In re M.R. CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 9/15/26 In re M.R. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re M.R. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D087823 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J521339AB)

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.R., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Alejandro Morales, Judge. Affirmed. Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for minors. M.R. and X.R. (Children) became dependents of the juvenile court after being present for domestic violence between their parents, K.R. (Father) and E.L. (Mother). The court placed Children with Mother’s aunt N.O. (Caregiver) and her husband. During the dependency case, paternal grandfather R.R. (Grandfather) made many blog posts identifying Caregiver by name and photograph and accusing her of abusing, kidnapping, stealing, and trafficking Children, who he also identified by name. The blog accused the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) and the juvenile court of engaging in kidnapping and child trafficking. Caregiver sought a restraining order against Grandfather that would also protect her husband and Children. After a hearing, the juvenile court issued the restraining order protecting all parties requested, including a no- contact order, a stay-away order, and an order not to abuse. The order not to abuse contained language prohibiting Grandfather from publicly identifying Caregiver or Children as participants in a juvenile court case, including online. Grandfather appeals the court’s order as to Children, contending it is unsupported by substantial evidence because he did not physically or emotionally harm them and his posts did not qualify as stalking. We affirm the order. BACKGROUND A. Dependency Proceedings In November 2023, the Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivision (b) on behalf of Children after Father used physical force on Mother while she held infant 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 X.R. and while two-year-old M.R. was present. The parents had a history of domestic violence over a period of years. Children were detained and eventually placed with Caregiver, sister of Mother’s adopted mother. Children did well and were happy in the home. The court held a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing in August 2024 and sustained the petition, ordering liberal supervised, separate visitation for Mother. Although Grandfather sought placement of Children with him, the court maintained Children’s placement with Caregiver, noting Grandfather had not yet been approved for placement. Approval of Grandfather for placement was delayed because his criminal history required a waiver, which required obtaining information from other states. Mother participated in domestic violence victim and parenting education. She visited Children regularly, during which she was engaged, affectionate, and positive. But she struggled with homelessness and eventually moved in with Grandfather. Although Mother had previously reported Grandfather had physically abused her, she then stated he had only threatened her. After she moved in with Grandfather, her relationship with Caregiver began to deteriorate. Father refused to meet with or cooperate with the Agency, communicating with the Agency in a hostile and threatening manner with attacks on the Agency, the social worker, and Mother. He did not visit Children and refused to engage in services. Grandfather told the Agency he had been helping the parents with Children for most of their lives. Grandfather expressed negative feelings toward both parents and stated he did not believe they should have parental rights. At times, Father had threatened to come to the home and harm the paternal family, and the Agency was concerned he would abduct Children 3 from Grandfather’s home. Grandfather also did not trust the Agency, believing that its representatives lied to him and used him and that he should already have had placement of Children. According to one Agency report, Grandfather called the Agency and its workers “disgusting and vile” and “barbaric criminals.” Nonetheless, in September 2024, Grandfather received resource family approval for placement. The Agency initially intended to move Children to Grandfather’s home when he received approval, but Children’s counsel objected and requested a contested hearing. In November 2024, Father made social media posts containing photos of the social worker and photos of Children crying in a Child Welfare vehicle. The Agency believed Father obtained those photographs from Grandfather. At subsequent hearings in 2025, the court admonished those present, including Father and Grandfather, regarding confidentiality of the proceedings. Despite these repeated admonitions, Father made posts on a website and social media that showed juvenile court records, identified Children as dependents, and accused the Agency and the court of child abuse and trafficking. In March 2025, Father posted a picture of him with Grandfather at a protest against Child and Family Well Being, with both displaying the middle finger while wearing a shirt showing the Agency social worker’s face. In May 2025, the Agency reported that the Grandfather posted numerous blog entries about the Agency and court, also identifying Children. One blog entry was titled, “Monster Abomination in the System: [Social Worker]’s Reign of Harm” and called the social worker cruel, manipulative, a psychopath, and malicious. Other blog posts accused the Agency of kidnapping, child trafficking, holding Children hostage, and causing Children to have medical problems.

4 The court held a contested six-month review hearing on April 25, May 6, and May 27, 2025. Based on the Agency’s recommendation, the court declined to place Children with Grandfather. The court terminated reunification services for Father. Mother continued to have services and unsupervised, separate visitation. Subsequently, however, due to concern that Father was seeing Children during Mother’s visits, Mother’s visits became supervised. In July 2025, Grandfather posted videos on social media of a child and family team meeting. When the Agency discussed confidentiality with him, he accused the Agency of “retaliating like a criminal,” being a “sick system that tears families apart,” and abuse. He also implied the Agency had engaged in child torture, covering up possible child molestation, withholding medical care, and fabricating reports. While accompanying Mother on visits, Grandfather called the Agency evil and accused it of elder abuse. At a special hearing, the court ordered Father to remove online posts containing juvenile court records or identifying Children as dependents and to refrain from making such posts. Both Father and Grandfather were removed from the hearing due to their behavior during the hearing. Father failed to remove the confidential information by the court ordered deadline. The court issued an order to show cause for contempt and a bench warrant for Father. As of mid-October, Father had not removed the confidential information, and he failed to appear for the order to show cause hearing. Grandfather and Mother attended San Diego County Board of Supervisors meetings, expressing concerns about and distrust toward the Agency. Grandfather spoke, including stating, “We’re exposing a predator, [social worker] and [Caregiver] trying to steal our children” and that one social worker was “toast” and they were “taking . . . down” another because 5 the Agency “messed with the wrong family” and “sold the wrong children.” Mother stated Children were kidnapped and the Agency are “monsters” who traffic children and belong in prison. On October 22 and 23, 2025, the court held a contested 12-month review hearing. The court terminated Mother’s services and set a section 366.26 hearing. B. Restraining Order Proceedings By August 2025, Grandfather’s blog had over 60 posts and 500 pages criticizing Caregiver, the court, Children’s attorney, and Agency representatives. Caregiver sought a restraining order against Grandfather protecting her, her husband, and Children because of his posts about her. The blog displayed Caregiver’s full name and photograph and accused her of being a child abuser, kidnapper, predator, child thief, and a child trafficker. The blog also included the names and photographs of Children. The accusations made Caregiver fear for her physical safety and emotional well- being. On August 12, 2025, the court granted a temporary restraining order. In response to the restraining order request, Grandfather submitted a declaration stating he never met or contacted Caregiver and the information on his website “is factual, publicly observable, and not directed to her personally.” He moved to strike the restraining order request, contending the request was in retaliation for his protected speech. The court held the restraining order hearing on February 10, 2026, and granted the restraining order protecting Caregiver, her husband, and Children under section 213.5. During the hearing, Caregiver testified that at least 40 posts have her name on them. She explained her concern that being labeled a child trafficker or thief might “trigger people to want to cause [her]

6 harm while [she] car[ed] for the children.” The posts affected her day-to-day thoughts and changed her behavior. In granting the restraining order, the court first found that Grandfather’s posts about Caregiver were false, defamatory, and harassing, and thus they were not constitutionally protected. The court explained, “[Grandfather] is identifying the minors by name . . . putting them on blast that they’re being kidnapped, trafficked.” But, the court stated, “the public shouldn’t know that there are children who are dependents of the juvenile court or that they’re in foster care because that can cause embarrassment or can cause distress to those children.” The court determined that this activity constituted stalking under the broad definition from In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1512, justifying a restraining order protecting Children. The court concluded stalking included making defamatory statements that could result in emotional distress. While the court announced its ruling, Grandfather frequently interrupted and accused the court of child trafficking, resulting in verbal intervention by the bailiff. In the restraining order, the court included an order not to abuse, a no- contact order, and a stay-away order. In addition to the standard language of the order not to abuse, the court checked the box prohibiting disturbing the peace and wrote in language prohibiting Grandfather from “disclos[ing] and identify[ing] minors or caregivers by name, as dependents or caregivers involved in a juvenile proceeding, on any blogs, internet, social media or public forum.” DISCUSSION Grandfather appeals the inclusion of Children in the restraining order, arguing he never caused actual physical or emotional harm to them and his conduct was not stalking. The Agency responds that past harm is not 7 required for issuance of a restraining order under section 213.5; restraining orders may be issued to protect emotional and psychological safety; and Grandfather’s actions constituted stalking based on his attendance at Board of Supervisors meetings, maintenance of the website, and attending supervised visits, which “threatened to interfere with the children’s placement and stability.” Children join the Agency’s letter. Section 213.5, subdivision (a) provides the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction to issue restraining orders “enjoining a person from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, . . . destroying the personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the child or any other child in the household” or of the current caretaker, either “upon application in the manner provided by Section 527 of the Code of Civil Procedure or in the manner provided by Section 6300 of the Family Code, if related to domestic violence.” This statute does not require evidence that the enjoined acts occurred previously or “evidence of a reasonable apprehension of future abuse.” (In re C.Q. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 355, 363.) Rather, juvenile courts may issue a restraining order under section 213.5, subdivision (a) “ ‘if “failure to make [the order] may jeopardize the safety of the petitioner.” ’ ” (In re C.Q., at p. 363.) This includes “emotional and psychological safety.” (In re A.M. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 614, 619.) Indeed, “disturbing the peace means ‘ “conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” ’ ” (In re Bruno M. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 990, 997; Judicial Council Forms, form JV-265 [“ ‘Disturb the peace’ means to destroy someone’s mental or emotional calm,” either “directly or indirectly” and “in any way,” including online].)

8 When a restraining order “arises in a dependency proceeding, we must keep in mind that the ‘purpose of a dependency hearing is to determine the best interests of the child and to protect those interests. [Citations.]’ ” (In re A.M., at p. 619.) “With regard to the issuance of a restraining order by the juvenile court pursuant to section 213.5, appellate courts apply the substantial evidence standard to determine whether sufficient facts supported the factual findings in support of a restraining order and the abuse of discretion standard to determine whether the court properly issued the order.”2 (In re Carlos H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.) “We independently review the dependency court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions.” (In re D.B. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 592, 603.) Here, there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that Grandfather’s public blog posts identifying Children as juvenile dependents who had been kidnapped and/or trafficked could cause the children embarrassment or distress and thus threatened their mental and emotional safety. In addition, these accusations threatened to destabilize Children’s placement, and their feelings of safety in it. (See In re Brittany K., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1512.) There is a strong public policy of confidentiality in juvenile proceedings, and sharing confidential information may “undermine the court’s efforts to protect the children and promote their best interests.” (See In re Tiffany G. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 443, 450–452.) Courts have authority to issue orders restricting the circulation of 2 Some courts do not apply this mixed standard, but only substantial evidence. (See, e.g., In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 210– 211.) We would reach the same result under either standard.

9 confidential information to protect children. (Ibid.) Particularly considering the importance of Children’s best interests in juvenile proceedings, the court did not abuse its discretion by including Children in the restraining order along with Caregiver. That said, we believe the court’s finding that Grandfather’s actions could cause Children embarrassment or distress falls under the definition of disturbing the peace rather than stalking. (In re Bruno M., supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 997.) In In re Brittany K., the grandmother’s “defamatory accusations about the foster parents” were just one aspect of the course of conduct deemed stalking. (In re Brittany K., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1512.) During this course of conduct, the grandmother also “concealed herself at a scheduled visitation between the minors and their birth mother so as to obtain unauthorized access to them; surreptitiously searched out and located the confidential location of the foster residence, in violation of their intended privacy; hired a private detective to spy on the minors’ comings and goings at their foster home; and showed up unannounced at each of the minors’ schools.” (Ibid.) We cannot say that Grandfather engaged in conduct of the same character. But “[w]e review the result the trial court reached, not its legal reasoning, and we may affirm on any ground supported by the record, unconstrained by the route the trial court took in getting there.” (Apex Solutions, Inc. v. Falls Lake National Ins. Co. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1249, 1257.) In addition, Grandfather’s demonstration of complete disdain for the proceedings based on his belief that the Children should have been placed with him or returned to Mother created a realistic concern for Children’s physical safety while in Caregiver’s care, justifying the court including Children in the no-contact and stay-away orders. By calling the Agency evil 10 during Mother’s visits with Children and interrupting court proceedings with false accusations against the court, Grandfather demonstrated his inability to modulate his behavior, a failure that could pose a threat to Children and their emotional and physical safety, as well as a threat to the stability of their placement with Caregiver. Contrary to Grandfather’s assertion, the fact that he had not already caused harm to Children does not prevent the issuance of a restraining order protecting them. (In re Bruno M., supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 997; In re C.Q., supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at pp. 363–364; In re B.S. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) The court need not wait to act to protect its dependents until Children are old enough to understand and become aware that confidential, potentially embarrassing information was shared online. Nothing in section 213.5, subdivision (a) requires past incidents. Grandfather cites cases in which appellate courts concluded there was insufficient evidence of a threat to a child’s safety to include them in the restraining order despite violence or threats of violence between the parents. (See In re C.Q., supra, 219 Cal.App.4th 355, In re N.L. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1460.) He fails to explain how they show the restraining order was improper here. In In re C.Q., the court found there was insufficient evidence of risk of harm to the children to support a restraining order against the father based on a single incident of domestic violence toward the mother that the children witnessed. (In re C.Q., at p. 364.) Citing that case, the court in In re N.L. concluded there was insufficient evidence of potential harm to the child to support a restraining order against the mother based on her violent conduct or threats outside the child’s presence and her contacting the child’s school when she was an educational rights holder. (In re N.L., at p. 1468.)

11 In this case, the court did not rely on Grandfather’s actions toward Caregiver as a basis for the restraining order, but issued the restraining order based on Grandfather’s actions that directly threatened Children’s mental and emotional safety on an ongoing basis. And, as a grandparent, Grandfather did not have the same rights as parents in juvenile cases. (See In re R.M. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 119, 130–131 [grandparents do not have constitutional rights protecting their relationship with grandchildren and do not have absolute statutory rights to visitation].) Grandfather notes he had financially supported Children and their parents and initially assisted the Agency. He fails to explain the relevance of this conduct, which occurred before the dependency case and early in the case, well before Grandfather started his blog targeting Caregiver, the Agency, and the court, and disclosing confidential information about Children. Grandfather also notes he testified at the 12-month review hearing that he would cooperate with the Agency if Children were returned to Mother and lived in his home. Such cooperation, apparently offered only upon the Agency’s willingness to agree with Grandfather’s positions, does nothing to mitigate Grandfather’s conduct and actions in connection with Children’s placement and their emotional and physical well-being. Finally, Grandfather notes that it is “concerning” that the judge declined to consider Grandfather’s visitation at the hearing or as part of the restraining order, leaving the matter to the judge presiding over the dependency case. He fails to explain why this was error, and we thus decline to consider whether it was. (See, e.g., Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 701, fn. 15 [failure to develop an argument forfeits that point]; Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368 [“One 12 cannot simply say the court erred, and leave it up to the appellate court to figure out why.”].) DISPOSITION We affirm the order.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.

BERMÚDEZ, J.