People v. Pinkins CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D063151 · 2013-11-15 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD233159
Trial judge: Leo Valentine, Jr.
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: criminal
Panel: O'Rourke (author), Cynthia Aaron, Joan K. Irion

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:48Z · confidence high

The trial court accepted a guilty plea for two counts of second-degree burglary, imposing a 16-month prison term and restitution fines. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment after finding no reasonably arguable issues on appeal.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Affirmance of the judgment following a Wende/Anders review “Our review of the entire record pursuant to People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738, including the possible issues referred to by appellate counsel and the circumstances surrounding the court's taking of the plea, has disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issues.”	de novo	not reached	agree with court The court conducted an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende and found no arguable errors among the issues raised by appointed counsel.

Authorities

relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Requires appointed appellate counsel to conduct an independent review of the record to identify potentially arguable issues when no issues are presented.
relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Establishes the procedure for appointed counsel to file a brief identifying potential errors while arguing for affirmance when no arguable issues exist.
relied: People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 — Establishes the standard for determining whether a defendant is entitled to appointed counsel in a criminal case.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound as it correctly applies the Wende/Anders framework to review the record for potential errors. It identifies the specific issues raised by counsel and concludes that none are reasonably arguable, which is the required standard for affirmance in such cases.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The trial court accepted Pinkins's guilty plea to two counts of second degree burglary, imposed a stipulated 16-month consecutive prison term, denied a Marsden motion, limited custody credits, and imposed $240 restitution fines under sections 1202.4(b) and 1202.45. On appeal, appointed counsel filed a Wende/Anders brief identifying six possible issues, Pinkins filed no supplemental brief, and the Court of Appeal independently reviewed the record, found no arguable issues, and affirmed.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Judgment on guilty plea and stipulated 16-month consecutive sentence (overall Wende independent review of the record) “has disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issues”	unclear	correct	agree with court The court followed the Wende/Anders procedure: counsel filed a no-issues brief, the defendant was given the opportunity to file his own brief and did not, and the court states it reviewed the entire record including the plea colloquy. Nothing in the opinion indicates any defect in the plea or sentence, and a stipulated sentence after a guilty plea without a certificate of probable cause sharply limits cognizable issues.
Trial court's statement that, because Pinkins was already serving a consecutive strike sentence, he was entitled to only 20 percent credit for time served in prison against the new nonstrike sentence “the trial court erred in stating that because he was already serving a consecutive strike sentence in a prior case, he was entitled to only 20 percent credit for time served in prison against the newly imposed nonstrike sentence”	unclear	correct	unsure The opinion gives no analysis of how the 20 percent limitation of the three strikes law interacts with a consecutive nonstrike term, and calculation of prison conduct credit is generally an administrative function of the Department of Corrections rather than the sentencing court, so the trial court's statement may have been advisory. Without the record or reasoning, I cannot identify a specific legal error, but I also cannot confirm the court's conclusion.
Whether the credit limitation was part of the plea bargain, whether estoppel applies, and the effect of the lack of a certificate of probable cause “the limitation on credit for time served in prison was part of the plea bargain and, if so, whether estoppel applies, and what effect the lack of a certificate of probable cause had”	unclear	correct	agree with court If the credit treatment was a negotiated term of the plea with a stipulated sentence, a challenge to it is in substance an attack on the plea's validity requiring a certificate of probable cause under section 1237.5, which Pinkins apparently did not obtain. The court's conclusion that this is not an arguable issue is consistent with that framework, though the opinion does not spell it out.
Denial of dual presentence custody credits under section 4019 because Pinkins was simultaneously serving prison time and earning credits in the earlier case “whether the court properly denied him dual credits for presentence custody under section 4019 on grounds that during presentence custody he was also serving prison time and receiving credits against that earlier case”	unclear	correct	agree with court Under section 2900.5, subdivision (b) and the Supreme Court's dual-credit cases, a defendant is not entitled to presentence credit for custody already credited against another term unless he shows the custody was attributable solely to the new case. The trial court's denial of duplicate credits is consistent with that rule, though the opinion does not discuss it.
Constitutional validity of the guilty plea “his guilty plea was constitutionally invalid”	unclear	correct	agree with court The court states it reviewed the circumstances surrounding the taking of the plea and found no arguable issue. Absent a certificate of probable cause, a challenge to plea validity is not cognizable in any event. The opinion provides no detail from the plea colloquy, so the conclusion cannot be independently verified from this record.
Denial of Marsden motion “the court properly denied his motion filed pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118”	unclear	correct	unsure A Marsden ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion, but the opinion recites nothing about the hearing or the grounds asserted. Counsel flagged it only as a possible, not arguable, issue and the court found nothing after full record review; there is no basis in the opinion to identify an error.
Imposition of $240 restitution fines under sections 1202.4(b) and 1202.45 without an ability-to-pay finding (ex post facto claim) “the court violated the federal Constitution's bar against ex post facto punishment when it failed to make a finding of his ability to pay the restitution fines under sections 1202.4, subdivision (b) and 1202.45”	unclear	correct	unsure Section 1202.4 requires an ability-to-pay inquiry only for fines above the statutory minimum, and $240 was the minimum for offenses committed in 2012. The opinion does not state the offense dates, so whether the 2012 minimum or an earlier $200 minimum applied cannot be confirmed; if the offenses predated 2012, imposing the higher minimum could raise an ex post facto question the court did not address.

Authorities

relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — When appointed appellate counsel finds no arguable issues, the Court of Appeal must independently review the entire record to determine whether any arguable issue exists.
relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Appointed counsel who finds an appeal wholly frivolous may so advise the court and refer to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.
relied: People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 — A defendant seeking substitution of appointed counsel must be permitted to state the reasons for dissatisfaction, and the court must inquire into them before ruling.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion follows the Wende/Anders procedure correctly: it identifies counsel's possible issues, confirms the defendant was invited to file his own brief, and states it reviewed the whole record including the plea. It offers no reasoning on any of the six flagged issues, particularly the 20 percent credit statement and the restitution fine minimum, so the result is defensible but the analysis is not shown.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 11/15/13 P. v. Pinkins CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D063151

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD233159)

ANTHONY LYNN PINKINS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Leo Valentine, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

Neil F. Auwarter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for the Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, for the Plaintiff and Respondent. Anthony Lynn Pinkins pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree burglary.

(Pen. Code,1 § 459.) In exchange, the People dismissed a charge of failure to appear after release on one's own recognizance. (§ 1320, subd. (b).) The court sentenced Pinkins to a stipulated prison term of 16 months, to run consecutively to another prison term he was serving. The court ordered him to pay restitution fines of $240 each under sections 1202.4, subdivision (b) and 1202.45. Pinkins appeals. We affirm.

Appointed counsel has filed a brief summarizing the facts and proceedings below.

Counsel presents no argument for reversal but asks that this court review the record for error as mandated by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, counsel refers to possible but not arguable issues of whether: (1) the trial court erred in stating that because he was already serving a consecutive strike sentence in a prior case, he was entitled to only 20 percent credit for time served in prison against the newly imposed nonstrike sentence; (2) the limitation on credit for time served in prison was part of the plea bargain and, if so, whether estoppel applies, and what effect the lack of a certificate of probable cause had; (3) whether the court properly denied him dual credits for presentence custody under section 4019 on grounds that during presentence custody he was also serving prison time and receiving credits against that earlier case; (4) his guilty plea was constitutionally invalid; (5) the court properly denied his motion filed pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118; and (6) the court violated the federal Constitution's bar against ex post facto 1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 punishment when it failed to make a finding of his ability to pay the restitution fines under sections 1202.4, subdivision (b) and 1202.45.

We granted Pinkins permission to file a brief on his own behalf. He has not responded. Our review of the entire record pursuant to People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738, including the possible issues referred to by appellate counsel and the circumstances surrounding the court's taking of the plea, has disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issues. Competent counsel has represented Pinkins on this appeal.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

AARON, J.

IRION, J.

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Wende Crim. 20851 · 1979-10-12
People v. Marsden Crim. 14119 · 1970-02-26