People v. Ayala CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 8/27/26 P. v. Ayala CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D088197

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. Nos. SWF2401634, SWF2101903, SWF240045) ISMAEL AYALA, Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Linda Clark, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Stephanie L. Gunther, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Kristine A. Gutierrez and Emily Reeves, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Ismael Ayala appeals the no-contact and stay-away orders imposed by the trial court as part of his prison sentence and as a condition of his parole following his conviction for petty theft (Pen. Code,1 § 484) and making criminal threats (§ 422). The Attorney General argues Ayala forfeited this issue by failing to object to the orders in the trial court. We disagree and strike the no-contact and stay-away orders because the trial court lacked authority to issue them and otherwise affirm the judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In December 2023, a Home Depot asset protection investigator was on the lookout for Ayala when he saw him enter the store. The investigator observed Ayala select a torch, walk toward the back of the store, and enter the bathroom with a backpack strapped around his chest and carrying the torch in his hands. About three to five minutes later, Ayala walked out of the bathroom with nothing in his hands and left the store. Once outside the store, the investigator asked Ayala to return the torch. Ayala responded with profanity and told the investigator he was “the type of [person] that I will cut up and leave . . . anywhere I want, and I’ll beat you up too.” The investigator saw Ayala was holding a knife, so he backed up “to deescalate” the situation. Ayala attempted to show the investigator his backpack, but the investigator “didn’t even look inside of it” because he was “just trying to step away from [Ayala] at that point.” As the investigator backed away, Ayala told him, “I can always come back any time and steal whatever I want, whenever I want, and do whatever I want.” The investigator went back inside the store and found packaging for the torch in the bathroom trashcan. He then called the police. Later, he was shown a photographic line up and he selected Ayala’s picture.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 2 In December 2024, the District Attorney filed a first amended information alleging that Ayala committed robbery (§ 211) and made criminal threats (§ 422). The information further alleged Ayala was previously convicted of a serious prior offense (§ 211) in 2010, and that the same offense also constituted a strike prior. It also alleged the following aggravating factors: “the offense involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness”; Ayala threatened to “cut the victim” and drew “attention to the knife in [his] possession in connection with the threat,” indicating a “serious danger to society”; Ayala’s adult convictions and sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings were “numerous and of increasing seriousness”; and he “served a prior term in prison or county jail.” Later that month, a jury found Ayala guilty of making criminal threats (§ 422) and the lesser offense of petty theft (§ 484). The court found the aggravating factors true. At his sentencing hearing in March 2025, Ayala pleaded guilty in other cases to grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), bringing or sending a controlled substance into a penal institution (§ 4573) and driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (f)). The court sentenced Ayala for all cases to a combined term of nine years and four months in state prison. At sentencing, the prosecutor asked, “As part of your orders and the sentence, could he be ordered not to have any contact with [the Home Depot asset protection investigator], as well as to stay away from the Home Depot in Temecula?” The court stated, “Well, Counsel, any such order has to be proscribed in terms of the period of time, number one, in which that order remains in effect.” The court then said, “I can make that order throughout the period of parole or 3 post release supervision.” The prosecutor affirmed he was requesting the orders throughout the period of parole or post release supervision. The court stated, “All right. That will be the court’s order. In addition, [Ayala] is ordered not to have any contact with [the Home Depot asset protection investigator]; not to be within 50 yards of the Home Depot in Temecula at any time while―well, obviously while in custody, but while on parole or post release supervision in this case.” DISCUSSION As noted, Ayala argues the trial court erred when it imposed no-contact and stay-away orders as part of his prison sentence and as a condition of his parole. He contends his failure to object below does not forfeit this issue on appeal because the orders were unauthorized under any circumstance. We agree. A. Waiver Normally, only “claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 (Scott).) “In the sentencing context, we have applied the rule to claims of error asserted by both the People and the defendant.” (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852.) “We have, however, created a narrow exception to the waiver rule for ‘ “unauthorized sentences” or sentences entered in “excess of jurisdiction.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “A claim that a sentence is unauthorized . . . may be raised for the first time on appeal, and is subject to judicial correction whenever the error comes to the attention of the reviewing court.” (People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6.) “[A] sentence is generally ‘unauthorized’ where it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354.) “[S]uch error is ‘clear and correctable’

4 independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing.” (Ibid.) Because this case concerns whether the trial court was authorized to impose no-contact and stay-away orders as part of a prison sentence and a condition of parole, we will consider Ayala’s claim on the merits. B. Analysis The parties agree that the trial court did not have statutory authority to impose no-contact or stay-away orders in these circumstances. While there are statutory provisions that allow a trial court to impose no-contact and stay-away orders in other circumstances, for example, domestic violence cases (§ 1203.097), cases involving sexual assault of a minor (§ 1202.05, subd. (a)), stalking cases (§ 646.9, subd. (k)), as a condition of probation (§ 1203.1, subd. (j)) or during active criminal proceedings (§ 136.2), there are no statutes specifically authorizing the trial court here to impose no-contact and stay- away orders as part of Ayala’s prison sentence or as a condition of his parole. The parties, however, disagree on whether the court here had inherent authority to impose the orders. In making their arguments, they discuss People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 380 (Ponce). In Ponce, the Attorney General argued that trial courts, independent of statute, have inherent authority to issue appropriate protective orders to protect trial participants. (Id. at pp. 383–384.) The Court of Appeal rejected that contention, citing both California and federal court cases, and held that even if the trial court had “relied on ‘inherent judicial authority’ to issue its order, the result would not change. An existing body of statutory law regulates restraining orders. ‘ “[I]nherent powers should never be exercised in such a manner as to nullify existing legislation . . . .” ’ [Citation.] Where the Legislature authorizes a specific variety of available procedures, the courts 5 should use them and should normally refrain from exercising their inherent powers to invent alternatives.” (Id. at p. 384.) As in Ponce, the trial court here should have refrained from acting because there is an existing body of statutory law regulating no-contact and stay-away orders. In fact, the Legislature has adopted specific statutory provisions authorizing parole boards to impose no-contact and stay-away orders as a condition of parole. (§ 3053.2, subd. (a) [the parole board must impose a no-contact order as a condition of parole if requested by the victim]; § 3053, subd. (a) [the parole board “may also impose on the parole any conditions that it may deem proper”].) Under this statutory scheme, the victims here can request the parole board to include no-contact and stay- away orders as a condition of Ayala’s parole. (§ 3053.2, subd. (a).) Additionally, Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (a) authorizes trial courts to issue orders to protect against any threats or harassment after notice and hearing. Therefore, because the Legislature already authorizes available procedures for no-contact and stay-away orders for the victims in this case, the trial court was not authorized to impose them under its inherent authority. Moreover, the Court of Appeal in Ponce rejected the Attorney General’s inherent authority argument because there was “no evidence” the defendant “had threatened, or had tried to dissuade, any witness, or had tried to unlawfully interfere with the criminal proceedings” and “[t]he prosecutor did not make an offer of proof or any argument to justify the need for a protective order.” (Ponce, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 384.) Similarly, here, apart from Ayala’s threat during the commission of the crime for which he was convicted, the “prosecutor’s wish to have such an order, without more, is not an adequate showing sufficient to justify the trial court’s action.” (Id. at 6 p. 385.) Although the Attorney General urges us to remand to the trial court “to make a record regarding the necessity of the protective orders,” because we conclude the trial court did not have authority (statutory or inherent) to impose them, we strike them instead. (Id. at p. 386 [striking protective order issued at sentencing where trial court lacked authority to impose it].) DISPOSITION We strike the no-contact and stay-away orders imposed by the trial court as part of Ayala’s prison sentence and as a condition of his parole but otherwise affirm the judgment.

BERMÚDEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.