Doe v. County of San Diego CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 9/21/26 Doe v. County of San Diego CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JANE DOE, D086071

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2019- v. 00020094-CU-CR-CTL)

THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Matthew C. Braner, Judge. Reversed. Law Offices of Joseph M. McMullen and Joseph M. McMullen; Law Office of Donnie R. Cox and Donnie R. Cox, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Office of County Counsel, County of San Diego, Andrei V. Dumitrescu and Ronald L. Lenert, for Defendant and Respondent. Timothy Wilson, an off-duty sheriff’s deputy, groped 14-year-old Jane Doe at a restaurant and later used the sheriff’s department computer system to access Doe’s personal information. As relevant here, Doe sued Wilson’s employer, The County of San Diego, for common law invasion of privacy under the rule of respondeat superior. The trial court granted summary judgment in the County’s favor. Doe appeals, contending the trial court erred because the issue whether Wilson’s use of the computer system was within the course and scope of his employment could not be decided as a matter of law. We agree and reverse. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Wilson worked as a deputy at the County’s Vista Detention Facility. In March 2018, as Doe stood in line at a restaurant waiting to place an order, Wilson approached from behind and grabbed her buttocks. At the time, Wilson was off-duty and not in uniform. Wilson immediately fled the scene. Doe’s mother called law enforcement. The San Diego County Sheriff’s Department responded and opened an investigation. During the investigation, Doe and her mother provided the sheriff’s department with information, including Doe’s name, home address, cell phone number, and the school she attended. The sheriff’s department also took photos of Doe for the investigation file. Doe’s personal information and photographs were entered into a report maintained in NetRMS, the sheriff’s department’s report- writing software (the computer system). During about a two month period, Wilson accessed Doe’s investigative file in the computer system approximately 44 times. In addition to repeatedly viewing the file, Wilson downloaded Doe’s photographs and wrote down her address. Wilson knew his access violated sheriff’s department policy and admits as much. He testified that he accessed Doe’s information 2 out of “curiosity” and “worry” because he perpetrated the assault. He was arrested after surveillance video from the restaurant identified him as the suspect. He subsequently resigned from the sheriff’s department and pled guilty to sexual assault and unauthorized use of a computer system. After Doe filed this action, the County removed the case to federal court. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, all federal claims were resolved, and the matter was remanded to superior court. The sole remaining claim against the County was for common law invasion of privacy. Doe alleged that Wilson invaded her privacy by using his position as a sheriff’s deputy to access her personal information and that the County was vicariously liable for his conduct. The County moved for summary judgment, arguing Doe could not establish that Wilson acted within the scope of his employment when he accessed her information. The trial court agreed. It found the evidence undisputed that Wilson knew accessing Doe’s file violated County policy and that his actions were not undertaken within the scope of his employment because his motivation for accessing the file was personal rather than law-enforcement related. DISCUSSION Doe contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the County because a reasonable juror could infer from the evidence presented that Wilson was acting within the scope of his employment when he used the County’s computer system to access her personal information. The County disagrees. It argues there are no disputed material facts and the undisputed evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that Wilson was acting outside the scope of his employment because his conduct was motivated by 3 purely personal reasons.1 Accordingly, we first consider the legal framework governing respondeat superior liability and then determine whether the undisputed facts support the County’s position as a matter of law. A. General Legal Principles The trial court and reviewing court evaluate a summary judgment motion under the same framework. (Dollinger DeAnza Associates v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1144.) First, because summary judgment is framed by the pleadings, the court examines the complaint to identify the elements of the causes of action at issue. (Ibid.) Next, the court reviews the moving papers and supporting evidence to determine whether the defendant has met its initial burden of establishing that one or more elements of a claim cannot be proven or that a complete defense exists. (Ibid.) If the defendant makes the required prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence demonstrating a triable issue of material fact. (Ibid.) On appeal, we independently review the record, construing the evidence in the manner most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving and losing party and resolving all doubts and ambiguities in the 1 The County also contends Doe’s invasion of privacy claim is defectively pled because she failed to identify a statutory basis for imposing liability on the County. While the County is correct that Doe did not expressly allege a statutory basis for the County’s liability, it does not follow that her claim is defective. Doe alleges the County is vicariously liable for Wilson’s conduct under a theory of respondeat superior. Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a), provides a public entity “is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would . . . have given rise to a cause of action against that employee . . . .” (See Societa Per Azioni De Navigazione Italia v. City of Los Angeles (1982) 31 Cal.3d 446, 463–464 [public entity is vicariously liable for any injury which its employee causes to the same extent as a private employer].) 4 evidence in the plaintiff’s favor. (Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 620.) Under the respondeat superior doctrine, an employer is vicariously liable “for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of the employment.” (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296 (Lisa M.).) The California Supreme Court articulated “three reasons for applying the respondeat superior doctrine: (1) to prevent recurrence of the tortious conduct; (2) to give greater assurance of compensation for the victim; and (3) to ensure that the victim’s losses will be equitably borne by those who benefit from the enterprise that gave rise to the injury.” (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 209 (Mary M.).) “The employer is liable not because the employer has control over the employee or is in some way at fault, but because the employer’s enterprise creates inevitable risks as a part of doing business.” (Bailey v. Filco, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1559 (Bailey).) “Ordinarily, the determination whether an employee has acted within the scope of employment presents a question of fact; it becomes a question of law, however, when ‘the facts are undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible.’ ” (Mary M., supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 213.) Accordingly, even where the facts are undisputed, if a reasonable trier of fact could draw conflicting inferences from those facts, summary judgment is improper. An employee’s conduct may fall within the scope of employment even if it was not motivated, in whole or in part, by a desire to serve the employer’s interests. (Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 297.) Instead, for purposes of respondeat superior, an employee’s misconduct may remain within the scope of employment even when it is willful, malicious, or criminal and was undertaken without the employer’s authorization. (Id. at pp. 296–297.)

5 Although an employee’s willful, malicious, and even criminal torts may fall within the scope of employment, “an employer is not strictly liable for all actions of its employees during working hours.” (Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 992, 1004 (Farmers).) For the employer to be liable for an intentional tort, the employee’s act must have a “causal nexus to the employee’s work.” (Lisa M., at p. 297.) Courts have articulated the required causal connection in a variety of ways, including that the injury-producing incident must arise out of the employment, the risk of harm must be inherent in the work environment, the risk must be typical of or broadly incidental to the employer’s enterprise, or the tort must constitute a generally foreseeable consequence of the employer’s business. (Id. at pp. 298–299; see also Musgrove v. Silver (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 694, 708–710 [naming the four tests].) Under the latter formulation, foreseeability in the context of determining scope of employment means that in the context of the particular enterprise an employee’s conduct is “ ‘not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s business.’ ” (Farmers, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1004.) Some courts have condensed the foreseeability premise into a two-prong disjunctive test. (Bailey, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1559.) The conduct of an employee falls within the scope of his or her employment if the conduct either (1) is required by or incidental to the employee’s duties, or (2) it is reasonably foreseeable in light of the employer’s business. (Id. at p. 1559; see CACI No. 3720 [essentially setting forth the two part disjunctive test].) “If the employee’s act satisfies either part of this two-prong test, the employer is liable.” (Bailey, at pp. 1559–1560.)

6 “Looking at the matter with a slightly different focus, California courts have also asked whether the tort was, in a general way, foreseeable from the employee’s duties. Respondeat superior liability should apply only to the types of injuries that ‘ “as a practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer’s enterprise.” ’ [Citation.] The employment, in other words, must be such as predictably to create the risk employees will commit intentional torts of the type for which liability is sought.” (Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 299.) B. Analysis The County contends the trial court properly granted summary judgment because it is not vicariously liable as a matter of law. It advances two primary arguments: (1) Wilson’s conduct was personally motivated and did not benefit the County, either directly or indirectly; and (2) there is an insufficient nexus between the tortious conduct and Wilson’s work. We address each contention in turn. Assuming Wilson’s conduct benefited himself rather than the County, this fact does not establish, as a matter of law, that he acted outside the scope of his employment. “There is no requirement that an employee’s act benefit an employer for respondeat superior to apply.” (Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 962, 969 (Perez).) An employee may act within the scope of employment even when pursuing personal objectives and even when engaging in unauthorized, willful, or criminal conduct. (Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 296–297.) Accordingly, Wilson’s admitted personal motivation does not end the inquiry. The relevant question is whether Wilson was transacting County business when he accessed Doe’s personal information. Although Wilson accessed Doe’s file because he was curious and worried after committing the 7 assault, the record does not establish what work-related tasks he may have been performing when he accessed Doe’s file. (Farmers, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1004 [“ ‘ “[W]here the employee is combining his own business with that of his employer, or attending to both at substantially the same time, no nice inquiry will be made as to which business he was actually engaged in at the time of injury, unless it clearly appears that neither directly nor indirectly could he have been serving his employer.” ’ ”].) Viewed in the light most favorable to Doe, a reasonable trier of fact could infer that Wilson was simultaneously performing work-related duties while improperly accessing Doe’s file. Accordingly, judgment is improper because a triable issue of fact exists as to whether Wilson was transacting County business when he accessed Doe’s personal information. The County next contends Wilson’s tortious conduct lacks a sufficient nexus to his employment, making summary judgment proper. On this record, we are not persuaded this issue may be resolved as a matter of law. The trial court concluded Wilson’s tortious conduct was not within the scope of his employment because his motivation for accessing Doe’s file was not related to his employment. That reasoning conflates motive with the scope of employment inquiry. Personal motivation does not, by itself, defeat respondeat superior liability. As the Supreme Court has explained, “California no longer follows the traditional rule that an employee’s actions are within the scope of employment only if motivated, in whole or part, by a desire to serve the employer’s interests.” (Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 297.) The relevant inquiry is whether there exists a sufficient causal nexus between the employee’s conduct and the employment enterprise. (Ibid.)

8 Under the foreseeability standard articulated in Farmers and Lisa M., the question is not whether the County anticipated this precise misconduct, but whether the risk of such misconduct was sufficiently connected to the enterprise that it would not be so “unusual or startling” as to make the resulting loss unfair to allocate to the employer. (Farmers, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1004.) Stated differently, the employment “must be such as predictably to create the risk employees will commit intentional torts of the type for which liability is sought.” (Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 299.) Under the two-prong disjunctive test adopted in Bailey, an employee acts within the scope of employment if the conduct either (1) is required by or incidental to the employee’s duties, or (2) it is reasonably foreseeable in light of the employer’s business. (Bailey, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1559.) CACI No. 3720 reflects the same standard and would govern the jury’s determination at trial. Under that instruction, Doe need prove only that Wilson’s conduct either: “(a) is reasonably related to the kinds of tasks that [he] was employed to perform; or (b) is reasonably foreseeable in light of the employer’s business or [his] responsibilities.” Viewed in the light most favorable to Doe, the evidence would permit a reasonable juror to conclude Wilson’s misuse of the County’s computer system was reasonably foreseeable under either prong of this test. The County authorized Wilson to access its computer system as part of his employment duties to make investigative reports and placed no restrictions on his ability to view files. The County also provided evidence that detention deputies routinely review reports involving cases in which they are not directly involved because doing so enables them to compare information learned in the jail with pending investigations and unsolved crimes. Reports further provide information relevant to institutional safety, including 9 whether inmates have histories of violence toward law enforcement or particular groups. A reasonable jury could infer from this evidence that reviewing investigative reports outside one’s assigned cases was not an aberrational use of the system but one contemplated by the County’s operational practices. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude Wilson’s act of accessing Doe’s investigative file was reasonably related to the tasks he was employed to perform. At a minimum, competing reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence and where conflicting inferences are reasonably possible, summary judgment is improper. (Mary M., supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 213.) Wilson further testified that deputies routinely used the system to review incidents occurring at other detention facilities and to examine photographs or videos unrelated to their own assignments. He acknowledged reviewing investigations in which he had no involvement, explaining it was “common practice” for detention deputies to access case files and incident reports and he had done so “over a hundred times” for reasons unrelated to his assigned duties. The evidence also established that investigative files could be password protected to prevent unauthorized viewing. Although password protection was to be used “sparingly,” it remained available for sensitive or “high-media” cases. From this evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude the County knowingly afforded detention deputies broad access to sensitive investigative information while relying primarily on policy, rather than technological restrictions, to prevent misuse. A jury could therefore conclude that an employee’s misuse of that access for personal purposes was not so unusual or startling as to fall outside the risks inherent in the County’s enterprise.

10 Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that Wilson’s conduct satisfied either prong of the disjunctive test in Bailey, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 1552. A jury could conclude Wilson’s access to Doe’s investigative file was reasonably related to the duties the County entrusted to detention deputies, or alternatively, that the County’s decision to provide detention deputies broad access to sensitive investigative information made the misuse of that access reasonably foreseeable given the sheriff’s department’s operations. Because the evidence supports either inference, the question whether Wilson acted within the scope of his employment is one for the jury, not the court on summary judgment. The County maintains that Perry v. County of Fresno (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 94 (Perry) supports a finding that Wilson’s tortious conduct was outside the scope of his employment. We disagree. In Perry, a correctional officer used information obtained from defendant’s jail computer system to carry out a scheme of sending fraudulent and threatening letters. (Id. at pp. 98–101.) The appellate court concluded the county was not vicariously liable because there was no causal nexus between the tort—the preparation and mailing of the letters—and the officer’s employment. (Id. at pp. 101–102, 105.) The court reasoned that the officer’s scheme was an entirely personal undertaking and mere access to the information through employment constituted but-for causation, not the causal nexus required for respondeat superior liability. (Id. at pp. 102, 105.) This case is materially different. Wilson did not merely use information obtained from the County’s computer system to commit a separate tort. Rather, the alleged tortious conduct consisted of his unauthorized access to Doe’s confidential information through the very computer system the County entrusted him to use.

11 Finally, the County asserts Wilson’s conduct was outside the scope of his employment because he was convicted under Penal Code section 502 (section 502). Section 502, subdivision (h)(1) provides that subdivision (c), the criminal punishment provision, “does not apply to punish any acts which are committed by a person within the scope of lawful employment,” and further states that “a person acts within the scope of employment” when performing acts reasonably necessary to the performance of the person’s work assignment. (Italics added.) The County reasons that because Wilson was criminally punished under section 502, his conduct was not within the scope of his employment. The argument is unpersuasive. The County cites no authority establishing that the phrase “scope of lawful employment” in section 502 is coextensive with the common law concept of “scope of employment” governing respondeat superior liability. Section 502 was enacted to protect computer systems and data from unauthorized access and related misconduct. (Pen. Code § 502, subd. (a); People v. Childs (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1099 (Childs).) The statutory defense for acts committed within the scope of lawful employment serves the statute’s purposes. (Childs, at p. 1097.) We know of no authority suggesting the Legislature intended to redefine the rule of respondeat superior or displace the standards to determine such liability articulated in numerous cases. In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Doe and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, a reasonable jury could conclude Wilson acted within the scope of his employment under either prong of the Bailey, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 1552 disjunctive test. Because competing inferences may be reasonably drawn regarding the relationship between Wilson’s misuse of the County’s computer system and his 12 employment, the issue cannot be resolved as a matter of law on summary judgment. Accordingly, the judgment in favor of the County must be reversed. DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed. Appellant is entitled to her costs on appeal.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

RUBIN, J.

BERMÚDEZ, J.