Holt v. Simmons

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Berdalia HOLT, Case No.: 23-cv-1618-AGS-WVG 4 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART UNOPPOSED 5 v. MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF 16) 6 Erika SIMMONS, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 Defendants Doris Coronel and San Diego Unified School District request that this 10 case be dismissed or the service on them be quashed for being insufficient. They also 11 request that plaintiff Berdalia Holt be required to provide a more definite statement. 12 Because the service was insufficient, it is quashed. But the request for a more definite 13 statement is denied. 14 Rule 4 requires that a summons be served on each defendant “with a copy of the 15 complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1). “Rule 4 is a flexible rule that should be liberally 16 construed so long as a party receives sufficient notice of the complaint.” Crowley v. 17 Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 975 (9th Cir. 2013). “However, neither actual notice, nor simply 18 naming the person in the caption of the complaint, will subject defendants to personal 19 jurisdiction if service was not made in substantial compliance with Rule 4.” Id. (cleaned 20 up). 21 In their unopposed motion, defendants Coronel and San Diego Unified argue that 22 the “complaint” they were served with does not match the version served on the other or, 23 more importantly, the one filed in this case. And they are correct; all three versions are 24 noticeably different documents. (Compare ECF 1 (filed complaint totaling 117 pages with 25 exhibits); with ECF 19-1, at 2–61 (60 pages of complaint and exhibits served on San Diego 26 Unified); and ECF 19-1, at 63–117 (54 pages of complaint and exhibits served on 27 Coronel).) And Holt has provided no authority—and this Court’s research has yielded 28 none—that service of a significantly different complaint constitutes “substantial 1 compliance” with Rule 4. See S.E.C. v. Internet Sols. for Bus. Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1165 2 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting “the plaintiff generally has the burden to establish jurisdiction” by 3 showing proper service). 4 So the service was improper. In that case, “the court has discretion to either dismiss 5 the action for failure to effect proper service, or instead merely quash the ineffective service 6 that has been made on the defendant in order to provide the plaintiff with the opportunity 7 to properly serve the defendant.” Houhoulas v. Cal. Dep’t of Trans. Hum. Res., No. 8 222CV0413TLNDBPS, 2023 WL 1420568, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2023), report and 9 recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-CV-00413-TLN-DB, 2023 WL 2480837 (E.D. Cal. 10 Mar. 13, 2023). Here, given Holt’s pro se status and apparent good-faith efforts to serve 11 defendants, the Court will quash the current service attempt and give her 90 days to 12 properly serve these defendants. 13 That leaves only defendants’ demand that Holt also provide a more definite 14 statement. A more definite statement is proper if the complaint “is so vague or ambiguous 15 that the [responding] party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). 16 “A motion for more definite statement is generally disfavored and is reserved for the 17 situation where a pleading is unintelligible, rather than lacking in detail.” Aviles v. City of 18 Long Beach, No. 22109684MEMFADS, 2022 WL 2965396, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 19 2022). Here, defendants argue that Holt’s complaint requires a more definite statement 20 because: (1) she does not “make it clear how” defendants “would not be entitled to 11th 21 Amendment immunity,” and (2) Holt “also does not make it clear how any cause of action 22 . . . would not be barred by the applicable statute of limitations” because Coronel “has not 23 worked for San Diego Unified School District for over 10 years.” (ECF 16-1, at 7.) But 24 both immunity and timeliness are affirmative defenses, so Holt has no duty to address them 25 in her complaint. See Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc., 735 F.3d 892, 902 (9th Cir. 2013) 26 (“plaintiffs ordinarily need not plead on the subject of an anticipated affirmative defense” 27 (citation omitted)); id. (noting that “statute of limitations” is an “affirmative defense”); 28 Walden v. Nevada, 945 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Eleventh Amendment immunity 1 an affirmative defense’). So the Court will not order Holt to provide a more definite 2 || statement on issues she is not required to address at all. 3 Thus, the request to dismiss or quash service is GRANTED, and the service is 4 ||quashed. Holt must provide service that substantially complies with Rule 4 by 5 || February 29, 2024. Defendants’ request for a more definite statement is DENIED. 6 Dated: November 29, 2023 g Hon. rew G. Schopler 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28