People v. Clayton CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of Riverside County · No. CVRI2403616
- Trial judge
- Samuel Diaz, Jr.
- Outcome
- reversed — Reversed and remanded with instructions.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Michele M. Castillo (author), O'Rourke, Laurence D. Rubin
Analysis
The trial court denied Clayton's petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon, erroneously concluding he was statutorily ineligible because he was convicted of a sex offense. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding that Clayton was eligible under the plain language of the statute because he was sentenced to prison rather than probation, and instructing the trial court to appoint counsel on remand.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for certificate of rehabilitation and pardon based on statutory ineligibility“The trial court’s denial turned on its interpretation of section 4852.01, which is a question of law we review de novo.” | de novo | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court agree with court |
Failure to appoint counsel“Because we are reversing on another ground, we do not need to reach this issue.” | unclear | not reached | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Failla (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1514 — Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo; plain meaning governs when the statute is unambiguous.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — General authority for the use of memorandum opinions.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the de novo standard of review to the statutory interpretation question. It accurately identifies that the exclusion in Penal Code section 4852.01(b) applies only to those granted probation, not those sentenced to prison, leading to a correct reversal.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe Riverside County Superior Court denied Jesse Edward Clayton's self-represented petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon, concluding he was statutorily ineligible under Penal Code section 4852.01(b) because his 2012 convictions were for sex offenses listed in section 290. The Court of Appeal, accepting the Attorney General's concession, held that subdivision (b) excludes only section 290 offenders who were granted probation, that Clayton (who was sentenced to prison) is eligible to petition under subdivision (a), reversed, and remanded with directions to consider the petition on the merits and to afford Clayton assigned counsel under section 4852.08.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for certificate of rehabilitation and pardon on the ground that Clayton was statutorily ineligible under Penal Code section 4852.01(b)“The trial court denied the petition after concluding Clayton was not eligible to petition for relief under section 4852.01(b).” | de novo | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court Section 4852.01(b) by its terms limits eligibility for persons convicted of a section 290 sex offense 'who [are] granted probation.' The opinion recites that Clayton was sentenced to prison, released in 2013, and discharged from parole in 2016, so the probation-based exclusion does not reach him and the general grant of eligibility in subdivision (a) applies. Statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo, the plain language controls where unambiguous, and the People conceded the point; the court's reading is consistent with the statutory text quoted in the opinion. The court appropriately confined its holding to eligibility and left the merits to the trial court. |
Failure to appoint counsel for the petitioner as required by Penal Code section 4852.08“Because we are reversing on another ground, we do not need to reach this issue.” | unclear | not reached | agree with court The court declined to decide whether the failure to appoint counsel was independently reversible, which is a reasonable exercise of judicial restraint given the reversal on the eligibility ground. It nonetheless directed the trial court on remand to honor the statutory right to assigned counsel under section 4852.08, which protects the petitioner without requiring resolution of the harmless-error question. Nothing in the opinion suggests this disposition was improper. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Failla (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1514 — Interpretation of Penal Code section 4852.01 is a question of law reviewed de novo; where statutory language is unambiguous, its plain meaning governs and resort to other interpretive aids is unnecessary.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Appellate courts may dispose of straightforward appeals, including those resolved by concession, through a memorandum opinion.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly identifies the de novo standard, quotes the operative statutory text, and applies its plain meaning to undisputed facts (prison sentence, not probation), supported by the Attorney General's concession and Failla's plain-language rule. It appropriately declines to reach the unnecessary section 4852.08 issue while ensuring counsel is appointed on remand, and it limits the holding to eligibility rather than the merits.
Opinion
Filed 8/5/25 P. v. Clayton CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085021
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. CVRI2403616)
JESSE EDWARD CLAYTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Samuel Diaz, Jr., Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions. Mytili G. Bala, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Nora S. Weyl, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Jesse Edward Clayton appeals an order denying his petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon under Penal Code section 4852.01. Clayton argues—and the People agree—the trial court misconstrued section 4852.01 by concluding Clayton was statutorily ineligible. He also asserts the trial court committed a reversible error by failing to appoint counsel as required by section 4852.08. Resolving this matter by memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we accept the People’s concession and reverse and remand with instructions. I. According to his petition, in 2012, Clayton was convicted of knowingly possessing child pornography (§ 311.11(a))1, having knowing contact with a minor to commit a sexual offense (§ 288.3(a)), and attempting to use a minor for obscene material (§§ 664, 311.4(c)). Clayton was released from prison in 2013 and discharged from parole in 2016. In 2024, Clayton petitioned for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. Clayton represented himself in the petition’s proceedings. The trial court denied the petition after concluding Clayton was not eligible to petition for relief under section 4852.01(b). II. A. Clayton argues the trial court erred because he is eligible to petition for relief under the plain language of section 4852.01(a). The People concede error, and we agree. The trial court’s denial turned on its interpretation of section 4852.01, which is a question of law we review de novo. (People v. Failla (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1514, 1520.)
1 Though the appellate record is unclear whether Clayton was convicted of section 311.11 or section 311.4, the outcome of this appeal is the same regardless. 2 Under section 4852.01(a), “a person convicted of a felony may file a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon.” But the statute excludes certain individuals. Relevant here, subdivision (b) restricts eligibility for those convicted of “a felony violation of any sex offense specified in [s]ection 290 who [are] granted probation.” (Id., subd. (b), italics added.) Clayton argues, and the People concede, he is eligible to petition for relief under section 4852.01(a). Although he was convicted of a sex offense felony under section 290, he was sentenced to prison, not probation. As a result, any restrictions in subdivision (b) do not apply to him. (§ 4852.01(b).) By the statute’s plain language, Clayton is thus eligible to petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon under subdivision (a). (§ 4852.01(a).) Because we perceive no ambiguity in the statute, the plain meaning governs. (Failla, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1520.) Consequently, we do not need to turn to any other interpretive aids. (Id. at pp. 1520-1521.) Given Clayton’s eligibility to petition for certification of rehabilitation and pardon, the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. As this appeal addresses only Clayton’s eligibility to petition, we express no opinion regarding the outcome of the merits of his petition on remand. B. Clayton argues reversal is also required because the trial court failed to appoint counsel as required under section 4852.08. Because we are reversing on another ground, we do not need to reach this issue. On remand, however, the trial court must ensure Clayton is afforded his statutory right to assigned counsel. (See § 4852.08.) III. We reverse and remand the order denying Clayton’s petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. On remand, the trial court shall 3 consider Clayton’s petition on the merits and proceed under the directives of section 4852.01 et seq., including the right to counsel under section 4852.08.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Failla E038122 · 2006-06-30
- People v. Garcia F034831 · 2002-04-17