Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No.: 25cv3837-RMB (BLM) 11 Mina Ann P. L., 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN 13 v. DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING OF FEES OR COSTS 14 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security, 15 [ECF NO. 2] Defendant. 16 17 The instant matter was initiated on December 30, 2025 when Plaintiff filed a 18 complaint seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s “claim for disability 19 benefits.” ECF No. 1 at 3. That same day, Plaintiff filed an Application To Proceed In District 20 Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs. ECF No. 2. 21 Having reviewed the complaint and motion, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to 22 proceed (“IFP”) and finds that Plaintiff’s complaint is sufficient to survive 23 screening. 24 Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs 25 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United 26 States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. 27 § 1915(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if 1 she is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), which states: 2 [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution 3 or defense of any suit, action or proceeding ... without prepayment of fees or 4 security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or 5 give security therefor. 6 The determination of indigency falls within the district court's discretion. California Men's 7 Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), reversed on other grounds by, 506 U.S. 8 194 (1993) (“Section 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion 9 in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the statute's requirement of indigency.”). It is 10 well-settled that a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont 11 de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948). To satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 12 § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient which states that one cannot because of [her] 13 poverty pay or give security for costs ... and still be able to provide for [herself] and dependents 14 with the necessities of life.” Id. at 339. At the same time, “the same even-handed care must 15 be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered to underwrite, at public expense, 16 ... the remonstrances of a suitor who is financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull [her] 17 own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). District courts tend to 18 reject IFP applications where the applicant can pay the filing fee with acceptable sacrifice to 19 other expenses. See, e.g., Allen v. Kelley, 1995 WL 396860, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (Plaintiff 20 initially permitted to proceed IFP, later required to pay $ 120 filing fee out of $ 900 settlement 21 proceeds); Ali v. Cuyler, 547 F. Supp. 129, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (IFP application denied because 22 the plaintiff possessed savings of $ 450 and that was more than sufficient to pay the $60 filing 23 fee). Moreover, the facts as to the affiant's poverty must be stated “with some particularity, 24 definiteness, and certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981). 25 Plaintiff has satisfied her burden of demonstrating that she is entitled to IFP status. 26 According to her affidavit in support of application, Plaintiff is not employed, has not worked in 27 the past twelve months, and has no income except for the $200 per month that she receives in 1 public assistance. ECF No. 2 at 1-2. Plaintiff is not married, does not have a checking or savings 2 account, and does not own a home or car. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff’s monthly expenses total $200. 3 Id. at 5. Plaintiff further explains that she is “currently homeless and doesn’t have any money 4 to afford fees at the moment.” Id. 5 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established that she is unable 6 to pay the filing fee without impairing her ability to pay for life’s necessities. Accordingly, the 7 Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or 8 Costs. 9 SUA SPONTE SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915(a) 10 Complaints filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) are 11 subject to a mandatory screening by the Court. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 12 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Alamar v. Social Security, 2019 WL1258846, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 13 19, 2019). A complaint should be dismissed if it is (1) “frivolous or malicious;” (2) 14 “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;” or (3) “seeks monetary relief against a 15 defendant who is immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 16 1126–27. 17 To survive, all complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 18 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 19 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an 20 unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 21 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Furthermore, 22 “recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not 23 suffice.” Id. Instead, the plaintiff must state a claim that is plausible on its face, meaning “the 24 pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 25 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570)). 26 “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then 27 determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. Social security 1 § 1915(e). Montoya v. Colvin, 2016 WL 890922, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2016) (citing Hoagland 2 v. Astrue, 2012 WL 2521753, *1 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012)). 3 In the context of a social security appeal, courts within the Ninth District have established 4 four elements necessary for a complaint to survive a screening: 5 First, the plaintiff must establish that she has exhausted her administrative 6 remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and that the civil action was commenced 7 within sixty days after notice of a final decision. Second, the complaint must indicate the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides. Third, the complaint must 8 state the nature of the plaintiff's disability and when the plaintiff claims she became 9 disabled. Fourth, the complaint must contain a plain, short, and concise statement 10 identifying the nature of the plaintiff's disagreement with the determination made by the Social Security Administration and show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. 11 12 Skylar v. Saul, 2019 WL 4039650, *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2019) (quoting Montoya, 2016 WL 13 890922 at *2). With regard to element four, a complaint is insufficient if it merely states that 14 the Commissioner was wrong in denying a plaintiff benefits. See id.; see also Hoagland, 2012 15 WL 2521753 at *3 (“Every plaintiff appealing an adverse decision of the Commissioner believes 16 that the Commissioner was wrong. The purpose of the complaint is to briefly and plainly allege 17 facts supporting the legal conclusion that the Commissioner’s decision was wrong.”). Instead, 18 the “complaint . . . must set forth a brief statement of facts setting forth the reasons why the 19 Commissioner’s decision was wrong.” Id. at *2. 20 After reviewing the amended complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established the 21 four elements necessary for a complaint to survive screening. Plaintiff states that 22 she resides within the jurisdictional boundaries of this Court in Calipatria, CA and “files this action 23 to seek judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision” to deny Plaintiff’s application for disability 24 insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. ECF No. 1 at 2-3. 25 Plaintiff also states that she is disabled as she “suffered from medically determinable 26 severe impairments consisting of Moyamoya syndrome, status post neurosurgery intervention.” 27 Id. at 2. Plaintiff further states that she disagrees with the determination made by the Social 1 ||symptom and limitation testimony that [Plaintiff] could not complete activities due to memory 2 || problems and has ongoing low energy levels.” Id. at 3. 3 CONCLUSION. 4 Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or > || Costs is GRANTED. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 - g ||Dated: 3/18/2026 lobe Mager 9 Hon. Barbara L. Major 0 United States Maqistrate Judde 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28