People v. McDonnell CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD296972
- Trial judge
- Euketa Oliver
- Outcome
- reversed — Reversed and remanded.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Bermudez (author), Judith D. McConnell, Buchanan
Analysis
The trial court imposed a stipulated five-year upper-term prison sentence for stalking with a prior, rejecting the defendant's argument that Senate Bill 567 required a reduction to the middle term absent stipulated aggravating facts. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding that under People v. Mitchell, the upper term could not be imposed without stipulated or proven aggravating circumstances, and the defendant could not unilaterally reduce the agreed-upon sentence.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of the stipulated five-year upper-term prison sentence“We therefore reverse the judgment because the facts relied on to justify the upper term were not “stipulated to or proven beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial.”” | de novo | error | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the holding in People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729, which mandates that Senate Bill 567's requirement for stipulated or proven aggravating facts applies retroactively to non-final plea agreements. Since the record indicates no aggravating facts were stipulated or proven, the trial court's imposition of the upper term violated Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). The court also correctly noted that the defendant cannot unilaterally reduce the sentence, preserving the integrity of the plea bargain while enforcing statutory sentencing limits. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729 — Senate Bill 567 amendments to Penal Code section 1170 apply retroactively to sentences imposed pursuant to stipulated plea agreements in cases not final on appeal, requiring aggravating facts to be stipulated or proven beyond a reasonable doubt for an upper term sentence.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Unpublished opinions merely reviewing the correctness of a trial court's decision do not merit extensive factual or legal statement.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it directly applies the controlling Supreme Court precedent in People v. Mitchell to the specific facts of a stipulated plea without aggravating circumstances. It correctly balances the statutory requirement for aggravating facts with the procedural options available to the defendant on remand, preventing a unilateral reduction while ensuring compliance with Senate Bill 567.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionAfter revoking McDonnell's probation, the San Diego Superior Court in 2025 imposed the stipulated five-year upper term for stalking with a prior (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (c)(2)), rejecting his argument that Senate Bill 567's amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b) barred the upper term because no aggravating facts had been stipulated to or proven. The Court of Appeal, accepting the People's concession and applying People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729, reversed and remanded so McDonnell may either reaffirm the bargain and waive the new section 1170(b) requirements or withdraw his plea.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of the stipulated five-year upper term under Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (c)(2) without any stipulated or proven aggravating circumstances, over defendant's objection that amended section 1170, subdivision (b) (Senate Bill 567) applied retroactively.“Here, McDonnell neither stipulated to any aggravating facts nor did the prosecutor prove any. We therefore reverse the judgment because the facts relied on to justify the upper term were not “stipulated to or proven beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial.”” | unclear | error (law misapplied) | agree with court The opinion does not state a standard of review, but the question—whether amended section 1170(b) applies to a stipulated upper-term sentence in a case not yet final—is a pure question of law. The Supreme Court in Mitchell held that Senate Bill 567 applies retroactively to stipulated-plea sentences in nonfinal cases, and the record as described shows no stipulation to aggravating facts and no proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The People conceded error. Given the opinion's statement that sentence was 'imposed' in 2025 (indicating imposition, not merely execution, had been suspended), the case was not final and the amended statute applied. |
Remedy on remand: whether defendant may unilaterally obtain reduction to the middle term, or whether the plea agreement must be reaffirmed (with waiver) or withdrawn.“What he may not do, however, is unilaterally obtain a reduction of his agreed-upon upper term sentence to the middle term.” | de novo | not reached | agree with court The trial court never reached remedy because it rejected the retroactivity argument; the Court of Appeal prescribed the remedy itself, following Mitchell's holding that the defendant may reaffirm the bargain and waive the section 1170(b) requirements or withdraw the plea and return the parties to pre-plea posture, but may not keep the benefits of the bargain while shedding its sentencing term. This tracks the Supreme Court's directive and the general rule that courts may not unilaterally rewrite a negotiated disposition. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729 — Senate Bill 567's amendments to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b) apply retroactively to upper-term sentences imposed pursuant to stipulated plea agreements in cases not final on appeal; on remand the defendant may reaffirm the bargain and waive the new requirements or withdraw the plea, but may not unilaterally obtain a reduced term.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — An unpublished opinion that merely reviews the correctness of a trial court's decision does not require an extensive factual or legal statement, supporting disposition by memorandum opinion.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The result follows directly from the Supreme Court's controlling decision in Mitchell and the People's concession, and the opinion correctly limits the remedy to reaffirmation-with-waiver or plea withdrawal rather than a unilateral middle-term reduction. It does not, however, expressly analyze whether the judgment was nonfinal for Estrada purposes given the 2021 suspended sentence, a predicate it assumes rather than explains.
Opinion
Filed 8/24/26 P. v. McDonnell CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086396
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD296972)
v. BRETT J. McDONNELL, Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Euketa Oliver, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Ava R. Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Connor O. Sakati, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION1 In 2021, Brett J. McDonnell pled no contest to stalking with a prior. (Pen. Code,2 § 646.9, subd. (c)(2).) Section 646.9, subdivision (c)(2) prescribes a two-, three-, or five-year prison term for stalking. As part of his plea agreement, he stipulated to a suspended five-year prison sentence, the upper term for this offense, and the court placed him on two years of formal probation. In 2023, McDonnell admitted a probation violation, and the court revoked probation. In 2025, the court imposed the stipulated five-year upper term prison sentence. It rejected McDonnell’s argument that imposition of the upper term violated section 1170 because he had not stipulated to any aggravating circumstances and he was entitled to the ameliorative benefit of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567). The People concede, and we agree, that the judgment must be reversed and the matter remanded for additional proceedings. Senate Bill 567 amended section 1170 to make the middle term the presumptive sentence and permit a trial court to impose the upper term only “when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2); People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729, 737–738 (Mitchell).) In Mitchell, the 1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We do not recite the factual and procedural background because our opinion is unpublished and the parties are familiar with the facts of the case and its procedural history. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851 [unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness of trial court’s decision “does not merit extensive factual or legal statement”].)
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 California Supreme Court resolved the effect of section 1170, subdivision (b) on negotiated dispositions, holding that Senate Bill 567’s amendments to the statute apply retroactively to sentences imposed pursuant to stipulated plea agreements in cases that were not final on appeal. (Mitchell, at p. 735.) Here, McDonnell neither stipulated to any aggravating facts nor did the prosecutor prove any. We therefore reverse the judgment because the facts relied on to justify the upper term were not “stipulated to or proven beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial.” (Mitchell, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 735.) McDonnell may reaffirm the bargain and waive the requirements now applicable under section 1170, subdivision (b), or he may withdraw his plea and return the parties to a pre-plea posture, with the prosecutor bearing its burden of proof. (Mitchell, at p. 749.) What he may not do, however, is unilaterally obtain a reduction of his agreed-upon upper term sentence to the middle term. (Ibid.) DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BERMÚDEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Garcia F034831 · 2002-04-17