gno.law

Cortez v. Bootsma

California Court of Appeal · D017438 · 1994-08-19 · Published · 27 Cal. App. 4th 935 · 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20 · 59 Cal. Comp. Cases 570 · 94 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6422 · 94 Daily Journal DAR 11704 · 1994 Cal. App. LEXIS 853

FIDEL CORTEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WILBUR BOOTSMA Et Al., Defendants and Appellants

Proceeding
appeal
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County
Trial judge
Ronald S. Prager
Outcome
affirmed — The judgment is affirmed.
Area
civil
Panel
Froehlich (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T07:29Z · confidence high

The trial court awarded $65,000 in attorney's fees, determining this amount was reasonable under Labor Code section 3709 and rejecting the argument that a local court rule capping fees at the agreed contingent fee amount was valid. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the local rule was invalid because it conflicted with the state statute granting the trial court discretion to award reasonable fees.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Award of $65,000 in attorney's fees
“The court concluded, based on the factors ordinarily considered when assessing reasonable attorney fees, that an award of $65,000 was reasonable.”
abuse of discretioncorrectagree with court
The appellate court affirmed the fee award, noting that defendants did not challenge the reasonableness of the amount based on standard factors, but only argued it violated a local rule. Since the local rule was found invalid, the trial court's exercise of discretion in determining the reasonable amount was upheld.
Validity of San Diego County Superior Court Rule 6.1 limiting attorney fees
“We conclude that when the Legislature grants statutory authority to the trial courts to award “reasonable attorney’s fees,” a local rule may not limit the discretion vested in those courts by restricting the amounts award-able.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The court held that local rules cannot conflict with state statutes. Because Labor Code section 3709 grants discretion to award 'reasonable' fees without a specific cap, a local rule imposing a cap based on the agreed contingent fee conflicts with state law and is therefore invalid.

Authorities

  • relied: Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618 — Determination of reasonable attorney fees is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court.
  • relied: Mandel v. Hodges (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 596 — Trial court has unique ability to value services rendered in a matter litigated before it.
  • relied: Marshall v. Department of Water & Power (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1124 — An agreed-upon contingency fee is a factor in determining reasonable fees but is not controlling.
  • relied: Lang v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 510 — Any conflict between a local rule and a state statute invalidates the local rule.
  • relied: Turlock Golf & Country Club v. Superior Court (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 693 — Local rule increasing deposits above statutory requirements is invalid.
  • relied: Sadler v. Turner (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 245 — Court rule inconsistent with state statute permitting different procedure is invalid.
  • relied: Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 918 — Local rule conflicting with Code of Civil Procedure deadlines is invalid.
  • relied: Estate of Brown (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1612 — Local policy fixing fees at a rate higher than authorized by statute cannot be maintained.
  • relied: Roberts v. Brian (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 427 — Basis for awarding attorney fees on appeal.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the principle that local rules must yield to conflicting state statutes, supported by multiple analogous cases. It clearly distinguishes the statutory mandate for 'reasonable' fees from the local rule's attempt to impose a cap, resolving the conflict in favor of the statute.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:32Z · confidence high

The trial court, awarding statutory attorney fees to an injured worker under Labor Code section 3709, fixed a reasonable fee of $65,000 and refused to cap the award at the 40 percent contingent-fee amount ($48,775) as San Diego Superior Court Rules, rule 6.1 would have required, holding the local rule conflicted with state law. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that a local rule may not restrict the discretion a state statute vests in the trial court to award a 'reasonable' fee, and awarded Cortez costs and $1,793.50 in appellate fees.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Rejection of local rule 6.1 as a ceiling on the statutory attorney fee award because the rule conflicts with Labor Code section 3709's mandate of 'reasonable attorney's fees fixed by the court'
“Any conflict between a local rule and a state statute invalidates the local rule.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
Although defendants framed the issue as abuse of discretion, the validity of a local rule against a state statute is a pure question of law and the court treated it as such without labeling the standard. Government Code section 68070 permits local rules only to the extent they do not conflict with state law, and the cited cases (Lang, Turlock, Sadler, Wells Fargo, Estate of Brown) consistently void local rules that add limits a statute does not contain. Marshall establishes the contingency agreement is only one factor, not a cap, so a rule making it controlling conflicts with the statutory grant of discretion. The reasoning and authorities support the result.
Determination that $65,000 was a reasonable attorney fee based on the ordinary factors
“Defendants do not argue the award would be unreasonable if judged solely by the criteria otherwise applicable to evaluating the proper amount of an award”
abuse of discretionnot reachedagree with court
The court noted that reasonableness determinations rest in the trial court's sound discretion but expressly observed that defendants challenged the award solely on the basis of rule 6.1 and did not contend the amount was otherwise unreasonable. The court therefore did not independently review the $65,000 figure, and nothing in the opinion suggests any error in it.

Authorities

  • relied: Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618 — Determination of reasonable attorney fees is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the expertise to decide the matter.
  • relied: Mandel v. Hodges (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 596 — The trial court is uniquely able to value legal services rendered in a matter litigated before it.
  • relied: Marshall v. Department of Water & Power (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1124 — An agreed-upon contingency fee is one factor in assessing a reasonable fee but is not controlling.
  • relied: Lang v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 510 — Any conflict between a local rule and a state statute invalidates the local rule.
  • relied: Turlock Golf & Country Club v. Superior Court (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 693 — A local rule increasing the jury fee deposit above the statutory amount is invalid.
  • relied: Sadler v. Turner (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 245 — A court rule requiring a noticed motion to dismiss after demurrer sustained without leave is invalid because the statute permits ex parte dismissal.
  • relied: Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 918 — A local rule requiring complex summary judgment motions to be filed six months before trial conflicts with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c and is invalid.
  • relied: Estate of Brown (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1612 — A local policy fixing brokers' fees at a rate inconsistent with statutory fee guidelines cannot be maintained.
  • relied: Wisniewski v. Clary (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 499 — Local court policies are treated the same as local court rules for purposes of conflict with state law.
  • relied: Glendora Community Redevelopment Agency v. Demeter (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 465 — Sets out the factors (hours, fee charged, risk, difficulty, results) used to evaluate the reasonable amount of a fee award.
  • relied: Roberts v. Brian (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 427 — A party entitled to statutory attorney fees below may recover reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion identifies the governing principle (Gov. Code, § 68070 and Lang) that local rules yield to conflicting statutes, and applies a consistent line of cases voiding local rules that add limits absent from the statute, while Marshall disposes of the contention that the contingency agreement should control. It carefully confines its holding to statutory fee awards and notes defendants raised no other challenge to reasonableness, leaving no argument unanswered.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion — Froehlich

Opinion

FROEHLICH, J.

This appeal presents a single narrow question: when a statute requires the superior court to award “reasonable attorney’s fees,” may a local court rule limit the amount of that award? Specifically, the court determined a “reasonable” fee was $65,000. However, San Diego County Superior Court Rules, 1 rule 6.1 provided that in contested actions no attorney fees could be awarded “in excess of the amount agreed by the plaintiff to be paid to the plaintiff’s attorney.” In this case plaintiff and his attorney agreed to a 40 percent contingent fee, which would have amounted to $48,775 based on the underlying jury award to plaintiff of $121,938.24.

*937 We are thus confronted with whether a superior court may disregard a local rule when the local rule would restrict the discretion granted a court by a state statute.

1. Facts

The relevant facts are undisputed. Plaintiff Fidel Cortez (Cortez) was an employee of the general contractor hired by appellants to perform work. Cortez was seriously injured on the job. The general contractor did not have workers’ compensation insurance. Accordingly, plaintiff was entitled to sue defendants for damages in superior court.

Cortez recovered damages of $121,938.24. As the successful plaintiff, Cortez also was entitled to “reasonable attorney’s fees fixed by the court.” (Lab. Code, § 3709.) Cortez requested fees of $149,848.75. Defendants moved to reduce the fee request, arguing both that it was unreasonable and that it exceeded the amount permitted by local rule.

The court concluded, based on the factors ordinarily considered when assessing reasonable attorney fees, that an award of $65,000 was reasonable. The court also rejected defendants’ claim that local court rules placed a ceiling on the award, reasoning that such a ceiling would contravene state law and hence be invalid.

2. The Local Rule Limiting Attorney Fees Must Yield to the State Law Granting Discretion to Award a Reasonable Fee

On appeal, defendants contend the attorney fee award was an abuse of discretion because it transgressed rule 6.1, which limits attorney fees to the amount agreed upon between plaintiff and his attorney. 2 Rule 6.1 provides: “Reasonable attorney’s fees in contested actions should be determined by the court in its discretion. . . . [H No fee shall be allowed in excess of the amount agreed by the plaintiff to be paid to plaintiffs attorney. . . .” (Italics added.) Cortez contends that to the extent the local rule limits the trial court’s ability to craft a “reasonable” award, the rule conflicts with the Labor Code mandate that “reasonable” attorney fees shall be awarded. We conclude that when the Legislature grants statutory authority to the trial courts to award “reasonable attorney’s fees,” a local rule may not *938 limit the discretion vested in those courts by restricting the amounts award-able.

It is axiomatic that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the trial court. (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 [134 Cal.Rptr. 602].) The trial court has both the expertise to decide this matter {ibid.) and the unique ability to value the services rendered in a matter litigated before it (Mandel v. Hodges (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 596, 623 [127 Cal.Rptr. 244, 90 A.L.R.3d 728]). The trial court weighs numerous factors in this calculus, and although an agreed-upon contingency fee is one of the factors considered, it is not controlling on the issue. (Marshall v. Department of Water & Power (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1124, 1150 [268 Cal.Rptr. 559].)

Defendants claim the local rule is controlling and places an upper limit on the fee awardable. Local rules may be adopted to the extent they are not in conflict with state law. (Gov. Code, § 68070.) Any conflict between a local rule and a state statute invalidates the local rule. (Lang v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 510, 516 [200 Cal.Rptr. 526].) Numerous courts have voided a local rule when in conflict with state law. (See, e.g., Turlock Golf & Country Club v. Superior Court (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 693, 700 [50 Cal.Rptr. 70] [local rule which increased the deposit for jury fees and mileage above that required by statute declared invalid].)

Here the local rule conflicts with state law mandating that a “reasonable” fee be awarded, because the local rule attempts to define the outer perimeters of a permissible fee award while the statute places no limits on the trial court’s discretion. 3 In similar circumstances, the courts have held that court rules may not impose limitations on a court’s ability to act when the statute contains no similar limitation. Thus, in Sadler v. Turner (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 245 [230 Cal.Rptr. 561], a court rule required a noticed motion to dismiss the complaint after a demurrer had been sustained without leave to amend. The Sadler court concluded the rule was invalid because it was inconsistent with the state statute permitting dismissal on ex parte motion. {Id. at pp. 248-250; see also Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 918, 923 [254 Cal.Rptr. 68] [local rule requiring complex summary judgment motion to be filed six months before trial invalid because of conflict with Code Civ. Proc., § 437c permitting motions to be heard 30 days before trial].)

*939 In another analogous case, Estate of Brown (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1612 [239 Cal.Rptr. 147], this court considered a local policy (accorded the same treatment as local court rules [see Wisniewski v. Clary (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 499, 504-505 (120 Cal.Rptr. 176)]), which allegedly would have fixed brokers’ fees at a rate higher than authorized by statute. This court concluded the local policy could not be maintained in light of the conflicting statutory guidelines on fee awards. (Estate of Brown, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 1619.)

Here the statute mandates a “reasonable fee.” The determination of what amount would be “reasonable” is vested in the trial judge. The local rule at issue here, if applied as advocated by defendants, would permit only 75 percent of the award deemed reasonable by the trial judge. To the extent this rule conflicts with state law it is inapplicable.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed. Cortez shall recover costs on appeal. Cortez also shall cover reasonable attorney fees incurred on this appeal in the sum of $1,793.50. (Roberts v. Brian (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 427, 430-431 [106 Cal.Rptr. 360].)

Todd, Acting P. J., and Huffman, J., concurred.

1

All rule references are to the San Diego County Superior Court Rules.

2

It is important to note that defendants claim the award was an abuse of discretion solely because of the ceiling on awards imposed by rule 6.1. Defendants do not argue the award would be unreasonable if judged solely by the criteria otherwise applicable to evaluating the proper amount of an award, such as the hours spent, the fee charged, the risks borne by the attorney, the difficulty of the issues, the results obtained, etc. (See, e.g., Glendora Community Redevelopment Agency v. Demeter (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 465, 472-475 [202 Cal.Rptr. 389].)

3

We caution that our holding is limited to the issue of whether rule 6.1 is invalid because it conflicts with, and hence must yield to, contrary state law. We are not presented with the issue of whether the local rule limiting fee awards is valid when the attorney fees are awarded based on a private contractual clause for “reasonable attorney’s fees,” rather than (as here) on a positive statutory provision.

Cites, in this corpus

Cited by