People v. Beadle CA1/2

Opinion

Filed 9/9/26 P. v. Beadle CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A173358 v. DANIEL THOMAS BEADLE, (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCR7539121) Defendant and Appellant.

Following a jury trial, defendant Daniel Thomas Beadle was convicted of aggravated domestic violence, false imprisonment, interference with a wireless communication device, and vandalism. He was sentenced to four years and eight months in prison. On appeal he raises two issues: first, that the trial court erred in declining to unseat a juror mid-trial, and second, that his sentence for false imprisonment should have been stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.1 We find no error and affirm.2 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Defendant was charged with various offenses related to alleged incidents in January, February, and March 2022. The only convictions 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 We grant defendant’s unopposed request for judicial notice filed June 25, 2026, and supplemented July 7, 2026.

1 relevant to this appeal arise from conduct alleged to have occurred on the night of March 6 and early morning of March 7, and we limit our discussion of the evidence accordingly. Trial Evidence Jessica Doe dated defendant for a few months starting around November 2021. Doe was going through a divorce and had young children; the children were two and five years old in 2022. After about a month of dating, Doe started working at an auto body shop with “a bunch of guys,” and defendant became jealous and controlling. He would show up at her workplace, and he “didn’t want [her] to talk to [her] friends, family, anyone.” Asked if she felt like she could break up with him, Doe testified, no, because “[t]here was . . . no getting rid of him.” She would ask defendant to leave, and “ ‘Let me be,’ ” but “he wouldn’t.” By March 6, 2022, Doe had been “trying to distance [her]self from [defendant] for quite a while.” That day, Doe picked up her children after work and went home. Defendant said he was leaving for Arizona and asked if he could see Doe’s children before he left. Doe allowed him to come say goodbye to them. Defendant arrived at Doe’s house that evening. Doe and her children had a phone call with Doe’s ex-husband in the living room while defendant was in Doe’s bedroom. Later, Doe put her children to bed, and the children were asleep by around 9:00 p.m. Doe went to her bedroom and lay in bed watching television. Doe testified, “[Defendant] was kind of pacing around and then came and laid next to me and then got upset because I was on the phone with my ex- husband with my kids and then started choking me.” She testified, “He jumped on top of me and put his . . . knee on my chest and then started choking me.” After he strangled her for about a minute, he stopped and then 2 he was “off and on” her. He said things to her like, “ ‘Stupid motherfucker’ ” and “ ‘Shut the fuck up.’ ” Doe testified, “If I moved an inch, like if I even tried to scratch my face, [he’d say something] like, ‘Don’t fucking move, you stupid motherfucker.’ Like, ‘I’m coming back,’ . . . and it would continue.” Defendant strangled her “[m]any, many, many times,” at least 20 times. She felt like she “could not breathe” and was going to lose consciousness, but she never actually passed out. Defendant also jabbed at Doe while verbally abusing her. Doe testified, “He was poking me. Like, ‘Shut the fuck up.’ Like—and I’m like, ‘Please stop,’ and he just kept . . . .” The poking was “jabbing,” “very hard” and “very forceful,” on her chest, neck, and face, and it hurt a lot. Once or twice he used a pillowcase to strangle her. Doe described what happened as “like three hours of torture” that continued into the early morning hours of March 7. The prosecutor asked, “What would happen when you got up and tried to leave?” Doe responded, “That was not possible.” “He wouldn’t let me. He wouldn’t even let me move. . . . [I]f I looked in one direction, if I—he just wouldn’t let me.’ ” When she tried to leave, defendant said, “ ‘Try it. Try it. See what happens.’ ” She asked “[m]any times” to go to the bathroom. Defendant eventually “led [her] to the bathroom,” and after she used the bathroom, “[l]ifted” her up—at one point grabbing her neck—and took her back to the bedroom. At times, defendant “would just pace around” and “keep an eye on” her, and “he left to smoke a cigarette right outside the window, . . . five feet away from the bed, a couple times.” Doe told defendant she was going to call the cops, and defendant said, “ ‘You’re not a cop caller.’ ” She said to defendant, “ ‘Then let me call my ex- husband’ ” because she “knew he would come and help [her] or at least come get the kids.” Doe tried to call her ex-husband at 11:48 p.m.; it rang once, 3 and defendant grabbed her phone and hung up. Doe’s ex-husband texted her, “ ‘Why did you call?’ ” Defendant held Doe’s phone to her face to unlock it (using facial recognition) and then responded to the ex-husband’s text, “ ‘Butt dial.’ ” Defendant kept Doe’s phone for the rest of the night. He also took her keys and the landline phone. Defendant said things like, “ ‘You say one more fucking word, I’m going to kill you.’ ” He also made threats to Doe’s father, her bosses, and her ex-husband. Defendant eventually fell asleep. Doe waited about a half an hour and then went upstairs to her children. She went to bed with them around 3:30 a.m., and defendant came and got her up at 5:00 a.m. Doe told defendant to leave and he wouldn’t. Defendant said things like, “ ‘Get the fuck down here,’ ” “ ‘Get down here right now. We’re going to continue this until . . . you answer my questions,’ ” and “ ‘You’re just a horrible person.’ ” Doe asked defendant to leave her house, but he would not. Doe left her house with her children. After she took her children to daycare and preschool, she went to work. Her coworkers saw bruising on her neck and told her to go to the police. A male police officer met with Doe on March 7 and found her upset and shaking with a hoarse voice. He observed bruising across her chest and neck, and, “[d]ue to the sensitive nature of the investigation as well as the areas on the body where [Doe] described having injury,” he requested a female officer photograph her injuries. Photographs taken on March 7 and a few days later showed bruising under Doe’s ear, on the right side of her chest, on the left side of her neck, on her left forearm, on the left side of her back, and on her left leg caused by defendant grabbing her, holding her down, and poking her and a pronounced bruise on the right side of her jawline and neck from defendant choking her with his hands. After the incident, Doe’s eyes hurt, 4 her vision was blurry, she couldn’t swallow, and her throat hurt for a long time. Defendant testified in his own defense. He denied that he was violent with Doe on the night of March 6. He testified that they argued, but he never took Doe’s phone, and he went to sleep around midnight. According to defendant, Doe’s bruising “was from sex.” He testified, “She liked me to be physical with her, as far as biting, choking, and that was her perspective, and I was doing what she wanted me to do.” Defendant testified he had marks on his body from sex, and he took photos of himself, which were admitted in evidence. Relevant Verdict and Sentence Regarding the events of March 6 and 7, defendant was charged with willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon Doe, a person with whom defendant had a dating relationship (§ 273.5, subd. (a)(1); count 1), assault with a deadly weapon, to wit, a pillowcase (§ 245, subd. (a); count 2), felony false imprisonment in that defendant unlawfully violated the personal liberty of Doe by use of violence, menace, or deceit (§§ 236, 237; count 3), and misdemeanor interference with a wireless communication device in that defendant unlawfully removed and obstructed the use of a wireless communication device with the intent to prevent the use of the device to summon assistance or to notify law enforcement of a crime (§ 591.5; count 4). The jury found defendant guilty of count 1 (aggravated domestic violence), count 3 (false imprisonment), and count 4 (interference with a communication device) and not guilty of count 2 (assault with a deadly weapon). In a subsequent court trial, the court found the following factors in aggravation: the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of 5 great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)); the victim was particularly vulnerable (id., rule 4.421(a)(3)); and defendant’s prior performance on probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease community supervision, or parole was unsatisfactory (id. rule 4.421(b)(5)). At sentencing, defense counsel asked for probation or, in the alternative, the low term for count 1. He asked for a concurrent term for count 3 “as it was unclear as to whether it was encompassed and [defendant] should be entitled to that benefit.”3 The trial court found defendant was not suitable for probation, noting “his general lack of insight and remorse make him dangerous to others.” The court also found, “based on the evidence received at the trial . . . that the conduct in Count 1 and Count 3 were, in fact, separate acts of violence committed against [the victim] over a period of hours.” It found Doe’s trial testimony “compelling and thoughtful” and “did not find [defendant’s] words credible.” The court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years for count 1 and a consecutive eight months (one-third the middle term) for count 3.

3 Here, it appears defense counsel may have been implicitly referring to California Rules of Court, rule 4.425, on factors affecting concurrent or consecutive sentences. Whether “[t]he crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence” is a “fact[] relating to [the] crimes” that “affect[s] the decision to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences.” (Id., rule 4.425(a)(2).) Defense counsel seemed to imply that the court should presume count 1 and count 3 did not involve separate acts of violence.

6 DISCUSSION A. Failure to Discharge a Juror Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying a defense motion to discharge a juror during trial. We are not persuaded. 1. Additional Background On the first day of testimony, the prosecutor asked Doe to describe the first thing defendant did to her physically on the night of March 6. She responded that “he jumped on top of me and put his, like, knee on my chest and then started choking me,” and put his hands around her neck so that she could not talk, and kept saying things like “ ‘you [s]tupid motherfucker,’ ” and “ ‘[s]hut the fuck up.’ ” After her response, the following exchange occurred between the prosecutor and the trial judge: “[Prosecutor]: Just for the record, Your Honor, the witness was holding both of her hands out, with her index and thumb in I guess I would describe as a choking motion, a standard choking motion. “[The Court]: I would phrase it as hands in front of her in close proximity to one another, with her thumbs towards her chest at about her chest level, I would say two to three inches apart, and then I would say cupped in a C and a backwards C. That’s how I would describe it. “[Prosecutor]: That was much better.” Testimony then resumed. The next day, the trial judge told counsel and defendant, outside the presence of the jurors and in a closed courtroom, that Juror No. 4602 expressed concerns to the bailiff that, after the prosecutor’s comment, a number of people laughed, whether that was fellow jurors, audience members, or others. The trial judge said that Juror No. 4602 reportedly felt “very bad” for Doe, but this would not impact his ability to serve as a juror, 7 and he just wanted to bring it to the court’s attention. Defense counsel responded that he had seen the juror that morning “pacing through the hallway” and “saying things” that defense counsel could not hear and that were not directed to him. The prosecutor stated that it did not appear to him that Doe “was taking any offense” at the courtroom colloquy described above. The trial judge responded, “I just want to ensure that this juror hasn’t emotionally prejudiced anything or is fully able to continue.” Juror No. 4602 was brought back into the courtroom, with the trial judge acknowledging that the bailiff had indicated the juror had some concerns or something was bothering him, and it is “best for you to just tell me in your own words.” Juror No. 4602 explained that it was about the point where Doe was on the stand “with respect to the motion around the neck, he [prosecutor] gave a very simple—you gave a much more detailed description about what had happened. And the prosecutor made a quip about being, you know, far more detailed, and everybody in the room kind of chuckled and laughed at that.” The juror went on to explain, uninterrupted by the trial court: “For someone who is on the stand, given their emotional state, pouring their heart out in testimony, for us to laugh at their trauma— “My wife went through an experience, somebody made a quip about that, and I can tell you, sitting down, hold—at night, listening to her cry at how people could minimize that, it dug at me. “So this doesn’t change how I’m viewing this. I am still trying to be impartial. But from that perspective, I—even having a victim advocate here, I felt like we minimized their trauma, and that just stuck with me, and I thought about it all night based on my own personal experiences, and I just wanted to call that out.

8 “And I don’t know if there’s anything that can be done to rectify that. We can’t go into the past and undo it. But I wanted to bring it to your attention that I felt it was a disservice to them testifying, that we all essentially laughed at how that was described.” (Italics added.) The trial court asked the juror, “Are you going to be able to set this aside and decide this case solely on the evidence presented?” The juror responded: “As I said, it doesn’t change my perspective looking at the case, but if I take a step back from just in terms of what they’re going through, again, it’s yet to be determined because the proceedings have not concluded, obviously. “But I just wanted to say that I know how that can make somebody feel, even if—because perception is reality. It’s their perception, so it’s their reality. “But from, you know, stepping back, looking objectively at the case and everything that’s going on, it’s still all up in the air. We still haven’t heard all the evidence, haven’t heard from everybody. “Does it give me empathy for someone? It absolutely does, but more in so that—the way that we minimized their trauma in that way. “So from that perspective, I—I can say that I can be impartial.· I still haven’t listened to all the evidence. I still have thoughts that I’m thinking about all the time. I mean, it’s a real-time event. “I don’t know how I can clarify it more than that. But again, this was just about—something that I did not expect to come up, and that’s how it affected me.” (Italics added.) The trial court went on to ask about whether the juror had already prejudged the case and the juror stated he had not: “It’s a perception of reality.

9 “And again, I don’t want to do a disservice to the court, but if what is going on up there is—if it is an act to bring empathy, that’s one thing. “I’m looking at it from a trauma perspective based on my own personal experience, but I have not made any decisions yet. All I can say is that we laughed at somebody who is testifying, and this is supposed to be a safe space where people can do that. They had a [sic] advocate. And I feel that we minimized their testimony, If we boil it down to the most base form, that’s all.” (Italics added.) The court asked counsel if they had any questions; when they did not, the court thanked the juror and asked him to leave the courtroom. The court then stated to counsel: “With that, I really let the juror try to explain it their own way, because at the beginning, he sounded like he had started to prejudge or maybe have a bias or move towards one side, and the Court wanted to be very sure he wasn’t just giving me the rote answer of ‘I haven’t judged anything yet. I just thought you should know. I haven’t judged.’ By the time he had concluded answering the questions and really put it into his own words— “I will just hear from the parties.” Defense counsel asked to have the juror removed from the panel because he had prejudged the case. The prosecutor opposed the motion, noting that he understood what the juror was saying, that “there was a point of levity in a very serious situation and a very serious testimony, and I think that’s what he was getting at . . . I don’t think that means he can’t be impartial. He was very clear that he could be. But he did not like the moment of levity in a very serious time.” The trial court then denied defendant’s motion to excuse the juror, stating as follows:

10 “Based on the totality of the answers, I at first did agree with [defense counsel]. [Juror No. 4602] was using terms as if he had prejudged it. “However, I kept asking him over and over, and not in a leading way. By the end of the conversation, he was very clear. He physically would say with his hands—he would use hand gestures, ‘this situation,’ like something in front of him, and then put up his hands and literally take a step back as if he is removing himself but yet, being a very diligent juror, is bringing it to my attention. It was in his head. He wanted us to know about it. “So I do feel, based on his answers—unequivocally, he indicated ‘I can be fair and impartial, it won’t interfere with my job as a juror’ but that he’s clearly trying to follow all of the Court’s directives, to the letter.· So that’s why I think he came forward, letting us know it was bothering him. “What was bothering him was the levity during a serious conversation, that he repeatedly said, ‘I don’t know what happened. I still haven’t decided. I haven’t heard all the evidence.’ ” “So I am going to retain him as a juror at this time.” 2. Analysis “The trial court may discharge a juror at any time if good cause exists to find that the juror is unable to perform his or her duty. (§ 1089.) ‘The trial court’s decision whether or not to discharge a juror under section 1089 is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence; to warrant discharge, the juror’s bias or other disability must appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.’ (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 124–125.) A reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence but ‘must be confident that the trial court’s conclusion is manifestly supported by evidence on which the court actually relied.’ (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1053.)” (People v. Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 339, 365.)

11 Here we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to leave Juror No. 4602 on the panel. The trial judge took the right approach: he told counsel before inviting the juror into the courtroom that he wanted to be sure the juror had not “emotionally prejudged anything” and was “fully able to continue.” The trial court then asked the juror an open ended and non- confrontational question, letting the juror speak at length uninterrupted. Although the juror was concerned that there appeared to be levity in the courtroom after the prosecutor’s self-deprecating quip, and took seriously that the courtroom is “supposed to be a safe space where people testify,” the juror reiterated that he could be fair and impartial and do his job as a juror. The court then asked whether the juror could set aside his feelings and decide the case on the evidence presented, and the juror said he could and that he would be impartial. And in response to whether he had prejudged the case, the juror said he had not made any decisions yet. The trial court permitted counsel to ask questions, but there were none. And then the trial court summed up the reasons for his finding that the juror should not be dismissed, based on the totality of the answers that he had heard and his observation of the juror. We are not persuaded by defendant’s position that the very same colloquy between the court and the juror that we have quoted in its entirety shows the juror was “actually biased in favor of the complainant.” In support of this conclusion, defendant contends that the juror did not really understand the “actual interchange” between the court and the “prosecutor’s deft, self-deprecating comment that the trial judge’s phrasing was ‘much better’ than his own description,” or that the judge’s description was actually “much better” than the prosecutor’s description of what happened, and that any “attorney or judge who has participated in a trial understands that a 12 brief amount of levity is a welcome respite from the very intense, serious endeavor.” This argument misses the point that the inquiry of the juror was not to determine whether the juror understood trial tactics and techniques or who better described the witness’s gestures but rather to get to the bottom of the juror’s apparent concerns to determine if he could continue to serve consistent with giving defendant a fair trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the juror. B. Consecutive Sentencing Defendant next contends the trial court was required to stay the eight- month term for count 3 under section 654.4 We disagree. 1. Applicable Law Section 654, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part, “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” “[T]he purpose of section 654 ‘is to insure that a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his culpability.’ ” (People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1211.) Determining “[w]hether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under section 654 requires a two-step inquiry.” (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) The first step is to determine whether “the different crimes were completed by a ‘single physical act.’ [Citation.] If so, the defendant may not be punished more than once for that act.” (Ibid.) If “the case involves more than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct,” then 4 Defendant may raise a claim under section 654 on appeal even though he did not raise the issue below. (See People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618 [considering appellate claim under section 654 although the issue was not raised in the trial court because error under section 654 results in an unauthorized sentence].)

13 the court reaches the second step and must determine “whether that course of conduct reflects a single ‘intent and objective’ or multiple intents and objectives.” (Ibid.) The second step is sometimes referred to as the Neal test. (See People v. Latimer, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 1205–1206, citing Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11.) Under the Neal test, the question “ ‘[w]hether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.’ ” (People v. Latimer, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1208.) On the other hand, if the “defendant ‘entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1257.) “Where reasonable minds can differ on whether multiple crimes involve a single act, [the California Supreme Court has] applied the [Neal] ‘intent and objective’ test.” (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 372 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) “A trial court’s express or implied determination that two crimes were separate, involving separate objectives [and, therefore, may be punished separately under section 654], must be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Brents, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 618.) The trial court “is vested with broad latitude in making its determination,” and “[w]e review the trial court’s determination in the light most favorable to the respondent and presume the existence of every fact the trial court could 14 reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.) 2. Analysis At the first step of the section 654 analysis, defendant claims count 1 and count 3 involved the same physical act. He argues, “The same physical injuries inflicted by physical force were the actus reus of both counts one and three. They both inflicted physical injury by physical force in count one and accomplished restraint by violence in count three.” We reject the premise of defendant’s claim that the crimes of count 1, aggravated domestic violence, and count 3, false imprisonment by use of violence, menace, or deceit, were completed by a single physical act. Rather, as the prosecutor argued at trial in closing argument, “Counts 1 and 3 are referring to multiple acts, strangulation with the hands, the poking, the sitting on top of her.” (Italics added.) Nor were the acts supporting each offense identical. As to count 1, the prosecutor relied on defendant’s conduct that caused the bruising seen in the photos, noting “bruising on [Doe’s] chest,” “bruising around her neck,” and marks on her arms and legs. As to count 3, the prosecutor argued the “menace” for felony false imprisonment “include[d] [defendant’s] verbal threats.” He argued, “[W]hile [defendant] wasn’t letting [Doe] leave the bed for hours, he was threatening to kill her father, to kill her. He was threatening her repeatedly.” Defendant’s threats used to restrain Doe for count 3 were not the same acts that caused Doe’s corporal injuries for count 1. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim under the first step of the section 654 analysis. At the second step of the analysis, defendant argues count 1 and count 3 involved a single objective. He asserts, “count one’s infliction of injuries was the incidental means to accomplish count three’s restraint.” In other 15 words, defendant claims his only intent and objective in committing count 1 and count 3 was to restrain Doe. However, the trial court reasonably could have determined that defendant harbored separate criminal intents and objectives when he committed the two crimes. As the Attorney General suggests, the trial court reasonably could have found that one of defendant’s intents and objectives in committing aggravated domestic violence (count 1) was to inflict physical harm upon Doe, but in falsely imprisoning Doe in her bedroom over the course of three hours (count 3), defendant entertained the separate intent and objective of preventing her from reporting the physical abuse. Because the record supports a finding that defendant, in committing count 1 and count 3, entertained at least two intents and objectives that were independent of each other, we conclude the trial court properly punished him separately for each count under section 654. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

16 _________________________ Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ Stewart, P. J.

_________________________ Richman, J.

A173358, People v. Beadle