People v. Thompson CA1/3

Opinion

Filed 9/10/26 P. v. Thompson CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A173047 v. WILLIE THOMPSON, (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 151836A) Defendant and Appellant.

In 2007, Willie Thompson and co-defendant Lavar Coleman were convicted of the first-degree murders of Dante Wallace and Ronnell Hodge. This court affirmed Thompson’s convictions on direct appeal with minor modifications to his sentence. (People v. Thompson (Sept. 29, 2010, A120613) [nonpub. opn.].) In 2022, Thompson filed a petition for resentencing under what is now Penal Code section 1172.6 as to the conviction for murder of Hodge.1 The superior court denied the petition after finding Thompson failed to make a prima facie case for relief. Thompson timely appealed. We affirm.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1 BACKGROUND I. Conviction, Direct Appeal, and Habeas Petition The following summary is drawn from our prior opinion affirming Thompson’s convictions, as well as the record of conviction.2 (Thompson, supra, A120613.) In a joint information, Thompson and Coleman were charged with the first degree murders of Wallace (count 1) and Hodge (count 2). It was also alleged that (1) during the murder of Hodge, each defendant personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death to Hodge; (2) during the murder of Wallace, Thompson personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death to Wallace, and Coleman was “a principal” and armed with a firearm. Each defendant was also charged with possession of a firearm by a felon (counts 3 and 4). A multiple-murder special circumstance pursuant to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3), was alleged against Thompson. The following evidence was then presented at a joint jury trial.

2 Our recitation of the background facts as stated in our prior opinion is solely for the purpose of efficiently summarizing the background of this case. In resolving the issue raised on appeal, our analysis is based on our independent review of the record of conviction, including the jury instructions and jury verdicts, and not the summary of facts in our prior opinion. (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970–972 (Lewis); People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1247, fn. 3 (Williams).) Relatedly, respondent sought judicial notice of this court’s records in the prior direct appeal (Thompson, supra, A120613). Appellant opposed the request insofar as it included the evidentiary portions of the record but did not oppose as to “the procedural components of the underlying trial.” The request is granted as to the procedural components comprising the record of conviction but denied as to the evidentiary portions of the trial. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970–972.)

2 In the early morning of April 25, 2004, Wallace and Hodge were the victims of a shooting incident on 65th Avenue between 14th Street (International Boulevard) and Eastlawn Street in an area of Oakland referred to as “The Village.” At that time the residential area was known for “a lot of dope traffic,” and gunfire was heard in the area “a lot,” at least three or four times a week. Thompson, Coleman (known as Moonie), Wallace, Hodge, and Matthew Cobbs had grown up together. By 2004, none of the men still lived in The Village but Wallace’s parents did. During the six months before the shooting, Thompson, Coleman, and Cobbs continued to hang out in The Village on a daily basis, but it had been two or three years since Wallace and Hodge had been seen in The Village on a regular basis. The night of the shooting, Cobbs arrived in The Village at about 1:30 a.m. He had his .357-caliber revolver concealed in his waistband. Cobbs saw defendants and other people drinking on 65th Avenue. Cobbs asked Coleman for a ride to a liquor store. During the drive, Cobbs was in the back seat and Coleman and Thompson were in the front. During the ride back to The Village, Cobbs again sat in the back seat and either Coleman or Thompson drove the car. On the trip to and from the liquor store, Coleman and Thompson started talking about Hodge and Wallace. Coleman said Hodge was “not cool,” and asked Cobbs why he still “mess[ed] around” with Hodge. Cobbs replied Hodge was cool to him, and Coleman, in a serious voice, repeated Hodge “just ain’t cool.” Thompson then asked, “what’s up with DT,” referring to Wallace. Cobbs replied Wallace was cool too, but both Thompson and Coleman responded “they not cool.” Coleman asked Cobbs why he still dealt with Wallace and Hodge. Coleman also asked Cobbs to call Hodge and ask 3 him to come out that night if he was a “homeboy,” but Cobbs refused to call Hodge. During the conversation, defendants were not joking, and they seemed angry based on the tone of their voices and how they were speaking. When the men arrived back at 65th Avenue, Cobbs saw Hodge on the sidewalk. Coleman said, “Ooh.” Wallace was also on the sidewalk, a few feet away from Hodge, kneeling and talking to someone in a car. They drove past Hodge, made a U-turn, and parked on the same side of the street a few feet behind Hodge. Defendants got out of the car “fast” and headed in separate directions. Coleman went into a nearby parking lot behind his parked car, and Thompson crossed the street and went into some bushes. Cobbs believed defendants were retrieving stashed weapons based on the way they had been talking in the car and their conduct after they left the car. “Right after” defendants left the car and walked away, Cobbs left the car and approached Hodge, shaking his hand and hugging Hodge. As he broke off the hug, Cobbs gave his .357-caliber revolver to Hodge. Cobbs attempted to conceal the gun by the way he was standing near Hodge, and how he shook hands and hugged him. Defendants had already “walked off.” Hodge put the gun in his waistband. Cobbs said, “What’s up? What you doing out here? These niggas tripping.” Hodge replied, “I know.” Cobbs was trying to convey a warning to Hodge that Hodge should leave. Cobbs asked Hodge where his car was so they could leave before things escalated. The two men started walking towards Hodge’s car, which was parked on Eastlawn Street. Cobbs was about two feet behind Hodge, and Wallace was walking about eight to 10 feet in front of Cobbs and Hodge. Cobbs saw Thompson walk diagonally from the bushes into the middle of the street in front of him and Hodge; Thompson had his hands in his pockets. Cobbs turned around and saw Coleman a few feet behind him on the 4 sidewalk. Cobbs saw that Coleman had Cobbs’s .22-caliber rifle under his arm. As the men walked down the street, Cobbs tried to stay between Coleman and Hodge and between Coleman and Thompson so that nothing would happen to Hodge. Wallace and Thompson were arguing and cussing at each other, loudly, with Thompson doing most of the cussing. Coleman did not participate in the argument between Thompson and Wallace. However, on two or three occasions, Coleman pulled and lightly shoved Cobbs’s shoulder backwards, telling Cobbs to get out of the way. Cobbs replied, “No,” because he did not want anything to happen to Hodge. Cobbs finally got out of the way when the group reached Eastlawn Street. At some point, Hodge was on a little walkway about 20 feet from the sidewalk. Cobbs stayed on the sidewalk, and Wallace went out into the street within two or three feet of Thompson. Wallace, a large man, weighing 250 to 300 pounds, said something like “Let’s get them up, let’s fight,” and, “I’m done. Let’s just do this.” Wallace did not raise his fists or have any weapons. Thompson’s immediate reaction was to pull a handgun from his pocket and fire five or six shots at Wallace. Cobbs saw Wallace’s head “ducking forward” while Wallace was “bending at the waist,” but Cobbs did not see Wallace actually fall to the street. As Thompson walked around Wallace in a half circle firing his gun, Cobbs believed the gunfire was now coming in his direction and he crouched behind a car. Cobbs then heard more gunshots coming from behind him. Out of his peripheral vision, Cobbs saw Coleman aim his .22-caliber rifle and begin firing in the direction in which Cobbs last saw Hodge in the walkway. Cobbs heard the rifle expend its entire capacity all in one sequence. After the rifle started to discharge, Cobbs heard the gunfire of six rounds from his .357- caliber revolver, which he had earlier given to Hodge. There was a point 5 when both the rifle and the .357 revolver were “going off” at the same time, but the rifle had been shot first. Cobbs thought the first 10 shots were from Thompson’s gun, which sounded like a .9-millimeter pistol. Cobbs thought the .9-millimeter pistol (Thompson’s gun) was fired at the same time as the .22-caliber rifle (Coleman’s gun), right before the .357-caliber revolver (Hodge’s gun). After Thompson stopped shooting at Wallace, Thompson walked to the sidewalk and fired up the walkway in the direction in which Cobbs had last seen Hodge. The .357-caliber revolver was fired before Thompson moved to the sidewalk and started firing in Hodge’s direction. Coleman left one or two seconds before Thompson fired his last shot, and then Thompson took off. Wallace was then lying in the street. Hodge left a blood trail going from the walkway around the corner to Eastlawn Street in front of Wallace’s parents’ apartment. Wallace’s parents testified about their knowledge of the incident. Inside their second-floor apartment, they heard the gunfire in the street. Wallace’s father recalled he heard at least 15 to 20 gunshots from two different guns “right after each other,” lasting one to two minutes. Wallace’s mother heard “a whole bunch” of “real loud” gunshots, in rapid succession, for 15 seconds or a minute or two, with no delays or breaks. About 10 or 15 minutes later, while he was still in his second-story apartment, Wallace’s father heard Hodge calling to him from some bushes directly below one of the bedroom windows. Hodge said, “Help me, . . . . They got me,” and “call my mother.” While still in the apartment, Wallace’s mother heard Hodge say, “They got me, they got me, Moonie got me,” and “call my mom.” When Wallace’s father was at Hodge’s side, Hodge said, “I’m dying,” and “They got me.” Hodge also said he was sorry “for bringing all this stuff round to your house.” Around the corner from his parents’ apartment, Wallace was found 6 lying on 65th Avenue. He appeared to have a gunshot wound to his head and other gunshot wounds to his upper body. From an area of around 75 feet where Wallace was found, the police recovered eight .22-caliber shell casings, and fifteen .9-millimeter casings. Hodge died of his wounds that morning. An autopsy report indicated Hodge sustained four bullet wounds. Hodge died due to a loss of blood from a gunshot wound caused by a .22-caliber bullet found in his abdomen. Wallace survived the shooting, sustaining multiple gunshot wounds to the arms, shoulder, and back, and a graze injury to the top left side of his head just above the ear. Bullets perforated his right lower lung and hit the right side of his liver. No bullets were recovered from Wallace’s body. About 10 days after the shooting, while Wallace was in the hospital recovering, he died within minutes when a blood clot traveled from his leg to his lung. His cause of death was determined to be “pulmonary thromboembolism,” and “complicating multiple gunshot wounds of the torso and extremities.” The autopsy pathologist opined that the gunshot wounds set in motion a series of events resulting in the pulmonary thromboembolism; in other words, “but for those gunshot wounds, the blood clot would not have occurred.” On April 27, 2004, the police stopped a vehicle in The Village. The front seat passenger discarded a bag as he fled. Inside the bag, the police found a .9-millimeter pistol and a .22-caliber rifle. The guns matched both the revolver casings and rifle casings found after the shootings and the rifle bullet found inside Hodge. A few weeks after the shooting, Cobbs’s .357- caliber revolver containing six expended cartridges was found on the roof of the apartment building where Wallace’s parents lived. The jury was instructed on multiple theories of liability for the first degree murder counts, including direct liability, direct aiding and abetting 7 liability, aiding and abetting liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and conspiracy liability, including under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The trial court instructed the jury with a modified version of CALCRIM 200 that “[s]ome of these instructions may not apply, depending on your findings about the facts of the case. . . . After you have decided what the facts are, follow the instructions that do apply to the facts as you find them.” The trial court read CALJIC No. 3.00, which defines principals in a crime to include “1. Those who directly and actively commit the act constituting the crime, or [¶] 2. Those who aid and abet the commission of the crime.” The relevant aiding and abetting instructions included CALJIC No. 3.01 on direct aiding and abetting: A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she: (1) With knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and (2) With the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, and (3) By act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.

Mere presence at the scene of a crime which does not itself assist the commission of the crime does not amount to aiding and abetting.

Mere knowledge that a crime is being committed and the failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting.

The trial court also read a version of CALJIC No. 3.02 on the natural and probable consequences theory: One who aids and abets another in the commission of a crime or crimes is not only guilty of 8 that crime or those crimes, but is also guilty of any other crime committed by a principal which is a natural and probable consequence of the crimes originally aided and abetted.

In order to find the defendant guilty of the crimes as charged in Counts 1 & 2, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1. The crime or crimes of Murder was or were committed; 2. That the defendant aided and abetted that or those crimes; 3. That a co-principal in that crime committed the crimes of Murder; and 4. The crimes of Murder was or were a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the crimes of Murder.

In determining whether a consequence is “natural and probable,” you must apply an objective test, based not on what the defendant actually intended, but on what a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence would have expected likely to occur. The issue is to be decided in light of all the circumstances surrounding the incident. A “natural” consequence is one which is within the normal range of outcomes that may be reasonably expected to occur if nothing unusual has intervened. “Probable” means likely to happen.

You are not required to unanimously agree as to which originally contemplated crime the defendant aided and abetted, so long as you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agree that the defendant aided and abetted the commission of an identified and defined target crime and that the crime of Murder was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of that target crime.

9 The jury was also instructed with CALJIC No. 8.80.1 on the multiple- murder special circumstance: If you find defendant Willie Thompson in this case guilty of murder of the first degree, you must then determine if one or more of the following special circumstances[] is or are true or not true: that defendant Thompson has in this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of murder.

The People have the burden of proving the truth of a special circumstance. If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether a special circumstance is true, you must find it to be not true.

If you find that a defendant was not the actual killer of a human being, or if you are unable to decide whether the defendant was the actual killer or an aider and abettor, you cannot find the special circumstance to be true as to that defendant unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such defendant with the intent to kill aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted any actor in the commission of the murder in the first degree. [CALJIC No. 8.80.1, as given.]

To find that the special circumstance referred to in these instructions as multiple murder convictions is true, it must be proved:

That defendant Thompson has in this case been convicted of at least one crime of murder of the first degree and one or more crimes of murder of the first or second degree. [CALJIC No. 8.81.3, as given.]

The prosecutor argued the natural and probable consequences doctrine only briefly in closing. In discussing direct aider and abettor liability, conspiracy liability, and liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, he first offered the following example: “Now, let’s say 10 A and B arm themselves to confront and kill C and D. . . . [¶] When they close in on their prey, A shoots and kills C. He doesn’t get a chance to aim and fire at D. B shoots and kills D, then turns and starts shooting at C.” Tweaking the hypothetical, the prosecutor then postulated that A and B “conspire to kill C. They arm themselves and they begin their pursuit. But then D interferes and tries to protect his friend, C. B kills D. A is just as responsible for that killing since killing D—when he interfered—was done to further the conspiracy, and it was a natural and probable consequence of the effort to kill C.” Finally, the prosecutor explained how the natural and probable consequences theory could apply to this case, but only in the context of extending liability to Coleman (“Moonie”) for the murder of Wallace: “[W]hen you are taking a look at the question of Moon[ie]’s responsibility for the murder of [Wallace], it doesn’t matter in the slightest that there’s no evidence that Moon[ie] fired a shot at [Wallace]. You can conclude that he aided and abetted [Thompson], you can conclude that they conspired and that it was a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy.” The prosecutor stressed these legal theories were all available, but what Coleman couldn’t say was, “I was only along for killing [Hodge], you know. That’s all I signed on for. I don’t know about this [Wallace] stuff.” The jury returned verdicts finding each defendant guilty of the first degree murder of both victims and of possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury also found that (a) during the murder of Wallace, Thompson personally used and intentionally discharged his firearm, which caused great bodily injury and the death of Wallace, and Coleman was armed with a firearm; and (b) during the murder of Hodge, Coleman personally used and intentionally discharged his firearm, which proximately caused great bodily injury and the 11 death of Hodge, and Thompson personally used and discharged his firearm but the discharge did not proximately cause great bodily injury or the death of Hodge. The jury also found Thompson had committed more than one murder within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3) (multiple- murder special circumstance). Thompson was sentenced to consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole on one count of first degree murder (Wallace), 25 years to life for another count of first degree murder (Hodge), and 25 years to life for possession of a firearm by a felon, plus consecutive terms of 25 years to life and 20 years for related firearm use enhancements and 10 years for prior conviction enhancements. On appeal, this court modified the judgment against Thompson by striking a section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison sentence enhancement and a section 1202.45 parole revocation restitution fine. It otherwise affirmed the judgment. In later habeas proceedings, this court vacated codefendant Coleman’s conviction for the first degree murder of Wallace based on a finding of prejudicial error under People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu). (In re Coleman (Jan. 16, 2020, A149484) [nonpub. opn.].) Thompson also filed a Chiu-related habeas petition challenging his conviction for Hodge’s murder, but the superior court denied this petition after finding that, while the natural and probable consequences instruction did indeed run afoul of Chiu, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to Thompson. After examining the evidence, the court was left with “no doubt that the jury actually relied on a legally valid theory that Thompson directly aided and abetted, with intent to kill, in the premeditated murder of Ronnell Hodge.”

12 II. Section 1172.6 Petition A. Legal Framework “Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) significantly narrowed accomplice liability for murder. The legislation amended sections 188 and 189 to eliminate murder liability based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (People v. Prak (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1048.) “It further restricted felony murder liability to defendants who were the actual killer, aided and abetted the killer with intent to kill, or were major participants in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Id. at pp. 1048–1049, citing §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e).) “As a result, individuals convicted under now-invalid theories of imputed malice may seek relief under section 1172.6, which provides a mechanism to vacate convictions that could not be sustained under current law.” (Prak, at p. 1049, citing § 1172.6; see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.) The process under section 1172.6 proceeds in three steps. First, if the superior court determines that the petition is facially sufficient, it appoints counsel for petitioner. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 961–970.) Second, the parties brief whether the petition makes a prima facie case for relief, and the court holds a hearing. (Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1251, citing § 1172.6, subd. (c).) The inquiry at the prima facie stage is limited. (Lewis, at p. 971.) If the petition and record of conviction in the case “establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 450 (Curiel).) But if the petition makes a prima facie case, the court issues an order to show cause and holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts. (Ibid.)

13 B. Petition Proceedings On May 10, 2022, Thompson filed a petition for resentencing under now-section 1172.6. The superior court appointed counsel for Thompson and ordered the district attorney to file a response addressing whether the petition made a prima facie showing. The district attorney filed a response, Thompson filed a reply, and the superior court held a hearing. At the hearing, the superior court acknowledged that a natural and probable consequences instruction had been given at trial, but it went on to find that Thompson had not stated a prima facie case for two reasons. First, the court explained that in a typical case involving the natural and probable consequences doctrine, a target crime other than murder is specified, and the jury is instructed that if the defendant aided and abetted the target crime, and murder was a natural and probable consequence of the target crime, then the jury could find the defendant guilty of murder. But here, there was no other crime specified; murder was both the target and non-target crime. As a result, the superior court found there was “no lesser or underlying crime . . . that lacks the required specific intent.” Second, the superior court found that the multiple-murder special circumstance true finding foreclosed relief. The court then denied the petition with prejudice. DISCUSSION We review de novo whether the superior court conducted a proper inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c). (Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1251.) Our inquiry at this stage is not to determine what the jury most likely concluded; we ask whether the record of a conviction necessarily precludes relief. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 441.) Thompson filed a petition that included allegations an information had been filed against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under the 14 natural and probable consequences doctrine, he was convicted of first degree murder, and he could not presently be convicted of first degree or second degree murder because of changes to section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Because the petition’s allegations must be accepted as true, the only basis to refuse to issue an order to show cause is if the record of conviction conclusively demonstrates Thompson was not entitled to relief as a matter of law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) We begin with whether the multiple-murder special circumstance precludes relief. The superior court concluded that it did, but both parties now agree it does not. “To find true the multiple-murder special- circumstance allegation, a jury must find that the defendant has been convicted of at least two counts of murder, at least one of which must be first degree murder, and that the defendant either actually killed or intended to kill at least one of the victims.” (People v. Mora & Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 495.) “The multiple-murder special circumstance does not require a finding of intent to kill more than one victim.” (People v. Holmes, McClain & Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 785.) Because the jury here found Thompson actually killed Wallace, it could have found the special circumstance true without necessarily concluding Thompson also intended to kill Hodge. We thus agree with the parties this special circumstance finding does not make Thompson ineligible for relief. The parties dispute the superior court’s other ground for finding Thompson ineligible. The court reasoned that a natural and probable consequences instruction was given to the jury, but both the target and non- target crimes were specified as murder. In the superior court’s view, this precluded relief, because there was no lesser target offense specified that involved a lesser mental state. Thompson contends this was error, citing In 15 re Brigham (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 318 (Brigham) for the proposition that a faulty path to conviction under the natural and probable consequences doctrine may have existed even though the target crime was murder. In Brigham, defendants Brigham, Bluitt, and Moore set out to kill a man named Chuckie. (Brigham, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 323, 324.) In searching for Chuckie, they came across Barfield. Brigham told Bluitt that Barfield was not Chuckie and Bluitt should not shoot him. Bluitt killed Barfield anyway. (Id. at p. 324.) The trial court instructed the jury on two theories of aider and abettor liability for first degree murder: one permissible (direct aiding and abetting) and one no longer permissible after Chiu (aiding and abetting under the natural and probable consequences doctrine). (Id. at pp. 326, 328.) In reversing Brigham’s murder conviction, our court explained he could be found guilty of first degree, premeditated murder as a direct aider and abettor only if he “ ‘aided or encouraged the commission of the murder [of Barfield] with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator’ ” and an intent to further the homicidal act. (Id. at p. 329.) If Brigham “did not intend to commit, encourage or facilitate the premeditated murder of Barfield, he could not be found guilty of that offense on the theory that the murder of Barfield was a natural and probable consequence of the crime he did intend to commit, encourage or facilitate (the premeditated murder of Chuckie).” (Ibid.) We agree with Thompson that under Brigham, a jury instruction’s specification of murder as the target crime does not necessarily preclude relief in every case, but we disagree with Thompson that Brigham resolves the issue here. The facts and the jury instructions in Brigham were not similar to those in this case. Thompson does not suggest that, as in Brigham, the jury found he intended to aid and abet his codefendant’s murder of one 16 man (Wallace), yet held him liable under the natural and probable consequences doctrine for the murder of another (Hodge). Nor could Thompson have made this argument, as the record of conviction conclusively establishes Thompson did not aid and abet Wallace’s murder; he directly perpetrated it. Thompson instead posits the jury held him liable for Coleman’s murder of Hodge as a natural and probable consequence of his own direct perpetration of Wallace’s murder. The Attorney General responds that the natural and probable consequences doctrine is a theory of accomplice liability, not something that operates to expand the scope of direct perpetrator liability. (See, e.g., People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 254 [describing the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a theory of aiding and abetting liability], superseded in part by Sen. Bill No. 1437.) More to the point, the jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a theory for expanding the scope of direct perpetrator liability. It was instructed on the doctrine as a theory of aiding and abetting liability: “One who aids and abets another in the commission of a crime or crimes is not only guilty of that crime or those crimes, but is also guilty of any other crime committed by a principal which is a natural and probable consequence of the crimes originally aided and abetted.” (Italics added.) Thompson argues the natural and probable consequences jury instruction was confusingly worded, flipping back and forth between referencing “crime” and “crimes.” According to Thompson, the instruction “impl[ied] that . . . the question was simply whether one crime led to the other.” In other words, Thompson does not appear to contest, as a matter of law, that the natural and probable consequences doctrine is an aiding and 17 abetting theory, but he argues the jury may have misunderstood or misapplied the instruction to expand Thompson’s liability based on his direct perpetration of Wallace’s murder—a theory, we note, the prosecutor never argued to the jury. “The crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury is that jurors generally understand and faithfully follow instructions.” (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17.) As a result, unless the record indicates otherwise, we assume that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions. (See People v. Dunn (2025) 18 Cal.5th 129, 184; People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1413.) Here, we see no indication the jury disregarded the plain text of multiple instructions that made clear (1) the distinction between direct perpetrators and aider and abettors and (2) that the natural and probable consequences doctrine was offered as a theory of aiding and abetting liability, not direct liability. Thompson’s suggestion the jury may have misapplied the instructions and convicted on a theory the prosecutor never argued is nothing more than “sheer conjecture.” (See Dunn, at p. 184 [rejecting argument the jury may have disregarded instructions as “sheer conjecture”]; People v. Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389, 397 [concluding “nothing in the instructions given here permitted jurors to” apply natural and probable consequences theory and it was not reasonably likely jury misconstrued instructions].) Here, the jury instructions, together with the jury’s verdicts, conclusively establish the jury did not rely on the natural and probable consequences theory of aiding and abetting to convict Thompson of Hodge’s murder. The instructions clearly distinguished between direct perpetrators and aider and abettors, then explained that to find a defendant guilty as an 18 aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the jury must find four elements satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. The crime or crimes of Murder was or were committed; 2. That the defendant aided and abetted that or those crimes; 3. That a co-principal in that crime committed the crimes of Murder; and 4. The crimes of Murder was or were a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the crimes of Murder.

According to Thompson, his own murder of Wallace satisfied the first element and Coleman’s murder of Hodge satisfied the third element. But the jury could not have found the second element—that Thompson aided and abetted Wallace’s murder—satisfied, because it found Thompson directly perpetrated that murder. It therefore must have determined the natural and probable consequences instruction did not apply to Thompson’s case, consistent with the trial court’s instruction that the jury must determine which instructions apply based on the facts it finds. Because the natural and probable consequences instruction did not fit the facts of the case against Thompson as the jury determined them, Thompson’s conviction for Hodge’s murder must have rested on a still-valid theory, whether that be direct aiding and abetting or conspiracy. The record of conviction thus necessarily precludes resentencing relief. (See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 441.) We need not reach the Attorney General’s other arguments in support of affirmance. DISPOSITION The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.

19 TUCHER, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, J. RODRÍGUEZ, J.

People v. Thompson (A173047)