gno.law

Turner v. Eli Lily Company

District Court, S.D. California · 3:23-cv-01722 · 2023-10-17 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Jinsook Ohta (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T21:47Z · confidence high

The court reviewed a pro se complaint filed by Terrance Turner on behalf of Day Spencer, alleging that Eli Lilly marketed a dangerous drug used to treat Spencer's child. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of standing and denied the motion to proceed in forma pauperis as moot.

What the court decidedThe model
Complaint dismissed with prejudice
“the Court DISMISSES this complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 with prejudice.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the standing doctrine. Under Article III, a plaintiff must demonstrate personal injury in fact. Turner admitted he was not involved in the facts and did not suffer the alleged injuries; he was acting as an unlicensed representative for Day Spencer. Because standing is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be cured by amendment, dismissal with prejudice is the appropriate remedy. The court's reliance on *Lujan* and *Warth* is correct.
Motion to proceed in forma pauperis denied as moot
“The Court also DENIES his motion to proceed IFP as moot because it has dismissed Turner’s case with prejudice.”
agree with court
Once the complaint is dismissed with prejudice, the underlying action is terminated. Therefore, the request for in forma pauperis status, which is tied to the pending action, becomes moot. This is a standard procedural consequence of a final dismissal.

The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies that Turner lacks standing because he did not suffer the alleged injuries and was acting as an unlicensed representative. The court properly applied the *Lujan* standing test and *Warth* regarding personal injury. The dismissal with prejudice is appropriate because standing is a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured by amendment. The court also appropriately noted the unlicensed practice of law and ordered the Clerk to report it to the relevant State Bars.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 || TERRANCE TURNER, Case No.: 23-CV-1722-JO-DDL 12 Plaintiff, 13 || Vv. ORDER: (1) DISMISSING uycompany.eraL, | COMPLAINT FURSUANT □□□ 15 Defendants. 1915; and (2) DENYING MOTION 16 FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 17 18 19 20 On September 14, 2023, Terrance Turner (“Turner”) filed a lawsuit and a motion to 21 || proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on behalf of another individual, Day Spencer. On behalf 22 || of Spencer, Turner alleges that doctors administered a dangerous drug to Spencer’s child. 23 || Dkt. 1 at 4-6. Although Turner filed this case as the plaintiff, he was not involved in the 24 || facts of the case, and he did not suffer the injuries alleged in the complaint. See generally 25 Nor is Turner a licensed attorney. For the reasons stated below, the Court DISMISSES 26 Turner’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 with prejudice and DENIES his motion to 27 || proceed IFP as moot. 28 1 I. SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915 2 A complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject tc 3 ||a mandatory and sua sponte review by the Court. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 4 Cir. 2000). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails tc 5 || state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendan 6 ||immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To pass screening, all complaint: 7 |{must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitlec 8 ||to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff ha: 9 || failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B) is the same 10 the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state <« 11 ||claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Barren v 12 || Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that “[t]he language of § 13 |11915(e)(2)(B)Gi) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 12(b)(6).”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter 15 || accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal 16 ||556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Detailed factual allegation: 17 ||are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supportec 18 || by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Jd. at 678. 19 Upon screening, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law □□□□□□□ 20 ||/Turner did not suffer the injuries alleged in his complaint. A plaintiff only has lega 21 |/standing to sue when they have suffered harm from the defendant’s alleged wrongfu 22 |\conduct. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Specifically, in order 23 have standing, a party must establish that: (1) it suffered an “injury in fact;” (2) there i: 24 causal connection between the injury and the allegedly wrongful conduct; and (3) the 25 injury would likely be redressed by a favorable decision. /d. at 560-61. Because standings 26 a jurisdictional requirement, courts should sua sponte examine whether plaintiffs have 27 |\met their burden of establishing standing. Bernhardt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 279 F.3¢ 28 1 |} 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (“[T]he party invoking federal jurisdiction 2 || has the burden of establishing [standing].”). 3 Here, Turner’s complaint rests entirely on events that occurred to someone other 4 himself. Turner alleges that an individual named Day Spencer suffered harm because 5 ||a pharmaceutical company marketed a dangerous prescription drug to doctors, and doctors 6 || subsequently used this medication in treating Spencer’s child. Dkt. 1 at 2-6. A review of 7 ||the complaint and the accompanying IFP motion reveals that Turner had no relationship 8 || with Day Spencer and her child, and that he was not involved in the facts alleged in this 9 See generally Dkt. 1. Instead, it appears that Turner is representing Day Spencer in 10 || this lawsuit for financial remuneration, despite the fact that he is not a licensed attorney. 11 says as much in his IFP request, noting that he is “hustling legal services at a modicum 12 just to pay the rent.” Dkt. 2 at 2. His court filings indicate no bar number! or 13 || affiliation with a law office. Because Turner is not the one who suffered the injury, he 14 || does not have standing to pursue this action. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975) 15 || (“Petitioners must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury 16 ||has been suffered by other, unidentified members . . . which they purport to represent.”). 17 || Moreover, it appears that Turner is engaged in the unlicensed practice of law. Accordingly, 18 || the Court dismisses the complaint pursuant to § 1915(e). 19 Il. CONCLUSION 20 Because amendment could not cure the fact that Turner is not the individual who 21 || suffered the injury in this case, the Court DISMISSES this complaint pursuant to 28 22 ||U.S.C. § 1915 with prejudice. Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th 23 || Cir. 2002) (stating that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where amendment would be 24 || futile because the flaws in the claims cannot be cured). The Court also DENIES his 25 ||motion to proceed IFP as moot because it has dismissed Turner’s case with prejudice. 26 27 28 l Because Turner listed a Virginia address in the Complaint, the Court ran its own search of both the Virginia and California Bar websites and found no record of an attorney named Terrance Turner.

1 || (This dismissal with prejudice applies only to the complaint filed by Turner; it does not 2 || foreclose Day Spencer and/or her child from refiling this action in their own right either 3 || pro se or represented by a licensed attorney.) The Clerk is directed to close this case. 4 Moreover, as it appears that Turner is engaged in the unlicensed practice of law, 5 ||the Court orders the Clerk to report this matter and send a copy of this order to both the 6 || California State Bar and the Virginia State Bar. 7 | SO ORDERED. 8 9 ||Dated: October 16, 2023 10 □ i Ho orgbfe Tinsook Ohta 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28