Andre A. v. Superior Court CA1/3

Opinion

Filed 9/18/26 Andre A. v. Superior Court CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ANDRE A., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF A176996 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, (Contra Costa County Respondent; Super. Ct. No. J25-00345) CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU, Real Party in Interest.

Andre A. seeks review by extraordinary writ of a juvenile court order setting a hearing to select a permanent plan for his seven-year-old daughter, Y.L. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; subsequent undesignated statutory references are to this code.) He requests that we reverse the order on the ground that he was denied his statutory and constitutional right to notice of this dependency case and the opportunity to appear and attempt to elevate his parental status. We grant the petition.

1 BACKGROUND In June 2025, the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau) filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of Y.L. The petition identifies Y.L.’s mother as Carolyn L. (mother) and her father as unknown. Jurisdiction was alleged pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1)) based on the substantial risk of harm associated with mother’s untreated mental health issues and negligent failure to obtain necessary dental treatment for Y.L. According to the detention/jurisdiction report, mother was homeless, displayed symptoms of mental illness, had a history of drug abuse, and there were concerns about domestic violence involving a former boyfriend. Before the dependency petition was filed, the Bureau attempted to work with mother to implement a safety plan for Y.L. However, on June 16, 2025, mother could not be located, and so Y.L. was taken into protective custody and placed with a maternal relative on an emergency basis. The Bureau reported that mother did not disclose the name of Y.L.’s father, but on the very day Y.L. was taken into protective custody maternal aunts identified him as a man named Andre. Although mother’s siblings were uncertain of Andre’s last name, an Emergency Response Worker found his full name the following day, searching child welfare services records relating to mother. Accordingly, the Bureau reported that on June 17, 2025 it initiated an absent parent search for Andre A. The Bureau also reported that mother has two older children who were removed from her custody. O.L., who was an adult, had been raised by a grandmother, and eight-year-old J.B. lived with his father. Bureau records pertaining to O.L.’s dependency case indicated that in 2010, O.L. was placed temporarily in the care of Andre A., who was a family friend.

2 Mother did not appear at the detention hearing held on June 20, 2025. County Counsel reported that Andre A. was an alleged father, and that the Bureau would continue to try to find him if they had “enough information to do the absent parent search.” The court made findings to detain Y.L. from mother and ordered weekly supervised visitation. The jurisdiction hearing was initially scheduled for July 11, 2025. Mother’s counsel appeared without her, and the matter was continued for a contest later that month. On July 28, mother appeared at the contested hearing and submitted to jurisdiction pursuant to amended allegations that she had delayed getting dental treatment for Y.L due to untreated mental health issues. During the hearing, the juvenile court examined mother to establish that she was knowingly and voluntarily admitting the amended allegations, confirmed that mother understood she would be entitled to “a minimum” of 12 months of reunification services, and reviewed with her the potential consequences if she failed to reunify with Y.L. The court did not ask mother about the identity or whereabouts of Y.L.’s father. The disposition hearing was set for early September 2025. The Bureau recommended adjudging Y.L. a dependent and offering family reunification services to mother. As to paternity, the disposition report described Andre A. as an alleged father who is not named on Y.L’s birth certificate. The Bureau reported that mother had been unable to provide identifying information for the child’s father, and that it would “continue to make efforts to identify, locate and contact Andre [A.], in the event additional information is provided.” The disposition hearing was continued at the request of the Bureau, and continued again for a contest. The contested hearing was held on November 5, 2025. Mother did not appear. Y.L. was adjudged a dependent 3 and removed from the custody of mother; reunification services were ordered for mother; and the matter was continued for a six-month review. The six month review was set for April 22, 2026. The Bureau filed a status report recommending that the court terminate mother’s services and set another review hearing. Mother had been absent throughout the reunification period, was reportedly still homeless, and the Bureau was unable to locate her. As to Andre A., the Bureau reiterated that it would “continue to make efforts to identify, locate, and contact [him] in the event additional information is provided.” On April 22, 2026, the date of the review hearing, the Bureau filed a Request to Change Court Order pursuant to section 388, requesting that the court terminate mother’s reunification services so that the Bureau could proceed with “assessing permanency options.” At the hearing, the court clarified that the Bureau was seeking to shorten the standard 12-month reunification period by having the court immediately terminate mother’s services. In light of that request, the six month review was set for a contest, to be heard in conjunction with the section 388 petition. The contested hearing was set for May 20, 2026. Andre A. appeared at the hearing with his adult daughter and introduced himself as Y.L.’s father. The court indicated that counsel would be appointed for Andre at a later date. Andre stated that he had received a call the previous day, felt “blind- sided,” and did not know what was “going on.” The court briefly described the situation; told Andre that an appointed attorney would assist him in presenting information about paternity; and indicated that the court would make “some legal decisions . . . regarding that” before going forward. The court then granted a request by minor’s counsel to continue the hearing as to the pending contested matters.

4 On June 3, 2026, the court appointed counsel for Andre A., and he immediately requested visitation. The court responded that visitation was premature as Andre was only an alleged father, and requested clarification as to what he wanted. Andre’s counsel responded that Andre did not contest paternity and would like to be elevated to presumed father status. The court asked for an “offer of proof,” but those issues were deferred for consideration at a later hearing. Prior to the continued hearing on the contested matters, the Bureau submitted a memorandum to update the court. Mother “continued to remain largely absent and disengaged with the Bureau.” Y.L.’s caregiver was unwilling to adopt or to pursue a legal guardianship; the caregiver was willing to offer a placement for two to four years, but she wanted Y.L. to reunite with a parent. The Bureau contacted several relatives who were not interested in a placement, and then made a family finding referral. The Bureau also reported that the case worker had two telephone conversations with Andre A. after he appeared at the May 2026 hearing. When the case worker asked whether Andre had been aware that the Bureau had an open case pertaining to Y.L., he responded, “ ‘No one ever reached out to me about the case.’ ” Andre said that mother’s sister had called him and said mother was not doing well, and then the case worker told him to come to court. Andre A. told the social worker that he and mother had not been in a relationship, but he had known there was a possibility he could be Y.L’s father. He also shared that he has several other children, ranging in age from pre-teen to adult, and that he has relationships with all of them. Andre told the case worker that if Y.L. is his daughter, he wants full custody.

5 The contested review hearing was held on July 1, 2026. Mother did not appear. Andre A. appeared with counsel. The court addressed pending matters as follows. First, a paternity test was ordered for Andre after all parties agreed to the order. Next, the court addressed the Bureau’s section 388 petition. The Bureau argued that mother’s services should be terminated due to her lack of contact with Y.L. or the Bureau. Minor’s counsel concurred, while mother’s counsel opposed the petition but submitted the matter without argument. The court granted the section 388 petition, finding that mother had not engaged in her case plan at all and that Y.L. needs permanency and stability. Next, the court conducted a six-month review. The court made findings as to mother’s noncompliance with her case plan; the Bureau’s reasonable efforts to assist mother; and mother’s lack of progress toward alleviating the problems that led to the dependency. The court also found, among other things, that Y.L. could not be safely returned to mother and terminated mother’s services. Then the court turned to the Bureau’s request to set a section 366.26 hearing, as mother’s services had been terminated. The court granted the request without inviting argument or otherwise discussing the propriety of the request. It advised Andre A. that the matter was being set for a section 366.26 hearing and stated: “You must seek an extraordinary writ by filing a notice of intent to file a writ petition and request for record within seven days of today’s decision.” The court went on to opine that paternity results would be back before the section 366.26 hearing date, and that there would be time to address that issue, either before or at the hearing. The court also proposed reserving visitation as to Andre A. until after “we figure out the paternity 6 issue.” Andre’s counsel agreed that was “fair,” and the other parties concurred. The section 366.26 hearing was set for October 7, 2026. Andre A. filed his notice of intent to file a writ petition on July 9, 2026. The results of his paternity test establishing he is Y.L’s biological father were issued on August 10.1 The following week, Andre A. filed his petition, which was met with vigorous opposition from the Bureau. DISCUSSION Andre A. (father) contends the order setting a section 366.26 hearing must be reversed because the Bureau and juvenile court violated his statutory and constitutional right to timely notice of Y.L.’s dependency. The Bureau acknowledges we “consider de novo whether inadequate notice violated father’s due process rights.” (In re Mia M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 792, 806 (Mia M.).) The Bureau disputes that in this case father’s notice rights were violated, and it argues the order setting a section 366.26 hearing should be affirmed in any event. When the section 366.26 hearing was set, father was an alleged father, “a man who may be a child’s father but has not yet established either presumed father status or biological paternity.” (In re A.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 340, 350 (A.H.).) Thus, his rights were relatively limited. Alleged fathers are not entitled to custody, reunification services or visitation. (Ibid.; In re J.W.-P. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 298, 301 (J.W.-P.) However, an alleged father in a dependency case has the constitutionally protected right to notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to appear, to assert a position, and to attempt to elevate his parental status. (A.H., at 1 We grant Andre A.’s unopposed motion for judicial notice of the results of his paternity test.

7 pp. 350–351; In re Kobe A. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1120.) We conclude that father’s right to such notice was violated in at least three material ways. First, section 316.2, subdivision (b) requires that each alleged father in a dependency case “shall” be provided notice “alleging that he is or could be the father of the child,” along with specific information pertaining to the dependency proceeding. (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.635(g); all rule references are to these rules.) Here, father was identified as Y.L’s alleged father at the very beginning of this dependency case, and yet he was not named in the dependency petition. Nor does the record contain information about the Bureau’s efforts to locate father, other than the simple assertion “an Absent Parent Search for Andre [A.] was initiated” but “results have not been received.” Moreover, we find no indication father was ever provided with the notice required by section 316.2, even after he appeared at the May 2026 hearing. Failure to provide such notice constitutes error because it deprives the alleged father of “crucial” information regarding the “process for elevating his status from alleged father and the consequences of not doing so.” (J.W.-P., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 306.) Second, section 361.2, subdivision (a) required the juvenile court to conduct an inquiry of mother (and any other appropriate person) as to the identity and address of all presumed or alleged fathers. The statute provides for this inquiry to be conducted at the detention hearing, “or as soon thereafter as practicable.” (Ibid.) Moreover, rule 5.635 “ ‘imposes a continuing duty on the juvenile court to inquire about parentage at every hearing from the very beginning of a dependency case until the question of parentage has been resolved.’ ” (In re A.K. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 252, 264 (A.K); see also A.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 364.) In the present case, mother did not appear at any hearing other than the contested jurisdiction 8 hearing, and unfortunately, the court did not take that opportunity to conduct any inquiry about the identity or whereabouts of Y.L.’s father. The blame for that lost opportunity rests also with the Bureau, who failed to bring the matter to the court’s attention at or before the hearing. Third, the record shows that father was not afforded any opportunity to elevate his parental status before the court set the section 366.26 hearing. On May 20, 2026, father made his first appearance, apparently in response to the caseworker’s directive of the previous day. Despite having no prior knowledge of Y.L.’s dependency case, father promptly attempted to assert his parental rights. But he was not appointed counsel until two weeks later (on June 3), and no paternity test was ordered for four more weeks (on July 1), even though Andre had expressed his desire to be elevated to presumed father status. This delay in ordering a paternity test was significant because a court “may order reunification services for biological fathers if they are in the child’s best interest but may not do so for alleged fathers.” (J.W.-P., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 301.) Then in spite of these delays and instead of waiting for the paternity test results, the court granted the Bureau’s request to set the section 366.26 hearing to select a permanent plan for Y.L. before the standard 12-month reunification period was over. We believe that setting a permanency planning hearing when father had only just appeared, and despite the fact that it appears no meaningful inquiry as to the paternity of Y.L. had ever been conducted, put father at an unfair and potentially unsurmountable disadvantage. At the section 366.26 hearing, the issues are limited to determining whether the child is adoptable and whether terminating parental rights would be detrimental under one of the statutory exceptions set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1). (In re Ninfa S. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 808, 811 (Ninfa S.).) The court does not 9 entertain requests for parental custody. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630–631.) “In fact, it is not permissible to order reunification at the section 366.26 hearing. [Citations.] Indeed, when the court orders the section 366.26 hearing, . . . the assumption is that the problems that led to the court taking jurisdiction have not been resolved.” (Id. at p. 630.) The law appears settled that a juvenile court “does not err by terminating a biological father’s parental rights when he has had the opportunity to show presumed father status and has not done so.” (Ninfa S., supra, 62 Cal.App.4th. at p. 811; see also In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351.) Father was afforded no such opportunity before this section 366.26 hearing was set. The Bureau contends father’s notice rights were not violated because his whereabouts were unknown despite the fact that the Bureau exercised reasonable diligence to locate him. This argument misunderstands the requirements of “reasonable diligence” and mischaracterizes the record. “Because parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their children, the due process clause requires child welfare agencies to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to locate and notify them of dependency proceedings.” (In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 569, 572.) As a corollary to this law, “ ‘[t]here is no due process violation where a child welfare services agency has exercised reasonable diligence to provide notice to a parent whose whereabouts are unknown.” (Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 807.) “ ‘On this score, reasonable diligence “denotes a thorough, systematic investigation and an inquiry conducted in good faith.” [Citation.] It includes searching not only “standard avenues available to help locate a missing parent,” but “ ‘specific ones most likely, under the unique facts known to the [agency], to yield [a 10 parent’s] address.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 807–808.) “This is no idle command. It requires a thorough and systematic investigation to protect a parent’s fundamental liberty interest.” (J.R., at p. 572.) Applying these standards, we find the Bureau did not exercise reasonable diligence. It knew father’s first and last name from the outset of this proceeding, and its own records confirmed that he was a longtime family friend who had previously cared for mother’s older child. Yet we find no evidence that the Bureau exercised any diligence in attempting to locate father. Did it search public databases or social media sites for possible leads? Did it ask mother’s family members about ways he might be reached? Attempting to shift the blame for its failure to find father, the Bureau asserts before this court that “[i]t appears [a maternal aunt] purposefully concealed Father’s identity and contact information that would have allowed the Bureau to locate him.” But the only evidence the Bureau cites in support of this accusation is its report that on the day Y.L. was taken into protective custody, when the maternal aunts informed the Bureau that Y.L.’s father was a man named Andre, they were uncertain of his last name. There is no indication that the aunts were asked at that time whether they knew how to find an address or telephone number for Andre, nor that the Bureau circled back after it had found Andre’s last name to see if the maternal aunts could supply any leads to help them find him. Instead, the reports evince a passive approach, suggesting the Bureau felt no responsibility to search for Y.L.’s father unless by chance some information was offered up. In its detention report the Bureau stated that it had initiated an absent parent search for Andre A. However, it never reported any results of that search, any steps taken or roadblocks encountered in the search, or indeed anything to substantiate that a search had actually occurred. (Cf. In re Daniel F. (2021)

11 64 Cal.App.5th 701, 706 (Daniel F.) [child welfare worker submitted an “ ‘Absent Parent search request’ ” that was never received or processed].) “ ‘Social services agencies, invested with a public trust and acting as temporary custodians of dependent minors, are bound by law to make every reasonable effort in attempting to inform parents of all hearings. They must leave no stone unturned.’ ” (Daniel F., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 711.) In Daniel F., the record showed that the Agency “made little to no effort” to give an alleged father notice “until it was poised to terminate parental rights.” (Id. at p. 715.) The same happened here, or so it appears. If the Bureau turned a single stone after learning Andre’s last name, we find no evidence of it in this record. In re R.A. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 826, decided by another division of this court, provides additional support for our decision. The R.A. court granted a father’s petition to reverse an order setting a section 366.26 hearing based on the father’s showing that the agency failed to use reasonable diligence to locate him. (Id. at pp. 837–840.) In that case, the father’s writ was consolidated with his appeal from an order denying his section 388 petition to set aside prior orders and findings on the ground that he was not sufficiently notified of the dependency proceedings. (Id. at p. 832.) Reversing the summary denial of the father’s section 388 petition, the R.A. court stated: “We cannot accept the idea that an agency may completely ignore its duty to search for a missing parent and then, should the missing parent show up, rely on the best interest of the child to preclude that parent from participating in the dependency case.” (Id. at p. 839.) The Bureau attempts to distinguish R.A., and multiple other cases confirming that an agency’s failure to provide notice to a parent constitutes reversible error, on both substantive and procedural grounds. None of those 12 arguments is persuasive. The Bureau is adamant that father could not be located despite the Bureau’s best efforts to locate him, but it fails to cite evidence to demonstrate that it made any effort at all.2 The Bureau’s notion that it had no obligation to search for father unless or until somebody provided his date of birth or social security number cannot be squared with the reasonable diligence standards established by the case law. We are equally unpersuaded by the Bureau’s argument that father’s writ should be summarily denied because he did not file a section 388 petition in the juvenile court. According to the Bureau, cases recognizing that a parent may challenge the agency’s failure to provide adequate notice by filing a section 388 petition establish that father’s writ petition is procedurally improper. (Citing, e.g., Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 792; A.K., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th 252.) We reject this argument, which overlooks the settled rule that a “case is not authority for a proposition not considered therein or an issue not presented by its own particular facts.” (Satten v. Webb (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 365, 383.) A section 388 petition is unquestionably an “ ‘appropriate method for raising a due process challenge based on lack of notice.’ ” (Mia M., at p. 807.) However, we know of no case establishing that such a petition is the only appropriate method for raising such a challenge, 2 We take particular issue with the Bureau’s representation that “the Bureau and court frequently discussed efforts to determine paternity and locate father.” The Bureau refers us to the June 2026 hearing, when father was appointed counsel. The transcript of that hearing contains no discussion of the Bureau’s efforts to locate father. The Bureau also references a brief exchange during the disposition hearing, when it requested that the court make findings that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply. County Counsel stated that the court had deferred making ICWA findings at the detention hearing “in hopes that we would be able to locate the father, and at this time, we have not.” We reject any suggestion that such offhand remarks establish reasonable diligence.

13 particularly in a case such as this where the Bureau failed to comply with its statutory duty. (Cf. In re Isabella G. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 708, 712 [when agency failed to complete relative home assessment as required by law, minor’s relative was entitled to placement hearing without having to file a section 388 petition].) Where a parent fails to receive due process notice of juvenile dependency proceedings, a “ ‘ “fatal defect” ’ ” in the jurisdiction of the juvenile court mars the dependency judgment. (Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 807.) And when a dependency judgment is shown to be fatally defective, we fail to see why the case ought to proceed to permanency planning. The Bureau cites no authority precluding the writ relief that father seeks here. The dependency statute requires that an order setting a section 366.26 hearing and any “findings subsumed therein” must be challenged in a petition for extraordinary writ to preserve those issues for a later appeal. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413; § 366.26, subd. (l).) Here, the order setting the permanency planning hearing subsumed findings that the Bureau and the court had made adequate efforts to locate Y.L.’s father and provide him with timely notice of the dependency case. Such findings can properly be challenged by filing a writ to vacate the setting of a section 366.26 hearing. (In re Suhey G. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 732, 742 (Suhey G.).) The petitioner in Suhey G. was the noncustodial father of a five-year- old child who had been removed from her mother and placed with a maternal relative. (Suhey G., supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 735.) The father sought to vacate two juvenile court orders made at a six-month review hearing during which the mother’s reunification services were terminated: (1) an order for the father to be evaluated under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of 14 Children (ICPC); and (2) an order setting a section 366.26 hearing to select a permanent plan for the child. (Suhey G., at pp. 734–735.) The Suhey G. court reviewed the petition on the merits, and vacated the order setting the permanency planning hearing after finding that the petitioner was denied “a fair opportunity” to request that his daughter be placed with him under section 361.2, which governs placement of a child with a noncustodial parent after the child’s initial removal from parental custody. (Suhey G., at p. 735.) Despite distinctions regarding father’s parental status here, our decision parallels the relief granted in Suhey G. Suhey G. recounts the following pertinent facts: The social services agency made inadequate efforts to locate the minor’s father, who lived in Idaho, or to serve him with timely notice of the dependency. (Suhey G., supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at pp. 743–744.) Consequently, the father had no opportunity to appear at the disposition hearing and request placement under section 361.2. (Suhey G. at pp. 743–744; see id. at p.736.) After the father “[s]erendipitously” learned about the case, he requested custody and appeared at a six-month review. (Id. at pp. 744, 737.) Following a contested hearing, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s services, and ordered an ICPC evaluation of the father. The court also set a section 366.26 hearing, stating that it believed it was required to set the hearing and that an update on father’s ICPC evaluation could be considered then. (Id. at p. 738.) Father then filed his writ petition, which took several months to resolve. In the meantime more relevant events were reported to the appellate court. Among other things, a series of abuse allegations against the relative caregivers that started early in the case were finally addressed by the agency and disclosed to the juvenile court; and the agency agreed to place the minor with her 15 father, after previously resisting that option without explanation. (Id. at pp. 738–741.) In granting the father’s writ, the Suhey G. court found that although the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering an ICPC evaluation, it did err by setting a section 366.26 hearing without requiring the agency to show that a placement with the father would have been detrimental to the child under section 361.2. (Suhey G., supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 743.) The court rejected the agency’s argument that the burden was on the father to file a section 388 petition to have the child placed with him; because the agency had failed to make adequate efforts to locate and serve father, the burden remained with the agency to show that a placement under section 361.2 was not warranted, the appellate court found. (Id. at pp. 743–745.) The court also found that the agency had failed to provide the juvenile court with accurate information about its inadequate search efforts, or about the mounting abuse allegations against the relative caregivers. (Id. at pp. 745–746.) Most importantly for our purposes, the appellate court concluded the juvenile court had erred by setting a section 366.26 hearing when the record demonstrated the agency had failed to facilitate reunification of the child with her father. (Id. at p. 746.) As in Suhey G., this record clearly shows that the Bureau failed in its obligation to conduct a reasonable search for a dependent child’s father, and failed to disclose these deficiencies to the juvenile court. The juvenile court in this case also appears to have assumed it had no choice but to set the section 366.26 hearing once it terminated services to the parent from whom the child was removed. Under these circumstances, setting the section 366.26 hearing deprived father of a sufficient opportunity to seek to elevate his parental status. Like the petitioner in Suhey G., father has demonstrated that he can 16 proceed by writ to vacate the section 366.26 hearing, even in the absence of a section 388 petition. The Bureau also argues that father’s notice challenge is forfeited because he did not object when the juvenile court set the section 366.26 hearing. We disagree that the issue has been forfeited given the facts presented to us. The Bureau’s apparent misunderstanding of its obligation to conduct a reasonable search for Y.L.’s father tainted this entire proceeding, such that it was pushing to accelerate the setting of the section 366.26 hearing, even as the court was still appointing counsel for father. The juvenile court then set the section 366.26 hearing without eliciting the views of father’s counsel, after addressing only with the other parties the contested matters that arose during the period father’s notice rights had been violated. The court also made comments that could reasonably be construed as directing father to challenge the setting of the section 366.26 hearing by filing a writ petition, which is exactly what he did. Under these circumstances, we do not insist on the prerequisite of a formal objection to the setting of the section 366.26 hearing. Finally, the Bureau argues that any error in failing to give father notice was harmless because it is not reasonably likely he would have achieved presumed father status “even if he appeared early in the dependency.” The Bureau bases this contention on the facts that father was not married to mother or present at Y.L.’s birth, and had not previously supported Y.L. or been involved in her life. But the Bureau cites no authority that any of these are prerequisites for achieving presumed father status. Here, the day after the Bureau’s case worker communicated with father for the first time, father appeared in court and attempted to assert his parental rights and to establish that he is Y.L’s biological father. “ ‘[B]iological 17 fatherhood does not, in and of itself, qualify a man for presumed father status’ ” (A.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 349), but as the Bureau acknowledges, biological fathers may receive reunification services where the juvenile court determines this to be in the best interests of the child. (§ 361.5.) Here, where the child’s existing caregiver does not wish to pursue adoption or guardianship but hopes Y.L. will reunify with a parent, we think it is entirely possible the juvenile court would determine that reunification services for father are in Y.L.’s best interest. We cannot assume, based on a “ ‘dearth of information’ ” about father, that if he had been afforded counsel and established paternity earlier in this case, he would not have received reunification services or have otherwise been able to protect his parental rights. (In re Daniel F., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 716; see also In re Paul H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 753, 761–762.) In sum, father has established that he had a right to notice of Y.L.’s dependency case, that this right was violated, fatally undermining the dependency judgment, and that it was therefore premature for the juvenile court to have set this case for permanency planning before it received the results of the paternity test and gave father a chance to present evidence that Y.L.’s best interests lay in him receiving reunification services. DISPOSITION Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the juvenile court to vacate its July 1, 2026 order setting a section 366.26 hearing. The respondent court is further directed to hold a status review hearing to address the recent appearance of a biological father who was previously denied notice of the dependency proceeding. Our decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

18 TUCHER, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, J. RODRÍGUEZ, J.

Andre A. v. Superior Court (A176996)