Walker v. Nestle USA, Inc.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- On appeal
- Falcone v. Nestle USA, Inc. (2026-01-09) — affirmed — the Ninth Circuit's later ruling on this docket
- Panel
- Myron James Lorenz (author)
Analysis
Plaintiff Marie Falcone moved for leave to file over 50 exhibits and portions of her class certification memorandum under seal based on a stipulated protective order. The Court denied the application, holding that a stipulated protective order is insufficient to meet the 'compelling reasons' standard required to overcome the strong presumption of public access to judicial records.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Plaintiff's Application for Leave to File Documents Under Seal“For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs application is denied.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit's 'compelling reasons' standard from Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu. The court properly identified that class certification is more than tangentially related to the merits, thus requiring the higher standard of review rather than the lower 'good cause' standard. The court correctly noted that a stipulated protective order does not automatically satisfy the burden of making a 'particularized showing' of compelling reasons, as established in Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. and Kamakana. The decision follows directly from the cited authorities and the facts presented (reliance solely on a protective order). |
The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the applicable standard of review ('compelling reasons') by distinguishing between motions tangential to the merits and those that are not. It correctly applies the Ninth Circuit precedent (Kamakana, Foltz) to reject the argument that a stipulated protective order is sufficient to seal records. The reasoning is concise but complete for the specific issue presented: the sufficiency of the basis for the sealing request.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARIE FALCONE, CASE NO. 3:19-cv-00723-L-DEB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO 13 v. FILE DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL 14 NESTLE USA, INC., [ECF NO. 122] 15 Defendant. 16 17 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Marie Falcone’s Application for Leave to File 18 Documents Under Seal. (ECF No. 122.) Plaintiff seeks to seal pursuant to a protective 19 order (ECF No. 97) the entirety of more than fifty exhibits, consisting of nearly 1,000 20 pages as well as approximately twelve entire pages of its memorandum of points and 21 authorities in support of class certification (ECF No. 125-1). For the reasons which 22 follow, Plaintiff’s application is denied. 23 Sealing court records implicates the "general right to inspect and copy public 24 records and documents, including judicial records and documents." Nixon v. Warner 25 Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978). The lack of opposition to a motion to 26 seal therefore does not automatically resolve it. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 27 Co., 331 F.3d 1128, 1130 & passim (9th Cir. 2003). Aside from “grand jury transcripts 28 and warrant materials in the midst of a pre-indictment investigation,” a strong 1 presumption applies in favor of public access to judicial records. Kamakana v. City and 2 County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). 3 Accordingly, a party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of 4 overcoming the strong presumption of public access by meeting the “compelling reasons” 5 standard. Id. at 1178. The compelling reasons standard applies to all motions except 6 those that are only “tangentially related to the merits of a case.” Center for Auto Safety v. 7 Chrysler Grp. LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff's motion for class 8 certification is more than tangentially related to the merits. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 9 Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 & n.6 (2011) (although in ruling on class certification the court 10 does not decide the merits of the case, the inquiry overlaps with the merits inquiry); see 11 also Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 981 (9th Cir. 2011) (the merits of a 12 plaintiff’s substantive claims are often highly relevant in determining whether to grant 13 class certification). 14 To meet its burden under the compelling reasons standard, the moving party must 15 make a "particularized showing," Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (internal quotation marks 16 and citation omitted) and, further, 17 must articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring 18 disclosure, such as the public interest in understanding the judicial process. 19 In turn, the court must conscientiously balance the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret. After 20 considering these interests, if the court decides to seal certain judicial 21 records, it must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture. 22 23 In general, “compelling reasons” sufficient to outweigh the public's interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such court files 24 might have become a vehicle for improper purposes, such as the use of 25 records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets. The mere fact that the production of 26 27 / / / / / 28 1 records may lead to a litigant's embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to 7 further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records. 3 || Jd. at 1178-79 (internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted). 4 Plaintiff’s application is based on a stipulated protective order. This is insufficient 5 meet the compelling reasons standard or make a "particularized showing." See 6 || Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180, 1179. 7 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs application is denied. The Court will not 8 consider any exhibits or redacted corresponding portions of her memorandum of points 9 || and authorities, unless publicly filed or sealed pursuant to an order of this Court. Plaintiff 10 refile the application supported by a particularized showing of compelling reasons. 11 || Any such further application shall be narrowly tailored. The Court is not inclined to seal 12 || any exhibit in its entirety but only the portions supported by a particularized showing of 13 ||compelling reasons. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated: January 22, 2024 1 fee fp 17 H . James Lorenz, ig United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28