Marin v. Catano
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- On appeal
- Marin v. Catano (2026-07-30) — affirmed — the Ninth Circuit's later ruling on this docket
- Panel
- Michelle M. Pettit (author)
Analysis
Plaintiff filed a motion to extend the deadline to designate experts by 45 days, citing financial hardships and a lack of response from the defendant. The Court denied the motion for failure to show good cause but granted a limited, one-time extension to March 15, 2024, due to Plaintiff's pro se status.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to Extend Expert Designation Deadline Denied“Accordingly, based on the current motion, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to establish good cause for the requested extension.” | agree with court The Court correctly applied the 'good cause' standard under Rule 16(b)(4) and Rule 6(b), focusing on the moving party's diligence as required by Ninth Circuit precedent. The Court identified specific instances of lack of diligence, such as the unexplained ten-day delay in filing the motion after receiving a response from defense counsel and the failure to explain when the financial issues arose. The denial is supported by the record recited in the order. |
Limited Extension of Expert Designation Deadline Granted“As such, the Court will grant a limited, one-time extension for the parties to designate their respective experts in writing by March 15, 2024.” | agree with court While the Court found no good cause for the requested 45-day extension, it exercised its discretion to grant a shorter, one-time extension to accommodate the plaintiff's pro se status. This is a common equitable practice in pro se litigation to ensure access to the courts, provided it does not unduly prejudice the opposing party. The Court imposed strict conditions (one-time only, joint status report) to prevent further delays. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the applicable legal standard (good cause/diligence) and cites the controlling Ninth Circuit authority (Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations). It applies this standard to the specific facts presented (delay in filing, lack of explanation for financial timing) to reach a defensible conclusion. The decision to grant a limited extension despite the denial of good cause is a discretionary exercise consistent with pro se litigation management.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MEL MARIN, Case No.: 21-cv-01445-JO-MMP 12 Plaintiff, ORDER EXTENDING EXPERT 13 v. DESIGNATION DEADLINE 14 SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY, 15 Defendant. 16 17 On October 25, 2023, the Court entered a Scheduling Order in this action, setting a 18 deadline for the parties to designate their respective experts in writing no later than 19 February 1, 2024. [ECF No. 43, ¶ 3.] 20 On January 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a “Notice and 1st Motion to Extend Date to 21 Designate Experts At Least 45 Days”1 in which Plaintiff seeks a forty-five (45) day 22 extension on the deadline to designate experts. [ECF No. 44.] The basis for Plaintiff’s 23 request is that he experienced “surprises” in the last two weeks by receiving a “cut-off of 24 half of his food stamps” and “a notice of dismissal from the 6th Cir. on an appeal if he does 25 26 1 The Court notes Plaintiff’s motion is procedurally improperly, as it fails to comply with 27 the undersigned’s Civil Chambers Rules, which require administrative requests to the Court such as an extension of time to be made by joint motion. Chambers Rule VII(A). 28 1 not pay $505 quickly” and, as a result, had to use the money he “might have had” to pay 2 for an expert but now does not. [Id. at 1 (emphasis in original).] Plaintiff further states that 3 he needs two additional pension payments, the latter to be paid March 3, to pay for an 4 expert. Plaintiff represents that Defendant agreed to a thirty-day extension; however, 5 Plaintiff needs additional time to receive his March 3 pension payment. Defendant has not 6 filed a response to Plaintiff’s motion. 7 A party seeking to modify the scheduling order must demonstrate good cause. Fed. 8 R. Civ. P. 6(b) (“When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, 9 for good cause, extend the time”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified 10 only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”); see also Scheduling Order Regulating 11 Discovery and Other Pre-Trial Proceedings, ECF No. 44 at ¶ 18 (“The dates and times set 12 forth herein will not modified except for good cause shown.”); Chambers Rule VIII (“As 13 provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4), modification of the Scheduling Order requires the 14 approval of the Court and good cause. The Rule 16 ‘good cause’ standard focuses on the 15 reasonable diligence of the moving party.”). Courts have broad discretion in determining 16 whether good cause exists. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 17 607 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit has instructed that the good cause standard focuses 18 on the diligence of the party seeking to amend the scheduling order and the reasons for 19 seeking modification. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (“[T]he focus of the inquiry is upon the 20 moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. [ ] If that party was not diligent, the 21 inquiry should end.”) (internal citation omitted). 22 Plaintiff has not shown good cause for the requested extension because he does 23 establish reasonable diligence. For example, Plaintiff attaches email correspondence with 24 Defense counsel showing he initially requested an extension on January 17, 2024, which 25 Defense counsel responded to on January 19, 2024. It is worth nothing that, contrary to 26 Plaintiff’s contention, this email does not show the state’s “approval of 30 days extra” but 27 instead states Defendant is “not necessarily opposed to the idea” and asks why Plaintiff 28 needs the extension. [ECF No. 44 at 6.] Upon receiving this response, Plaintiff does not 1 |}explain why he waited ten (10) days to seek the requested extension with the Court, 2 || particularly when he did not wait for a response from Defense counsel to his January 28, 3 2024 email anyway. Plaintiff also does not address when he learned of his alleged financial 4 surprises or provide any explanation of the diligent steps he has taken to find an expert to 5 determine relevancy, cost, and availability and thus comply with the current February 1, 6 || 2024 deadline to designate experts. Accordingly, based on the current motion, the Court 7 || finds Plaintiff has failed to establish good cause for the requested extension. 8 Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. As such, the 9 || Court will grant a limited, one-time extension for the parties to designate their respective 10 experts in writing by March 15, 2024. No further extensions will be granted, and the 11 ||Court’s Scheduling Order, ECF No. 43, will not be modified further except for good 12 || cause shown. All other substantive provisions of the Court’s October 25, 2023 Scheduling 13 Order, ECF No. 43, remain in effect. 14 In addition, the parties must submit via the undersigned’s efile a joint status report 15 March 18, 2024, informing the Court whether experts were designated by either side. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 Dated: February 1, 2024 “WA rf hol In. Sete 18 HON. MICHELLE M. PETTIT 19 United States Magistrate Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28