People v. Coronado CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 9/4/26 P. v. Coronado CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085912

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. FSB22001549)

v.

ABRAHAM JATNEL CORONADO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, David J. Mazurek, Judge. Affirmed. Matthew Aaron Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel B. Rogers and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION1 A jury convicted Abraham Jatnel Coronado of 13 sex offenses against three victims under the age of 16. With respect to John Doe 1, the jury found Coronado guilty of five counts of lewd act upon a child under 14 (Pen. Code,2 § 288, subd. (a); counts 5–9); sexual penetration upon a minor 14 or older by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(C); count 10); and sodomy with a minor 14 or older by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(C); count 11). With respect to John Doe 2, the jury found Coronado guilty of two counts of oral copulation with a person under 16 by a person over 21 years of age (§ 287, subd. (b)(2); counts 1 & 2); sodomy of a person under 18 (§ 286, subd. (b)(1); count 3); and sexual penetration of a person under 18 (§ 289, subd. (h); count 4). With respect to John Doe 3, the jury found Coronado guilty of two counts of lewd act upon a child under 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 12 & 13). The jury further found true multiple-victim allegations (§ 667.61) as to counts 5 through 9, 12, and 13, and at least two aggravating circumstance allegations for each count (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)). The trial court sentenced Coronado to the total aggregated prison sentence of 26 years followed by 175 years to life. On appeal, he challenges the court’s decision to run the terms imposed for two convictions—counts 10 and 11 with John Doe 1—consecutively instead of concurrently under 1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 section 667.6, subdivision (d)(1). Limiting our discussion of the facts relevant to this narrow sentencing issue, we affirm the court’s decision. In 2011, when John Doe 1 (hereinafter John) was 14 years old, Coronado grabbed his hand, pulled him into a pool shed, and began hugging him. As they were hugging, Coronado reached into John’s pants and inserted his fingers into his anus. John pulled away and told Coronado he wanted him to stop. But Coronado pulled down John’s pants anyway and “forced his penis into [his] rectum.” John again pulled away, this time yelling that it hurt. Coronado stopped, pulled John back toward him, hugged him, and apologized. In sentencing Coronado, the trial court selected count 1 as the principal term and imposed the upper term of three years. For counts 2 through 4, it ran each term consecutively, imposing one-third the middle term of two years (eight months). For counts 5 through 9, 12, and 13, it imposed indeterminate terms of 25 years to life and ran them each consecutively. Finally, and relevant here, for count 10 against John—sexual penetration upon a minor 14 years of age or older by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury—the court imposed the upper term of 10 years and ran it consecutively. For count 11 against John—sodomy with a minor 14 years of age or older by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury—the court imposed the upper term of 11 years and ran it consecutively pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (d). When addressing count 10, the court specifically said, “[T]he Court will impose the aggravated term of 10 years. That’s a full term, consecutive sentence pursuant to . . . section 667.6[,] subdivision (d).” When addressing 3 count 11, the court specifically said, “[A]gain, a full and consecutive aggravated term pursuant to 667.6[, subdivision] (d).” Coronado contends the trial court erred for two reasons when it imposed consecutive terms for the count 10 and count 11 convictions. We see no merit in either contention. Section 667.6, subdivision (d), mandates the imposition of consecutive terms for convictions of certain enumerated sex offenses. Consecutive terms are mandated “if the crimes . . . involve the same victim on separate occasions.” (§ 667.6, subd. (d)(1).) Here, the parties do not dispute that the enumerated offenses in this code section include Coronado’s convictions for sexual penetration upon a minor 14 years of age or older by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury (count 10), and sodomy with a minor 14 years of age or older by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury (count 11). Coronado’s first contention is that the trial court purportedly erred when it failed to articulate reasons on the record to support the imposition of consecutive terms for these two counts. We reject this contention, for several reasons. For one thing, Coronado makes no attempt to provide us with legal authority for the proposition that a statement of reasons is required when imposing mandatory consecutive terms pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (d)(1). For another, there is no such authority. As the Attorney General points out in his respondent’s brief to which Coronado failed to reply, it is well-settled that a statement of reasons need not be given when a court runs a term consecutive pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (d)(1). (E.g., People v. Craft (1986) 41 Cal.3d 554, 558–559, superseded by statute on another 4 ground as stated in People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110; People v. Thomas (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1477, 1489; People v. Smith (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 539, 543.) A statement of reasons is required for sentencing choices. (§ 1170, subd. (c); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.406 [listing sentencing choices that require a statement of reasons].) A statement of reasons is accordingly required when a court exercises its discretion to impose consecutive terms pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (c). (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.426(b).) By contrast, “[a] finding under section 667.6[, subdivision (d)] that the crimes . . . occurred on separate occasions eliminates the court’s discretion.” (People v. Catarino (2023) 14 Cal.5th 748, 753–754.) In addition to failing on the merits, Coronado forfeited this argument. He failed to object or ask for a more detailed statement of reasons at the sentencing hearing. Complaints about a missing or improper statement of reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356 [seminal case]; People v. Quintanilla (2009) 70 Cal.App.4th 406, 412–413 [rule applied to a discretionary consecutive sentencing decision].) Coronado’s second claim of error is that the trial court erred when it decided consecutive sentences were mandatory because the record purportedly lacked sufficient evidence to support a finding under the applicable standard of proof that the offenses charged in count 10 and count 11 occurred on separate occasions. The applicable standard of proof here was by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Groves (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1230.) Our review is for abuse of discretion. (People v. King (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1323.) “The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a 5 trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711– 712, fns. omitted.) Thus, “[i]n deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion, ‘[w]e are . . . bound . . . by the substantial evidence rule.’ ” (Strasbourger Pearson Tulcin Wolff Inc. v. Wiz Technoloty, Inc. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1403.) This is because “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence.” (People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991, 998.) After reviewing the record for substantial evidence, we are not persuaded the trial court abused its discretion. “Separate occasions” within the meaning of section 667.6, subdivision (d)(1) is a term of art. Section 667.6, subdivision (d)(2), provides: “In determining whether crimes against a single victim were committed on separate occasions under this subdivision, the court shall consider whether, between the commission of one sex crime and another, the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to reflect upon the defendant’s actions and nevertheless resumed sexually assaultive behavior. Neither the duration of time between crimes, nor whether or not the defendant lost or abandoned the opportunity to attack, shall be, in and of itself, determinative on the issue of whether the crimes in question occurred on separate occasions.” Here, under the applicable standard of review, the evidence shows there was a clear break between the two sex acts that led to Coronado’s convictions for the offenses charged in counts 10 and 11. According to John’s police interview, he pulled away from Coronado after Coronado digitally penetrated his anus and “made it very clear” that he wanted Coronado to 6 stop. Nevertheless, after this opportunity to reflect upon his actions, Coronado resumed his sexually assaultive activity by pulling down John’s pants and forcefully sodomizing him. The trial court’s implied finding that Coronado had a reasonable opportunity for reflection after digitally penetrating John before deciding to sodomize him is amply supported by the evidence. Coronado asserts the evidence that he had time to reflect is insubstantial because John gave no testimony about “the length of the encounter or other details regarding the transition from anal sex to digital penetration (or the reverse).” Coronado’s summary of the facts, however, completely ignores the details John related about the encounter in his police interview and improperly focuses exclusively on John’s testimony at trial, which is less clear about the sequence of events. “[T]o prevail on a sufficiency of the evidence argument, the defendant must present his case to us consistently with the substantial evidence standard of review. That is, the defendant must set forth in his opening brief all of the material evidence . . . in the light most favorable to the People.” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1574.) In the police interview, John was clear that sequence of events was as follows: (1) Coronado digitally penetrated John, (2) John pulled away and made it clear he wanted Coronado to stop, saying, “No, not now. I don’t want to,” (3) Coronado nevertheless pulled John back and began forcefully sodomizing him, and (4) Coronado stopped sodomizing John only when he “kinda yelled” because it hurt. The People were not required to demonstrate “a break of any specific duration or any change in physical location” in order to demonstrate the applicability of section 667.6, subdivision (d)(1). (People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 104.) There are many cases that discuss and 7 interpret this principle, all of which Coronado fails to discuss. (See People v. Solis (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1216–1220 [surveying the case law and concluding the “reasonable opportunity to reflect” standard has not been interpreted in a manner that is unconstitutionally vague].) On this record, we cannot say that no reasonable trier of fact could have decided that Coronado had a reasonable opportunity for reflection before resuming his assaultive behavior toward John. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

DO, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

RUBIN, J.

BERMÚDEZ, J.