gno.law

In Re Leticia S.

California Court of Appeal · D037075 · 2001-09-19 · Published · 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810 · 92 Cal. App. 4th 378

Area
dependency

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T07:20Z · confidence high

The trial court granted Fredrick W. de facto parent status in a dependency proceeding, finding it in the child's best interests despite his drug use and physical discipline being the basis for the child's removal. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by balancing the child's bond with the father against the father's misconduct, rather than applying the rule that a caretaker who causes the dependency proceedings forfeits de facto parent status.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Granting of de facto parent status to Fredrick W.
“By balancing these factors against Fredrick's actions as Leticia's psychological and physical parent, the court did not apply the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court.”
abuse of discretionerroragree with court
The appellate court correctly applied the holding in In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, which establishes that a nonparental caretaker who commits substantial harm fundamentally at odds with the parental role forfeits de facto parent status. The trial court erred by treating the status as a best-interests determination that could be balanced against the caretaker's misconduct, rather than a threshold eligibility requirement. The facts established that Fredrick's drug use and physical abuse were the direct cause of the dependency jurisdiction, triggering the forfeiture rule.

Authorities

  • relied: In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68 — A nonparental caretaker who commits substantial harm fundamentally at odds with the role of parent forfeits any opportunity to attain de facto parent status.
  • relied: In re Patricia L. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 61 — De facto parent status is a judicially created concept and the court does not consider whether the order is in the child's best interests, but rather the applicant's adherence to the parental role.
  • relied: In re Rachael C. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1445 — This case was disapproved by the Supreme Court in In re Kieshia E. for allowing de facto parent status despite the caretaker's drug-related misconduct causing the dependency.
  • relied: Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 — A court must apply the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court and cannot substitute its own policy judgments for established legal rules.
  • relied: In re Michael R. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 150 — The juvenile court applies the preponderance of the evidence standard for factual findings, and appellate review is for abuse of discretion.
  • relied: In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339 — An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court makes an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.
  • relied: In re Ashley P. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 23 — Factors for de facto parent status include psychological bonding, assumption of parental role, and possession of unique information about the child.
  • relied: In re Brandon M. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1387 — De facto parent status is a judicially created and maintained concept.
  • relied: In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580 — A party does not waive the right to contest an order on appeal if the opposing party bore the burden of proof below.
  • relied: In re Eric B. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 996 — Juvenile dependency law does not require a child to be actually harmed before the Agency and courts may intervene.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies the controlling precedent in In re Kieshia E. and applies it to the specific facts where the caretaker's misconduct caused the dependency. It effectively distinguishes the trial court's error of balancing best interests against the mandatory forfeiture rule established by the Supreme Court.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence medium

The juvenile court granted Fredrick W., the mother's live-in boyfriend who had raised Leticia for eight years, de facto parent status, finding it in the child's best interests even though his methamphetamine use and leaving drugs within the children's reach were the basis for the jurisdictional finding. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding under In re Kieshia E. that a caretaker whose conduct caused the dependency forfeits de facto parent status and that the juvenile court erred by balancing his culpability against his parental role; it directed entry of an order denying the application.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Grant of Fredrick W.'s application for de facto parent status despite his conduct being a basis for the jurisdictional finding
“If the applicant's action caused the child to be declared a dependent, that person has abandoned "the role of parent" and "by acting in a manner so fundamentally inconsistent with the parental role . . . forfeits any opportunity to attain the legal status of de facto parent."”
abuse of discretionerror (law misapplied)agree with court
Kieshia E. holds that a nonparental caretaker whose misconduct caused the jurisdictional finding forfeits de facto status, and the Supreme Court specifically disapproved Rachael C., a drug-exposure case closely resembling these facts. The appellate court's application of that rule to Fredrick's purposeful methamphetamine use, drugs left within reach, and hitting the child is supported, though the court's categorical statement that any 'cause' of the dependency compels denial is somewhat broader than Kieshia E.'s 'substantial harm, such as sexual or other serious physical abuse' formulation.
Juvenile court's use of a best-interests/totality-of-circumstances framework and its assumption that de facto status could be terminated at will
“Likewise, the court does not consider whether the order would be detrimental to Leticia or was in her best interests. To the contrary, the court considers the applicant's adherence to the role of parent and whether the applicant has information that is in the child's best interests for the court to receive.”
abuse of discretionerror (law misapplied)agree with court
Kieshia E. and Patricia L. frame the inquiry around the applicant's adherence to the parental role and the value of the applicant's information to the court, not a freestanding best-interests balancing, and Patricia L. states that de facto status persists until the dependency ends or circumstances change. The appellate court's correction of the trial court's legal framework is consistent with those authorities.
Fredrick's claim that Isiah waived the issue by not challenging the evidence below
“However, because Fredrick bore the burden of proof on the de facto parent issue, Isiah did not need to challenge the evidence below to raise the issue on appeal.”
de novocorrectagree with court
Because the applicant bears the burden of establishing de facto parent status, the opposing parent's failure to contest the evidence does not forfeit a legal challenge to whether the applicant met that burden; the court's reliance on In re Richard K. for this proposition is reasonable, though the point is addressed only briefly in a footnote.

Authorities

  • relied: In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68 — A nonparental caretaker whose substantial harm to the child, fundamentally at odds with the role of parent, is the basis for the jurisdictional finding forfeits any opportunity to attain de facto parent status.
  • relied: In re Patricia L. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 61 — De facto parent status depends on the particular individual and facts; factors include psychological bond, day-to-day parental role, unique information, hearing attendance, and risk of permanent severance; status ends only with termination of dependency or changed circumstances.
  • relied: In re Michael R. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 150 — Juvenile court applies preponderance standard to de facto parent findings, reviewed for abuse of discretion.
  • relied: In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339 — Abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court makes an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination exceeding the limits of legal discretion.
  • relied: In re Rachael C. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1445 — Disapproved by Kieshia E.; had held caretakers' drug-related misconduct was irrelevant to granting de facto parent status, illustrating that Kieshia E. reaches drug-exposure cases.
  • relied: Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 — Lower courts are bound to follow decisions of the California Supreme Court.
  • relied: In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580 — A party who does not bear the burden of proof need not challenge evidence below to raise the issue on appeal.
  • relied: In re Ashley P. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 23 — Lists the factors ordinarily considered in deciding a de facto parent application.
  • relied: In re Brandon M. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1387 — De facto parent status is a judicially created and maintained concept.
  • relied: In re Eric B. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 996 — Dependency law does not require actual harm to the child before the Agency and courts may intervene.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly identifies Kieshia E. as controlling and persuasively notes the Supreme Court's disapproval of Rachael C., a drug-exposure case on nearly identical facts, so the result is well supported. However, the opinion announces a categorical rule that any applicant who is 'a cause for the dependency proceedings' must be denied without squarely addressing Kieshia E.'s narrower 'substantial harm, such as sexual or other serious physical abuse' language or explaining why the trial court's weighing of eight years of parenting was an abuse of discretion rather than merely a legal error in framework.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

111 Cal.Rptr.2d 810 (2001)
92 Cal.App.4th 378

In re LETICIA S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Fredrick W., Defendant and Respondent;
Isiah S., Defendant and Appellant.

No. D037075.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division One.

September 19, 2001.
Review Denied December 12, 2001.

*812 Patti L. Dikes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

John J. Sansone, County Counsel, Susan Strom, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Gary Seiser, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Donna B. Kaiser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.

Mary Elizabeth Handy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.

*811 O'ROURKE, J.

Isiah S. appeals from the order granting Fredrick W. de facto parent status in the dependency proceedings filed on behalf of Isiah's daughter, Leticia S. Isiah contends the court abused its discretion by granting Fredrick de facto parent status because Fredrick's conduct was the reason the court found Leticia to be a dependent child. We reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Leticia was born in 1991 to Corina C. and Isiah. In 1992 Corina and Fredrick began a relationship and Leticia has lived with them since that time. Corina and Fredrick had a daughter, Sarina, in 1995.

In February 2000 the police conducted a probation search of Corina's residence and found methamphetamine and related drug paraphernalia on the kitchen table within reach of the girls. Fredrick and Corina had been smoking methamphetamine just before the police arrived. Accordingly, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) removed the girls from Corina's care.

In March 2000 the court made a true finding on the petition. Later that month, Fredrick applied to become Leticia's de facto parent. He asserted he (1) has known Leticia since she was one year old, (2) has had daily contact with her ever since, and (3) has been raising her as if she were his own by providing for her daily needs, disciplining her, and supporting her financially and emotionally. He contended Leticia calls him "Dad" and he refers to her as his daughter.

Based on these factors, the court granted Fredrick's de facto parent application. The court determined the order was in Leticia's best interests because Fredrick *813 had been her psychological and physical parent for the last eight years.

DISCUSSION

Isiah contends the court abused its discretion in granting Fredrick's de facto parent application because Fredrick's behavior was a basis for the juvenile court's finding Leticia was a dependent child.[1]

The concept of de facto parent has been judicially created to recognize limited rights in dependency cases for a person who has been found by the juvenile court to have assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of a parent, fulfilling the child's physical and psychological needs. (In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 70-71, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 775, 859 P.2d 1290; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1401(a)(6).) The decision to grant de facto parent status depends on an assessment of the particular individual and the facts of the case. (In re Patricia L. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 61, 66-67, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 631.) The juvenile court applies the preponderance of the evidence standard in making its factual findings and we review those findings for an abuse of discretion. (In re Michael R. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 150, 155-156, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 842.) An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal. App.4th 1339, 1351, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 644.)

In determining whether a person should be accorded de facto parent status, the court must consider whether that person's behavior was the basis for a jurisdictional finding by the court. (In re Kieshia E., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 78, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 775, 859 P.2d 1290.) If the applicant's action caused the child to be declared a dependent, that person has abandoned "the role of parent" and "by acting in a manner so fundamentally inconsistent with the parental role . . . forfeits any opportunity to attain the legal status of de facto parent." (Ibid.)

Here, the court detained Leticia because Fredrick and Corina left methamphetamine within her reach. For the same reason, the court made a true finding that Leticia came under the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Moreover, Fredrick has been an addict since he began living with Corina and Leticia. He smoked methamphetamine the day the police found the drugs. Leticia saw his drug pipe and, when the children were detained, presumptive tests concluded Sarina had methamphetamine in her system. In addition, Fredrick disciplined Leticia by hitting her, sometimes with a shoe.[2] Courts routinely remove children from their parents under similar circumstances. Leaving drugs within a child's reach, using drugs while responsible for a child's welfare, and hitting a child are not parental acts.

Leticia and Fredrick argue that In re Kieshia E. should not apply as it only applies to intentional acts and Fredrick's acts were "negligent." Using drugs and hitting children are not negligent acts. Regardless of whether Fredrick negligently left drugs on the table, he purposefully used them, which is sufficient to bring this matter under the aegis of In re Kieshia E.

*814 Fredrick also asserts that In re Kieshia E. only applies when the applicant has sexually or physically abused the child. However, In re Kieshia E. is not limited to cases of physical or sexual abuse, but also applies to an applicant whose drug use places children in his or her care at risk. The court in In re Kieshia E. disapproved of In re Rachael C. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1445, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 473. (In re Kieshia E., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 78-80, 23 Cal. Rptr.2d 775, 859 P.2d 1290.) In In re Rachael C, the court allowed a child's caretakers to become de facto parents even though the child had been removed after drugs were found in their home and upon the child's dresser and bottle liners, and the child had drugs in her system. (In re Rachael C, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1453, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 473.) The court stated that the misconduct of the child's nonparental caretaker was irrelevant to the interests and policies favoring the caretaker's limited right of participation in dependency proceedings. (Id. at pp. 1452-1453, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 473.)

The Supreme Court disagreed. "Once there is an adjudication that a child is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court because a nonparental caretaker committed a substantial harm, such as sexual or other serious physical abuse, which is fundamentally at odds with `the role of parent,' the perpetrator's `protectible interest' . . . is extinguished." (In re Kieshia E., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 78, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 775, 859 P.2d 1290.) Simply stated, when examining a de facto parent application, a court must first examine whether the applicant committed a substantial harm fundamentally at odds with the role of parent.

Moreover, contrary to Fredrick's argument that Leticia suffered no harm at his hands, he did hit her, which indisputably is harm. In any event, no case law holds that a child must actually be harmed by the applicant in order for the court to deny de facto parent status.[3] Instead, the court considers whether the applicant's conduct was a cause of the child being declared a dependent. Here, Fredrick's conduct was such a cause.

The court here also looked at the totality of the circumstances, including the cause of the dependency, to determine whether de facto status was appropriate. However, there is no indication in In re Kieshia E. that the Supreme Court intended for juvenile courts to look at the totality of the circumstances, or to weigh the applicant's culpability against other factors normally considered.[4] To the contrary, the opinion holds that if an applicant for de facto parent status is a cause for the dependency proceedings, the application must be denied.[5]

*815 By balancing these factors against Fredrick's actions as Leticia's psychological and physical parent, the court did not apply the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937.) The court abused its discretion in granting Fredrick's request for de facto parent status.

DISPOSITION

The order is reversed. The juvenile court is directed to enter a new order denying Fredrick's de facto parent application.

We concur: KREMER, P.J., and HUFFMAN, J.

NOTES

[1] Fredrick contends Isiah has waived his right to contest the court's order because he did not challenge the evidence Fredrick presented to the trial court. However, because Fredrick bore the burden of proof on the de facto parent issue, Isiah did not need to challenge the evidence below to raise the issue on appeal. (See In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal. App.4th 580, 589, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 575.)

[2] Fredrick also used to hit Corina "all the time" and once dragged her by her hair.

[3] Juvenile dependency law in general does not require a child to be actually harmed before the Agency and the courts may intervene. (In re Eric B. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 996, 1002-1003, 235 Cal.Rptr. 22.)

[4] Those factors are whether the child is psychologically bonded to the adult; whether the adult has assumed the role of a parent on a day-to-day basis for a substantial period of time and possesses information about the child, unique from the other participants in the process; whether the adult has regularly attended juvenile court hearings; and whether a future proceeding may result in an order permanently foreclosing any further contact with the adult. (In re Ashley P. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 23, 27, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 383; In re Patricia L. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 61, 66-67, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 631.)

[5] The court here was also confused about the nature of de facto parent status. Contrary to the court's belief, de facto parent status is a judicially created and maintained concept. (In re Brandon M. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 671.) Likewise, the court does not consider whether the order would be detrimental to Leticia or was in her best interests. To the contrary, the court considers the applicant's adherence to the role of parent and whether the applicant has information that is in the child's best interests for the court to receive. (In re Kieshia E., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 76, 78, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 775, 859 P.2d 1290; In re Patricia L., supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at pp. 66-67, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 631.) Finally, contrary to the court's assumption it could terminate Fredrick's de facto parent status at will, de facto parent status ends only when the dependency is terminated or a changed circumstance no longer supports the status. (In re Patricia L., supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 67, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 631.)

Cites, in this corpus

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