Bridgett Jr. v. County of San Diego
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis and his complaint seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional prison sentence. The court granted the IFP application but dismissed the complaint because the Plaintiff failed to allege that his conviction or sentence had been invalidated, as required by Heck v. Humphrey.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Grant application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis“Because Plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fee and “still afford the necessities of life,” the IFP application is granted.” | agree with court The order recites that the Plaintiff alleged he was recently released from prison and has no income or assets. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and Ninth Circuit precedent, an affidavit alleging inability to pay court costs while affording necessities of life is sufficient to grant IFP status. The court's decision follows directly from the facts stated in the order. |
Dismiss complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)“Accordingly, under Heck, Plaintiff may not assert a § 1983 claim seeking damages arising from his allegedly unconstitutional sentence.” | agree with court The court applied the mandatory screening provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It correctly identified that the complaint sought damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or sentence. Under Heck v. Humphrey, such a claim is barred unless the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The order states the complaint does not allege any such invalidation. Therefore, the dismissal is legally correct based on the record presented. |
Certify that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith“Further, this Court certifies that any IFP appeal from this Order would not be taken “in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).” | agree with court The court certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. This is a standard certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) when a district court dismisses a case as frivolous or failing to state a claim. Given the clear application of the Heck bar to the facts alleged, the certification is procedurally appropriate. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly applies the mandatory screening standard of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It accurately cites Heck v. Humphrey for the proposition that a § 1983 damages claim challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence is barred unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. The court correctly notes that the complaint alleges the plaintiff served the sentence but does not allege that the sentence was reversed, expunged, or invalidated. The reasoning is direct, cites the correct binding authority, and reaches the only legally supportable conclusion based on the facts recited.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 NEWMAN BRIDGETT JR. Case No.: 23-CV-1767-CAB-BLM 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION 12 v. FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND 13 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO et al., DISMISSING CASE 14 Defendants. [Doc. No. 2] 15 16 17 18 19 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in 20 forma pauperis (“IFP”). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where 21 it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” 22 Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). “[A] plaintiff seeking IFP 23 status must allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. (internal 24 quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s application states that he was recently released 25 from prison and that he has no income or assets. Because Plaintiff is unable to pay the filing 26 fee and “still afford the necessities of life,” the IFP application is granted. 27 However, a complaint filed by any person seeking to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal should the 1 Court determine, inter alia, it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 2 relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 3 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 4 prisoners.”). Congress enacted this safeguard because “a litigant whose filing fees and 5 court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive 6 to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 7 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)); Lopez v. 8 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, 9 but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a 10 claim.”). 11 Here, the complaint seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of 12 Plaintiff’s civil rights stemming from a prison sentence he received in state court. 13 However, “to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, 14 or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or 15 sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been 16 reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal 17 authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance 18 of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). As a result, 19 “a § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or 20 sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” Id. at 489- 21 90. Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that his sentence was reversed, expunged, 22 invalidated, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a write of habeas corpus. 23 Rather, the complaint merely alleges that Plaintiff served the entirety of a sentence that he 24 now asserts was unconstitutional. Accordingly, under Heck, Plaintiff may not assert a § 25 1983 claim seeking damages arising from his allegedly unconstitutional sentence. 26 In light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the application to proceed in 27 forma pauperis is GRANTED [Doc. No. 2], and the complaint is DISMISSED pursuant 28 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, this Court certifies that any IFP appeal from this 1 || Order would not be taken “in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). The Clerk 2 Court shall CLOSE this case. 3 It is SO ORDERED. 4 ||Dated: October 10, 2023 <6 5 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28