People v. Jacaso CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCN024923
- Trial judge
- David G. Brown
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Buchanan (author), Truc T. Do, Julia C. Kelety
Analysis
The trial court denied Jacaso's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, finding he had not made a prima facie case because his plea stipulated to implied malice murder, a theory not eliminated by the 2019 amendments. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the stipulated facts conclusively established his ineligibility for resentencing as he was not convicted under a theory of imputed malice.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6“The court found that Jacaso had not made a prima facie case for resentencing and denied his petition.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the standard that a defendant is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 if the factual basis for their plea conclusively establishes guilt under a still-valid theory of murder, such as implied malice. The court properly relied on the stipulated facts from the plea colloquy to determine that Jacaso was not convicted under a theory of imputed malice (felony murder or natural and probable consequences), which are the only theories eliminated by the 2019 amendments. The reasoning is supported by the record and controlling authority regarding the scope of section 1172.6. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 — Establishes the procedure for reviewing appeals where appointed counsel files a brief identifying no meritorious issues, requiring the court to evaluate specific arguments raised by the defendant and permitting independent review of the record.
- relied: People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974 — A generic plea to second degree murder does not establish any particular theory of the crime, necessitating a review of the factual basis to determine eligibility for resentencing.
- relied: People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444 — The factual basis for a plea may conclusively establish as a matter of law that a defendant is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6.
- relied: People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110 — Defense counsel has the authority to stipulate to the factual basis for a plea agreement on behalf of the client.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the legal standard for section 1172.6 eligibility, focusing on whether the stipulated facts support a conviction under a theory of imputed malice. It properly distinguishes between the eliminated theories (felony murder, natural and probable consequences) and the still-valid theory of implied malice, using the specific stipulations in the record to affirm the denial.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe San Diego Superior Court denied Anthony Jacaso's Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing on his 1996 guilty plea to second degree murder, finding he failed to state a prima facie case. The Court of Appeal, after a Delgadillo brief from counsel and a supplemental pro se brief, independently reviewed the record and affirmed, holding that the stipulated factual basis for the plea established Jacaso was the actual perpetrator of an implied malice murder, a theory still valid after the 2019 amendments to sections 188 and 189.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of section 1172.6 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage on the ground that the record of conviction (the stipulated factual basis for the plea) conclusively shows Jacaso was convicted as the actual killer acting with implied malice, not under felony murder, natural and probable consequences, or any imputed-malice theory.“Here, Jacaso through his counsel stipulated to specific facts demonstrating that he was guilty of murder under a still-valid theory as the actual perpetrator of implied malice murder.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The opinion does not expressly name a standard of review, though it conducts what is functionally de novo review of whether the record of conviction establishes ineligibility as a matter of law. The result is well supported: defense counsel affirmatively recited that Jacaso himself shook the infant knowing it was wrong and in conscious disregard of that knowledge, agreed the circumstances showed implied malice, and the court took the plea specifically to 'murder in the second degree, implied malice.' Under section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1), relief is limited to those convicted under felony murder, natural and probable consequences, or other imputed-malice theories; a sole-perpetrator implied malice murder is untouched by SB 1437. The court correctly distinguished a generic plea (Flores) from a plea with a theory-specific factual basis (Saavedra), and relied on Palmer for counsel's authority to stipulate. The court did not cite People v. Lewis for the prima facie standard or address People v. French's limits on treating a factual-basis stipulation as a personal admission, but neither omission undermines the result because the defendant personally pleaded guilty to the charge as framed by the court to include implied malice and no record evidence suggests any accomplice or alternative theory. |
Rejection of Jacaso's supplemental claims (diminished capacity affecting plea, insufficient evidence of malice, youth as mitigation) as outside the scope of a section 1172.6 petition.“These arguments are outside the scope of this section 1172.6 petition” | de novo | correct | agree with court Section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3) requires a showing that the petitioner could not presently be convicted because of the 2019 changes to sections 188 and 189. Claims attacking the voluntariness of the plea, the sufficiency of the evidence of malice, or youth-based mitigation do not depend on those statutory changes and are properly raised, if at all, by direct appeal or habeas corpus. The court correctly applied the statutory text and Delgadillo's instruction to address the arguments actually raised. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 — In an appeal from denial of a section 1172.6 petition where appointed counsel finds no arguable issues, the Court of Appeal must evaluate arguments in a defendant's supplemental brief but is not compelled to independently review the entire record, though it may do so in its discretion.
- relied: People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974 — A generic guilty plea to second degree murder does not by itself establish any particular theory of murder for purposes of section 1172.6 prima facie review.
- relied: People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444 — The stipulated factual basis for a plea may conclusively establish as a matter of law that a petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 resentencing.
- relied: People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110 — Defense counsel has authority to stipulate to the factual basis for a plea on the client's behalf, consistent with counsel's broad authority over factual and procedural matters.
- missed: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 — At the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 petition the court takes the petitioner's allegations as true and may not engage in factfinding or weigh evidence, but may deny the petition where the record of conviction conclusively refutes the allegations as a matter of law.
- missed: People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36 — Defense counsel's stipulation to a factual basis for a guilty plea does not constitute the defendant's personal admission of the truth of those facts for purposes beyond establishing the factual basis itself.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court reached the correct result with the right core authorities: the plea colloquy, which it quoted at length, shows Jacaso was prosecuted and pleaded guilty as the sole actor on an implied malice theory, which section 1172.6 does not reach. It did not cite Lewis for the governing prima facie standard or confront French's caution about treating counsel's factual-basis stipulation as a binding personal admission, gaps that do not change the outcome here because the court itself framed the charge as implied malice murder when taking the plea and no alternative theory appears in the record.
Opinion
Filed 7/10/24 P. v. Jacaso CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082985
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN024923)
ANTHONY JACASO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David G. Brown, Judge. Affirmed. Anthony Jacaso, in pro. per., and Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent. In 1996, Anthony Jacaso pled guilty to one count of second degree murder. (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a).) In 2023, Jacaso filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 on the ground that he “could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes made to Penal Code [sections] 188 and 189 effective January 1, 2019.” The court 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. appointed counsel for Jacaso, received briefing, and held a hearing. The trial court found that Jacaso had not made a prima facie case for resentencing and denied his petition. Jacaso appealed. Appellate counsel subsequently filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), indicating he has not been able to identify any potentially meritorious issues for reversal on appeal. We notified Jacaso of his right to file his own brief on appeal, and he has elected to do so. We have reviewed the issues raised by Jacaso and have independently reviewed relevant portions of the record. We agree with counsel that there are no potentially meritorious arguments for appeal. We therefore affirm. DISCUSSION As we have noted, appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Delgadillo, and Jacaso has elected to file his own supplemental brief. Although we are “required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief,” we are not “compel[led to conduct] an independent review of the entire record to identify unraised issues.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) Jacaso does not raise any potentially meritorious issues in his supplemental brief, in which he claims that (1) his diminished capacity precluded him from knowingly and voluntarily accepting a plea, (2) the evidence was insufficient to show that he killed his son with implied or express malice, and (3) his youth at the time of the offense constituted a mitigating factor. These arguments are outside the scope of this section 1172.6 petition as they cannot support his claim that he “could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to Section 188 . . . made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3), italics added.)
2 We nonetheless exercise our discretion to conduct an independent review of the record. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) A generic plea to second degree murder does not establish any particular theory of the crime. (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 987.) However, the factual basis for such plea may “conclusively establish[ ] as a matter of law that [the defendant] is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6.” (People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444, 448.) Here, Jacaso through his counsel stipulated to specific facts demonstrating that he was guilty of murder under a still-valid theory as the actual perpetrator of implied malice murder. During Jacaso’s plea colloquy, the trial court asked the parties to provide the factual basis for the plea.2 Defense counsel summarized the factual basis as follows: “On June 24, 1995, my client shook his son knowing that he shouldn’t have shaken his son, and that resulted in his son’s death. The son was . . . 23 days old, and . . . my client[ ] was caring for him in the absence of the child’s mother.” The court interjected: “It can’t be because of accident, misfortune, that type of thing. It requires implied [malice].” Defense counsel responded: “It was in this case implied malice. The two-part test of implied [malice], I believe, is satisfied in that my client knew that it was wrong for him to shake a baby, and that he acted in conscious disregard for the knowledge that he had that it was wrong. He lost his temper because the baby was crying and not responding well to his care.”
The court then asked defense counsel about specific facts supporting Jacaso’s implied malice:
2 Jacaso separately stipulated to the transcript of the preliminary hearing as the general factual basis for his plea. 3 “The Court: I read the moving papers from the people. There were three things that seemed to assist the people in showing this implied malice. One was that there was no immediate call to 9-1-1.
“[Counsel]: Correct.
“The Court: Second, there was no immediate, according to the mother, explanation to the mother of distress the child was in. And third, the first rendition of events to the police included a story that was not true: the child had choked. Is that all accurate?
“[Counsel]: All of that is accurate from those facts. I believe a jury could certainly infer and reach the conclusion that there was implied malice.”
Defense counsel also agreed that the week before the death of the baby, the child’s mother had instructed Jacaso how to “handle the child” and properly support his head and neck. The court then asked Jacaso, “Sir, how do you plead to a charge of guilty of murder in the second degree, implied malice, death of a human being, namely, your son, by age 23 days. Guilty or not guilty?” Jacaso answered, “Guilty.” “[C]onsistent with defense counsel’s broad authority to stipulate to factual and procedural matters on his client’s behalf,” counsel has authority to stipulate to the factual basis for a plea agreement. (People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110, 118.) Jacaso, through counsel, specifically agreed that the circumstances of his offense demonstrated implied malice, which is still a viable ground for a murder conviction. (§ 188, subd. (a)(2) [“Malice is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.”].) He thus was not convicted “under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which 4 malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).) DISPOSITION The order denying Jacaso’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Delgadillo S266305 · 2022-12-19
- People v. Palmer S204409 · 2013-12-05