In re T.R. CA1/2

Opinion

Filed 9/24/26 In re T.R. CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re T.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

MENDOCINO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND A174912 CHILDREN’S SERVICES, (Mendocino County Super. Ct. Plaintiff and Respondent, No. 25JV00224-01) v. T.R., et al, Defendants and Appellants.

T.R. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order and dispositional order removing his son T.R. (Minor) from his custody. Noncustodial parent L.R. (Mother) appeals from the court’s dispositional order denying placement of Minor with her and the court’s finding that active efforts were made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and California’s state analog, Cal-ICWA (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.). We affirm.

1 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Family Background Minor was born in 2018. Father and Minor are enrolled members of the Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians (Coyote Valley). Mother is a member of Dry Creek Rancheria Band of Pomo Indians (Dry Creek). In the years before the current matter, the Mendocino County Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) received five prior referrals for the family involving Minor. In a dependency proceeding in 2021, allegations were found true that Mother “abuses controlled substances,” which “periodically renders [her] incapable of providing appropriate care and supervision for the minor”; Mother was found by police “ ‘passed out’ in the home, leaving 3 year old [Minor] and 7-year-old [L.M., Minor’s maternal half-sibling,] without supervision” in a home described by a police officer “as being in a ‘filthy unsafe condition’ ”; and Father “has a history of abusing alcohol and becoming violent” and “was arrested in March of 2019 with a blood alcohol content of .18, after he had thrown a rock through the kitchen window towards [Mother] while she was holding [Minor].” The case was closed in December 2022 with Minor returned to the care of Father. The juvenile court terminated reunification services for Mother and granted Father full physical custody of Minor with Mother and Father sharing legal custody. Mother was to have weekly “supervised visitation” with “[a]ll in-person visits to take place within Mendocino County.”1 1 The operative custody order specified that the reason for “only supervised visitation” was that Mother had not made substantial progress in a court-ordered drug abuse treatment program with random testing.

2 Before the incident leading to the current proceeding, Minor lived with Father in Redwood Valley on a tribal reservation, and Mother lived in the Sacramento area. Mother had another child, Le.M. (Minor’s younger half-brother), who was born in 2023 and was removed from Mother’s care when he was 10 months old.2 As of May 2025, Le.M. was a dependent of the Sacramento County juvenile court, and Mother was pregnant. (She gave birth in June 2025.) According to Mother’s attorney, the “open case” in Sacramento “involve[ed] conditions related to domestic violence and inadequate living conditions.” The domestic violence involved Mother and D.T., the father of two-year old Le.M. and Mother’s then-unborn baby.3 2 Minor’s older half-sibling, L.M. (who, along with Minor, had been the subject of the 2021 dependency matter in Mendocino County), was in the custody of L.M.’s father. In May 2025, L.M.’s father provided a letter reporting that Mother’s communication with L.M. “has been virtually nonexistent” for over two years. He further wrote that, at a court hearing on custody matters (on an unspecified date), Mother and her mother “appeared to be under the influence (as noted by the judge that day), further reinforcing the concern that her lifestyle and choices have not aligned with the responsibilities of motherhood.” 3 The Department documented six law enforcement contacts between Sacramento County Sheriff’s deputies and Mother and D.T. in 2023 and 2024. In October 2024, deputies responding to a report that “two subjects were attempting to steal from a business,” found Mother and D.T. together, and drug paraphernalia and crystal methamphetamine were found in Mother’s backpack. In 2023 and 2024, law enforcement responded to multiple incidents of reported domestic violence. In August 2023, Mother was arrested on a report that she slapped and punched D.T. numerous times with her child next door. In September 2023, law enforcement responded to a disturbance and found Mother “aggressive, screaming and threatening to harm others.” In June 2023, law enforcement responded to a report of domestic violence; Mother was found with multiple scratches on her arms, legs, and neck, and D.T. was arrested.

3 Circumstances Leading to Detention On May 4, 2025, Minor was taken into protective custody in Oregon. According to an Oregon Department of Human Services protective custody report, Father’s vehicle was observed stopped in the middle lane of I-5 near Salem, Oregon, with cars driving around the vehicle. Police responded to reports that Father appeared to be unconscious or asleep in the car. Minor, then six years old, was in the back seat. When officers arrived, Father initially refused to move his car off the highway but eventually allowed the car to be moved. Father was placed on a hold at Salem Hospital. Father “stated he has complex PTSD and mentioned he has [a] family history of bipolar disorder, but confirmed he doesn’t take medication.” An Oregon social worker met Father in the hospital. Father “began to make random statements” and “to laugh uncontrollably.” Father became “increasingly erra[t]ic,” and the social worker left the room. The social worker spoke with Father’s brother, who reported that Father’s mental health had been a concern for a long time and recently had gotten worse. The social worker next spoke with ICWA representative Mora from Coyote Valley. Mora stated that Minor’s paternal grandmother was planning to drive up to Oregon and she (the grandmother) wanted custody of Minor. Mora did not doubt Minor needed to be removed from Father given his mental health issues. The social worker spoke with the paternal grandmother who said she was coming to pick up Minor and reported her concerns that Father “was not making any sense” in the previous few days. When the social worker tried to speak with Father again, he became aggressive and ran out of his hospital room with staff chasing him. A nurse told the social worker they needed to sedate Father because of his aggression toward staff.

4 The next day, May 5, Coyote Valley representative Mora told an Oregon social services supervisor that Coyote Valley would not take jurisdiction of Minor, but the tribe would like the matter transferred to Mendocino County. Father was admitted to the inpatient psychiatric unit of Salem Hospital that day. Detention and Jurisdiction On May 6, 2025, the Department filed a dependency petition on behalf of Minor under Welfare and Institutions Code4 section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (section 300(b)(1)), alleging Father was unable to supervise or protect Minor adequately and was unable to provide regular care due to mental illness.5 The Department requested that the juvenile court detain Minor. At the detention hearing on May 8, Father, Mother, Minor’s paternal grandmother and paternal uncle, and representatives from Coyote Valley and Dry Creek were present via Zoom. Coyote Valley formally intervened and was designated the lead tribe in the matter. The juvenile court also allowed Dry Creek to appear and participate, and Dry Creek did not dispute Coyote Valley’s status as lead tribe. Minor’s attorney agreed with the Department’s request and asked the court to detain Minor.

4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 5 The petition alleged that Father and Minor were found in Father’s car, which was stopped in the middle lane on an interstate freeway; that Father was placed on a mental health hold in Salem, Oregon; and that, at the hospital, Father made random statements, could not hold a conversation, laughed uncontrollably, and had to be sedated due to his aggressive behavior with hospital staff.

5 Father’s attorney stated that Father wanted Minor placed with the paternal grandmother, with whom Minor was placed during the prior dependency. Minor could continue going to the same school while staying with the paternal grandmother, and Father’s attorney argued that Minor’s schooling should not be disrupted. Coyote Valley’s ICWA representative supported the Department’s request and wanted Minor to stay with the paternal grandmother. She said Coyote Valley believed it was “premature at this time to return to the home of Mother, especially given Mother’s child welfare history,” which included Father being given full custody of Minor in December 2022. She also noted the tribe’s “prior concerns about [Mother’s] substance use and abuse.” Mother asked that Minor be placed with her, although she acknowledged she had a current dependency matter in Sacramento involving another child (Le.M.) who was currently removed from her care. The Department attorney responded that there were “many questions that need to be resolved before the department would feel comfortable releasing [Minor] to the mother.” Mother’s attorney stated that Mother “has alleviated those issues [of domestic violence in the Sacramento case] by engaging in all of the services that were provided to her.” She told the court that Mother had not seen Minor “in about a year” because “she did not know how to get in contact with the father.” Dry Creek’s attorney supported placing Minor with Mother.

6 The juvenile court detained Minor from Father and declined to place Minor with Mother.6 The court ordered supervised visits for both parents and gave the Department discretion to provide unsupervised visits. On June 6, 2025, the Department filed an amended dependency petition with new allegations regarding Mother under section 300, subdivision (j) (section 300(j)).7 At the jurisdictional hearing on July 3, 2025, the juvenile court sustained the section 300(b)(1) allegations related to Father but did not sustain the section 300(j) allegations related to Mother. The court agreed with Mother’s attorney that there was insufficient evidence of current risk of substantial harm based on the Sacramento dependency case, given the paucity of documentary evidence and the parties’ representations regarding the status of the Sacramento matter.8 The court continued disposition for a later hearing.

6 Regarding its decision not to place Minor with the noncustodial parent, Mother, the court explained, “I am finding a detriment to the child based on the prior welfare history and the noncontact with the mother . . . [for] a substantial period of time. [¶] He is residing with the paternal grandmother. It is a preferred placement for the tribe right now. He is attending school.” 7 It was alleged Mother did not have physical custody of her three children (referring to Minor, his older half-sibling L.M., and his younger half- sibling Le.M.) and the reasons for her lack of custody “have not been adequately remediated.” Minor’s half-brother Le.M. had been removed from Mother’s care in March 2024 and was “currently in an open CWS case in Sacramento County.” 8 Mother’s attorney acknowledged that Le.M. had not yet been returned to Mother’s care in the Sacramento dependency case but reported that Mother was having overnight visits with Le.M. and she expected to obtain stable housing soon. The court observed that Mother had just given birth, and the newborn was in Mother’s care.

7 Contested Disposition In a disposition report dated September 17, 2025, the Department recommended the court (1) order Minor removed from the physical custody of Father, (2) find placement of Minor with Mother would be detrimental to his safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being, and (3) order reunification services for Father and Mother. The report noted a concern regarding mother “that the county social worker from Sacramento County [wa]s recommending for [Mother]’s services to be terminated as she is still in contact with [D.T.] and is showing toxic behaviors in their relationship.” It was reported that D.T. “is in and out of the home and has admitted to relapsing with . . . only one month sober,” which “raises concerns as [Mother] is a recovering addict.” Concerns were also raised that Father was not taking his medication, and Father “stated his current prescription messed with his equilibrium.” In an addendum report dated October 20, the Department reported that Father and Mother had “both been compliant with the Department and their services,” and “[v]isits with each parent have been going well.” The Department wrote, “The only barrier to reunifying [Minor] and his parents is the fact that he has not had any overnights with either parent,” and the Department wanted to “see more overnights to accommodate [Minor] having a smooth transition.” On October 21, 2025, Father filed a brief requesting that the court return Minor to his care with family maintenance. The same day, Mother filed a brief requesting that Minor be placed with her under section 361.2. A contested hearing on disposition was held over two days in October and November 2025, during which the court heard from an expert on ICWA matters, social workers who observed visits with the parents, Mother, the 8 maternal grandfather, the paternal grandmother, and Father. Coyote Valley also submitted evidence showing that in February 2025, Father had been debarred from tribal premises for one year “based on the continued pattern of harassment, disruption and safety concerns,” which followed a six-month debarment in April 2024 for similar behavior. ICWA expert9 Richard England testified that he believed Minor’s return to Father’s care or placement with Mother would cause Minor “emotional and/or physical damage.” He found that Minor “did not have a strong bond or attachment with mom” as they were “essentially, estranged” for a couple years, and abruptly taking Minor out of his community—“away from his culture, his family, his grandmother, safety, security”—could be detrimental psychologically and emotionally. He also took into account Mother’s history of substance use and domestic violence. England noted Coyote Valley approved of Minor’s current placement with the paternal grandmother, and he believed the Department had made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. Mother testified that Minor had been living with Father for four years, and during that time, she had three or four visits with Minor, with the last visit around June 2023. Since Minor was detained in May 2025, Mother had three in-person visits with Minor and also saw him at his birthday party. In the Sacramento dependency matter, Mother’s son Le.M. was removed from 9 Under Cal-ICWA, a “qualified expert witness” (QEW) is required to “testify regarding whether continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child” whenever the juvenile court is “considering whether to remove an Indian child from the custody of a parent.” (§ 224.6, subds. (a) and (b).) The QEW “may be designated by the child’s tribe as qualified to testify to the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian child’s tribe.” (Id., subd. (a).) England was the designated QEW in this case.

9 her care when he was 10 months old. Now about two-and-a-half, he was recently returned to Mother’s care with family maintenance. Mother did not know whether she had a case plan under family maintenance. Mother testified that she had not been in a relationship with D.T. for over a year and a half, and she denied any knowledge of being found with him by Sheriff’s deputies in October 2024.10 The paternal grandmother testified Father used to have outbursts where he would yell at her, but he had improved. She believed Father was ready for Minor to return to his home “[s]lowly.” By “slowly” returning Minor to Father, the paternal grandmother meant that she would check in on Father every other day and, “if I have to take him [Minor], I will take him.” She thought it was important for Father to take his medication “so that it doesn’t cause trauma for [Minor],” but she also thought Father “need[ed] to be assessed . . . by a doctor a little bit more” because he currently seemed “overmedicated, because he’s not himself.” Before he was detained, Minor had missed about two months of school while in Father’s care. Father testified that the incident on May 4, 2025, occurred because he had “an anxiety attack while driving,” so he stopped. He had anxiety because he “was going through multiple situations” and “was physically assaulted,” although he did not know when he was assaulted. He was prescribed antidepressant medication at the time, but he had run out. At the time of hearing, Father had a therapist, but he could not recall that last time he saw her; he missed an appointment and then “just never got back to making 10 A Sacramento Sheriff’s Office narrative report documenting deputies’

interaction with Mother and D.T. on October 26, 2024, during which they found a hypodermic needle and a baggie of methamphetamine in Mother’s backpack was an exhibit to the Department’s jurisdiction report.

10 another date for a therapy session.” Father testified he was not learning anything from his therapist. He was taking medication for manic depression, and his medication used to make him tired and he would sleep until 2:00 or 3:00 p.m., but his medication had changed recently. Before Minor was detained, Father “wasn’t taking him to school,” but he said this was because Minor was being bullied at school. In addition to the debarment preventing him from going on Coyote Valley premises, Father’s aunt had a restraining order against Father. Mother’s attorney argued against returning Minor to Father’s care. She argued Father demonstrated “no insight as to his progress in therapy or in his work with his caseworker” and observed that “he appeared out of it” at the last hearing, “suggesting that his mental health remains unstable.” Dry Creek’s attorney agreed with Mother’s position that Minor should be placed with her. Father’s attorney asked the court to deny placement with Mother and return Minor to him. The Department’s attorney “recognize[d] that both parents are what the Department believes to be very close to FM,” that is, either parent might soon be ready to take custody of Minor with family maintenance. But the Department first wanted Minor to have overnight visits “with both parents to assess how that goes” because “that’s a more accurate reflection of what it would be like in [family maintenance].” Coyote Valley’s attorney agreed with the Department that it was premature for Father or Mother to receive custody or placement of Minor and there was clear evidence of detriment. The tribe further objected to overnight visits with either parent without notice and consent of the tribe.

11 Minor’s attorney agreed with the Department that there should be overnight visits before Minor is placed in the home of either parent. She hoped Mother and Father eventually could share physical custody of Minor.11 In written “Findings and Orders after Dispositional Hearing” filed November 18, 2025, the juvenile court adjudged Minor a dependent of the court and removed Minor from Father’s physical custody. The court found the Department made active and timely efforts to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and those efforts proved unsuccessful. It further found that placing Minor with Mother would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of Minor. Minor was placed with the paternal grandmother, and it was noted that Minor was “placed in accordance with the preferences established by the tribe.” The juvenile court ordered reunification services for Father and Mother and ordered supervised visitation with the Department given discretion to expand visitation to unsupervised and overnight visits. DISCUSSION A. Father’s Claims 1. Jurisdictional Finding Father contends the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that there was a substantial risk Minor would suffer serious physical harm or illness as the result of Father’s failure or inability to adequately supervise or protect him due to mental illness. (§ 300(b)(1).) Father does not dispute that he suffers from a mental disorder, 11 Minor’s attorney hoped for “a concrete plan” in which “the Court will make an order that these are the steps we’re going to follow, and this is how mom gets . . . [Minor] into her home so many nights a week, and this is how dad has [Minor] in his home so many nights a week, and these are the things we’re going to do, and this is how it’s going to work.”

12 but he argues his “mental health crisis while driving on the Oregon freeway on May 4, 2025,” was insufficient to show his mental disorder “precludes him from safely caring for his son.” We disagree.12 First and foremost, Father’s attempt to minimize the seriousness of the May 4 incident is unpersuasive. He claims he “made the best out of a bad situation,” by stopping his car when he experienced an anxiety attack, and “[t]he anxiety attack, itself, was not father’s fault, other than the fact that he was not on his medication at the time.” But the juvenile court found the May 4 incident to be “very traumatic” and “life threatening.” The court’s characterization is supported by the record. Father was found apparently unconscious in his stopped car in the middle of an interstate freeway with cars driving by (presumably driving at freeway speeds) and Minor in the car. When Father was taken from the freeway to the hospital, his behavior was erratic and aggressive, and the hospital had to sedate him to protect staff. Minor was not physically injured on May 4, but the incident nonetheless shows that Father’s mental health issues pose a substantial risk to Minor’s physical safety and emotional well-being. “By enacting section 300, the Legislature intended to protect children who are currently being abused or neglected, ‘and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.’ (§ 300.2, italics added.) The court need not wait until a child is seriously . . . injured to 12 “ ‘[W]here the findings are attacked for insufficiency of the evidence, our power begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence to support them; that we have no power to judge the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to consider the credibility of the witnesses, or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.’ ” (In re Stephen W. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 629, 642.)

13 assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.” (In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843.) Second, the May 4 incident was not an isolated and aberrant incident. Respondent points out that Father threw a rock at Mother while she was holding Minor in 2019 and that Father himself testified he had a physical altercation with his brother in Minor’s presence.13 There was also evidence that Father’s family members had been concerned about Father’s mental health for some time before the May 4 incident and that Father “was not making any sense” in the days before the incident. At a hearing in October 2025, Minor’s attorney observed that everyone present had “heard Father’s outbursts ourselves as he’s come in and out of the courtroom.” In addition, Mother’s attorney observed that Father “appeared out of it” at a court hearing, “suggesting that his mental health remains unstable.” On this record, we conclude substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional finding under section 300(b)(1). 2. Disposition Next, Father claims the dispositional order removing Minor from his care must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence of a substantial danger to Minor’s physical or emotional well-being if Minor were returned to his care. He cites evidence that he engaged in services, he had not had any mental breakdowns since Minor was detained, and his visits with Minor were going well. Father faults the juvenile court for relying on circumstances that preceded detention and he asserts the “court minimized the father’s progress and present positive circumstances.”

13 Father did not file a reply brief on appeal.

14 Again, we disagree. The juvenile court found that prior to the May 4 incident, Father “was experiencing extreme psychological[] issue[s] culminating in a very traumatic life threatening incident on the freeway” and Father’s current “mental stability appears to be . . . an ongoing work in progress.” The court observed that Father’s “mental state remains fragile and the Court believes a longer period of stability is required before placing [Minor] back with father. The Court would like to see consistency in appointments, consistency with medication and behavior, consistency with services.” The court’s findings are supported by the record. Father’s own testimony was that he could not remember the last time he saw his therapist; he missed an appointment and then never made another one. Asked why he recently stopped engaging in services, Father testified that he had “a fear of court, so [he] go[es] into this depression . . . .” He said, “I stopped attending because I went into a shell.” Father also testified he was not learning anything from his therapist. Father’s mother observed that Father seemed “overmedicated, because he’s not himself,” and Minor’s attorney and Mother’s attorney also commented on Father’s behavior at court. We find sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing Minor from Father’s care. B. Mother’s Claims Mother contends the juvenile court erred in denying placement of Minor with her, and the Department did not make active efforts to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. Dry Creek has filed an amicus curiae brief 15 in support of Mother’s appeal and Coyote Valley as intervenor has filed an answer to Dry Creek’s brief.14 1. Denial of Placement When a juvenile court removes a child adjudged a dependent under section 300, “the court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) “Section 361.2, subdivision (a) does not mandate placement with the noncustodial parent absent a judicial examination of the circumstances of the parent and child.” (In re Nickolas T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1506.) “The court may assign such weight to a prior removal order or detriment finding against a noncustodial parent as it considers appropriate in view of the parent’s and child’s current circumstances.” (Ibid.) “In many cases, . . . the noncustodial parent’s history and circumstances will clearly warrant a detriment finding. [Citation.] In other cases, a noncustodial parent, 14 Coyote Valley’s answering brief, the last brief filed in this appeal, was filed September 1, 2026. Here, we note that “[w]e do not consider issues raised by amici that were not raised by the parties in their appellate briefs.” (Disney Platform Distribution, Inc. v. City of Santa Barbara (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 238, 243, fn. 3; see In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1154, fn., 7 [“Ordinarily, an amicus must take the case as it finds it and accept the issues tendered by the parties to the appeal,” and “California courts will not consider issues raised for the first time by an amicus”].) Accordingly, to the extent Dry Creek may have raised appellate issues different from Mother’s, we do not address them.

16 notwithstanding a previous removal order or detriment finding, may have remedied the conditions that led to the prior dependency proceedings, maintained a parental relationship with the child and stabilized his or her circumstances.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Mother argues there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s detriment finding under section 361.2.15 She asserts, “Although Father had been awarded sole custody after a prior dependency case, . . . Mother had ameliorated the reasons for [Minor]’s removal since that award of custody, and she had two of [Minor]’s siblings in her care.” Mother acknowledges she “had a case established in 2024 for a younger child, 15 In a heading to one of her appellate arguments, Mother asserts there was no “substantial evidence that placement was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to minor” under 25 United States Code section 1912. (Capitalization and bolding omitted.) 25 United States Code section 1912(e) provides, “No foster care placement may be ordered . . . in the absence of a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” (Italics added.) Mother does not explain why this statute should apply to her when she did not have custody of Minor at the time he was detained from Father. Indeed, after citing the statute in the argument heading, she makes no legal argument at all about the application of this statute to her circumstances. “The juvenile court’s judgment is presumed to be correct, and it is appellant's burden to affirmatively show error. To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a point is asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’ ” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) Mother has waived any argument related to 25 United States Code 1912(e). (See Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [when an appellant asserts a point “but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived”].)

17 however, that case did not involve substance abuse and by the time of the Disposition hearing she had been clean for a year . . ., and she had reunified with the younger child.” Mother’s argument shows why she believes Minor should have been placed with her, but she fails to show that no substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s contrary determination. In stating its decision not to place Minor with Mother at the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court explained that some of its “findings are based on history.” The court considered the circumstances that, at the beginning of this case, Mother “was considered for bypass due to failure to reunify in the 2021 case with [Minor],” and she “had an open CPS case, 300 dependency action in Sacramento which began with detention of [Minor]’s sibling.” The court noted the Sacramento case involved “domestic violence between mother and the father of [Minor]’s two siblings,” “Mother was in reunification up until September 10th of 2025, about six weeks before disposition was begun in this matter,” and she “is still under the supervision of Sacramento, CPS, the tribe, and the Court.” The court also considered that Mother had sporadic or no contact with Minor for a three-year period, “culminating in no visitation” for a year prior to the current case. The court found detriment to Minor’s emotional well-being if he were to be immediately placed with Mother, abruptly “removing him from extended family, his school, which he . . . is attending consistently with—with the help of paternal grandmother, removal from his after school program with cousins on the reservation, removal from his paternal grandmother who he’s been living with and seeing every day for the last six months and removal from the tribe.” The juvenile court properly relied on Mother’s “history and circumstances” as well as Minor’s circumstances in making its detriment 18 finding. (In re Nickolas T., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1506.) Mother’s prior dependency with Minor, her current dependency in Sacramento—in which two-and-half-year old Le.M. was out of Mother’s care for 18 months and Mother only recently regained custody with family maintenance, Mother’s general absence from Minor’s life since he was three years old, and the fact that placing Minor with Mother in Sacramento would mean removing Minor from his tribal community, his grandmother and other relatives, and his school provide sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that placing Minor with Mother at disposition would be detrimental to his well-being. 2. Active Efforts to Prevent the Breakup of the Indian Family “[A] party seeking an involuntary foster care placement of . . . an Indian child shall provide evidence to the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.” (§ 361.7, subd. (a); 25 U.S.C. § 1912.) “What constitutes active efforts shall be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The active efforts shall be made in a manner that takes into account the prevailing social and cultural values, conditions, and way of life of the Indian child’s tribe. Active efforts shall utilize the available resources of the Indian child’s extended family, tribe, tribal and other Indian social service agencies, and individual Indian caregiver service providers.” (§ 361.7, subd. (b). “Under California law, there is no significant difference between ‘active efforts’ required by ICWA and ‘reasonable services’ required in both ICWA and non-ICWA cases under section 366.21, subdivision (g)(1). . . . ‘[T]he standards in assessing whether “active efforts” were made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and whether reasonable services under state 19 law were provided, are essentially undifferentiable.’ ” (C.F. v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 227, 238.) We review a finding that “active efforts” have been made “for substantial evidence, under which ‘ “ ‘we review the record in a light most favorable to the judgment and must uphold the trial court’s findings unless it can be said that no rational factfinder could reach the same conclusion.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 239.) Mother argues active efforts were not made, claiming the Department failed to “provide the visitation necessary to successfully reunify Mother and [Minor]” and “fail[ed] to conduct a ‘comprehensive assessment of the circumstances of the Indian child’s family, with a focus on safe reunification as the most desirable goal’ as required by [section 224.1, subdivision] (f)(1).” Mother’s argument fails to show that no substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding of active efforts. The record shows Mother had visits with Minor two to three times per week via Zoom, and the paternal grandmother had been facilitating such visits since the detention hearing on May 6, 2025. To the extent Mother’s complaint is that she was not provided enough in-person visitation, the Department reasonably responds that delay in expanding visitation was “due to Mother’s back and forth progress in services” and her “declining to travel to the visit location as required by court order.” We do not believe the Department was required to transport Minor from Mendocino County to Sacramento to facilitate visitation with Mother.16 We also conclude that the Department’s reports provide an adequate assessment of the circumstances of Minor’s family for purposes of section 224.1, subdivision (f)(1).

16 We also note that Coyote Valley objected to unsupervised or overnight visits with Mother, and we do not fault the Department for considering Minor’s tribe’s wishes in providing services.

20 In short, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s active-efforts finding. DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s orders appealed from are affirmed.

_________________________ Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ Richman, Acting P. J.

_________________________ Desautels, J.

A174912, Mendocino County Department of Family and Children’s Services v. T.R., et al.