeal dismissed where intervening events made effectual relief impossible.
  • relied: In re Kristin B. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 596 — Mootness is decided on a case-by-case basis.
  • relied: Fleming v. Bennett (1941) 18 Cal.2d 888 — Mootness doctrine applies to writ proceedings.
  • relied: Lay v. Pacific Perforating Co. (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 452 — Mootness doctrine applies to writ proceedings.
  • missed: In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16 — A court has inherent discretion to resolve an otherwise moot issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur; the opinion dismisses without considering this exception.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The mootness analysis is correct and well supported: once the BPH granted the advanced hearing Field sought, no order the court could issue would have practical effect, and the cited Supreme Court authority squarely requires dismissal. The opinion skips the discretionary public-interest exception to mootness and does not address whether Vicks left room for an as-applied ex post facto claim, though neither omission affects the result.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 12/18/13 In re Field CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re JOHN FIELD D063227 on (San Diego County Super. Ct. No. CRN22066) Habeas Corpus.

Petition for writ of habeas corpus. Order to show cause discharged and petition dismissed.

Steve M. Defilippis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Jennifer A. Neill, Assistant Attorney General, Phillip Lindsay and Linnea D. Piazza, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.

Petitioner John Field seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) to grant his petition to advance his next parole suitability hearing.

Although this court issued an order to show cause, subsequent developments have made the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot. BACKGROUND In 1992, a jury found Field guilty of first degree murder with use of a firearm, and he was sentenced to 27 years to life. At Field's 2009 parole suitability hearing, the BPH found him unsuitable for parole and, applying the provisions of Marsy's Law, ordered a five-year waiting period until his next parole suitability hearing.

In 2012, Field filed a petition with the BPH, pursuant to Penal Code1 section 3041.5, subdivision (d)(1), seeking an order from the BPH advancing his next parole suitability hearing to an earlier date, alleging there were changed circumstances or new information establishing a reasonable likelihood that consideration of the public safety did not require the additional period of incarceration. (§ 3041.5, subd. (d)(1).) The BPH summarily denied the petition, as permitted by section 3041.5, subdivision (d)(2), which provides, in part, that the BPH "shall have the power to summarily deny a request that does not comply with the provisions of this subdivision or that does not set forth a change in circumstances or new information as required in paragraph (1) that in the judgment of the board is sufficient to justify the action described in paragraph (4) of subdivision (b)."

Field petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the denial of his petition to advance the hearing date. The superior court denied the petition, and Field then filed the instant petition. This court issued an order to show cause and directed newly appointed counsel for Field to address whether application of Marsy's Law to Field violated ex post facto principles.

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

2 After we issued our order to show cause, the Supreme Court filed its decision in In re Vicks (2013) 56 Cal.4th 274 upholding Marsy's Law against a facial ex post facto challenge. Accordingly, to the extent Field's habeas corpus petition sought relief under ex post facto principles, that relief is now foreclosed. However, Field's habeas corpus petition also asserted he adequately demonstrated new information or changed circumstances, and therefore the BPH's summary denial of his petition to advance his next parole suitability hearing to an earlier date was a manifest abuse of discretion (§ 3041.5, subd. (d)(2) [BPH decision on request made pursuant to subdivision (d)(1) "shall be subject to review by a court or magistrate only for a manifest abuse of discretion by the board"]), denying him due process, and he therefore continued to pursue this writ seeking an order requiring the BPH to set an advanced hearing date. The People contend that because the relief sought in the habeas corpus petition has been granted by the BPH, the petition is moot.

DISCUSSION

Ordinarily, we do not review questions that have become moot. (National Assn. of Wine Bottlers v. Paul (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 741, 746.) As one court instructed:

"It is settled that 'the duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it. It necessarily follows that when, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without any fault of the defendant, an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will 3 dismiss the appeal. [Citations.]' " (Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 132.)

Numerous other decisions have likewise concluded mootness requires dismissal of an appellate challenge to an underlying ruling. (See Finnie v. Town of Tiburon (1988)

199 Cal.App.3d 1, 11 [dismissing as moot appeal from trial court's denial of injunction to stop election where election had subsequently taken place]; National Assn. of Wine Bottlers v. Paul, supra, 268 Cal.App.2d at p. 746 [dismissing as moot appeal where challenged order of Director of Agriculture had been terminated]; Bell v. Board of Supervisors (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 629, 636 [dismissing as moot appeal where challenged legislation had been repealed and replaced with materially different law].)

The policy of dismissing moot appellate proceedings, which applies with equal force to writ proceedings (see Fleming v. Bennett (1941) 18 Cal.2d 888; Lay v. Pacific Perforating Co. (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 452), is based on the rationale that "an action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events. A reversal would be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be dismissed." (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 749, p. 814.) " '[T]he duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.' " (Consol. etc. Corp. v. United A. etc. Workers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859, 863, quoting Mills v. Green (1895) 159 U.S. 651, 653.) "A case is moot when the decision of 4 the reviewing court 'can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief.

[Citation.]' " (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214.) " '[W]hen, pending an appeal . . . , an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of [appellant], to grant him [or her] any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal. [Citations.]' " (Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541; accord, In re Jessica K.

(2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315-1316.) The question of mootness must be decided on a case-by-case basis. (In re Kristin B. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 596, 605.)

Here, even were we to conclude the BPH's summary denial of Field's petition to advance his next parole suitability hearing to an earlier date was a manifest abuse of discretion or a denial of due process, the only relief we could have granted under Field's petition would be to order the BPH to conduct a suitability hearing for a date earlier than the "due course" suitability hearing set by the BPH in its 2009 order. However, we are informed by the parties that the BPH reconsidered its summary denial of his petition to advance his next parole suitability hearing to an earlier date and, on August 1, 2013, the BPH approved Field's application for an advanced parole suitability hearing date.

Accordingly, even were we to rule that Field's petition for an advanced hearing date should have been granted by the BPH, that ruling would have no impact because the relief he sought--an order requiring the BPH to advance his next suitability hearing for a date earlier than the due course suitability hearing--has already been provided by the 5 BPH. We therefore agree with the People that the proper disposition is to discharge the order to show cause and dismiss the petition as moot.

DISPOSITION

The order to show cause is discharged and the petition is dismissed.

McDONALD, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

McINTYRE, J.

Cites, in this corpus