Dale Sundby v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Company
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Gonzalo P. Curiel (author)
Analysis
The court considered a motion to dismiss, a motion to amend, and a motion to disqualify the judge in a case involving alleged wrongful foreclosure and title insurance issues. The court sua sponte stayed the proceedings pending the outcome of a related Ninth Circuit appeal and denied the pending motions without prejudice.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Stay of proceedings“It is hereby ordered that the proceedings in Case No. 23-cv-1239 shall be stayed pending resolution of the appeal to the Ninth Circuit in Case No. 23-55659.” | agree with court The court applied the standard from Landis and Lockyer, weighing the competing interests. It found that the risk of damage was minimal because the property was already foreclosed, and that the stay would simplify legal issues (specifically standing and pro se representation of a trust) that are currently being litigated in the related appeal. The court also noted the stay would be short and avoid the appearance of impropriety regarding the pending motion to disqualify. This is a defensible exercise of discretion. |
Denial of Motion to Dismiss“the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss and motion to amend the complaint without prejudice to refiling once the Ninth Circuit issues its decision” | agree with court The court denied the motion without prejudice as part of the stay order. This is a procedural mechanism to preserve the motion for later consideration rather than a substantive ruling on the merits of the dismissal arguments (litigation privilege, standing, etc.). |
Denial of Motion to Amend“the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss and motion to amend the complaint without prejudice to refiling once the Ninth Circuit issues its decision” | agree with court Similar to the motion to dismiss, the motion to amend was denied without prejudice to allow the court to address it after the related appeal is resolved, likely because the standing issues raised in the appeal are directly relevant to the proposed amendments. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the relevant legal standards for a stay of proceedings in the Ninth Circuit. It applies the factors from Lockyer and CMAX to the specific facts of the case, noting the minimal risk of harm due to the completed foreclosure and the significant overlap in legal issues (standing/pro se representation) between this case and the pending appeal. The decision to deny the pending motions without prejudice is a logical procedural step consistent with the stay.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DALE SUNDBY and EDITH Case No.: 23-cv-1239-GPC(AHG) LITTLEFIELD SUNDBY; DALE 12 SUNDBY and EDITH LITTLEFIELD ORDER ISSUING SUA SPONTE 13 SUNDBY, Trustees, STAY OF PROCEEDINGS 14 Plaintiffs, 15 v. 16 FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY; and DOES 1-X, inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18 19 Currently pending before the Court are Defendant Fidelity National Title Company’s 20 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Dale Sundby’s and Edith Littlefield Sundby’s Complaint, 21 ECF No. 29; Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 70; 22 and Plaintiff Dale Sundby’s Motion to Disqualify the Honorable Gonzalo P. Curiel, ECF 23 No. 79. The Court has also asked the parties to brief whether the proceedings should be 24 stayed pending the outcome of an appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals by Dale 25 Sundby in related Case Nos. 19-cv-390 and 21-cv-2013. See ECF Nos. 85 & 88. The 26 motions to dismiss and amend have been fully briefed, see ECF Nos. 37, 42, 75, & 81, but 27 1 the motion to disqualify and the issue of whether the proceedings should be stayed have 2 not been fully briefed. 3 Upon closer inspection of the issues raised in the pending motions, the Court has 4 concluded that staying the proceedings would be the best use of the Court’s and the parties’ 5 time, effort, and resources. For the reasons explained below, the Court sua sponte stays 6 the proceedings in the above-captioned matter pending the outcome of Dale Sundby’s 7 appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Case No. 23-55659. Any pending briefing deadlines and 8 hearing dates are hereby VACATED, and the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss and 9 motion to amend the complaint without prejudice to refiling once the Ninth Circuit issues 10 its decision When the stay is lifted, the Court will issue a new briefing schedule on Dale 11 Sundby’s motion to disqualify. 12 I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS 13 A. Original Complaint 14 On November 1, 2022, Plaintiffs Dale Sundby and Edith Littlefield Sundby, 15 appearing pro se as individuals and in their capacity as trustees of Declaration of Trust, 16 Trust No. 1989-1 Dated: January 26, 1989 (“Trust”), filed their initial Complaint against 17 Defendant Fidelity National Title Company and an indeterminate number of Doe 18 Defendants in the Central District of California. ECF No. 1 (Compl.). The facts giving rise 19 to the Complaint concern allegedly altered mortgage loan documents as to Sundbys’ 20 residence in La Jolla, California. Compl. ¶¶ 12–49. Defendant Fidelity National Title 21 Company is alleged to have issued title insurance for the loan policy. Compl. ¶ 41. 22 In 2019, Dale Sundby, appearing pro se on behalf of the Trust, initiated litigation 23 against the lenders concerning the altered loan documents. Compl. ¶¶ 50–55; see Case No. 24 19-cv-390.1 The Sundbys allege that Fidelity, as the policy insurer, had effective control 25 26 1 The Court takes judicial notice of the filings and proceedings from Case No. 19-cv-390. 27 1 over that litigation, including selecting and directing counsel and the defendants to defend 2 against the claims. Compl. ¶¶ 58–69. The Sundbys further allege that Fidelity improperly 3 caused a revoked deed of trust to be recorded, caused the initiation of default proceedings, 4 and caused the foreclosure of Sundbys’ property. Compl. ¶¶ 82–116. 5 The Sundbys allege four causes of action concerning the purported wrongful 6 foreclosure of their property. Compl. ¶¶ 117–96. 7 B. Fidelity’s Motion To Dismiss The Complaint And Sundbys’ Motion To 8 Amend The Complaint 9 In December 2022, Fidelity moved to dismiss the Complaint for failing to state a 10 claim upon which relief may be granted. ECF No. 29. First, Fidelity argues that all of its 11 conduct for which the Sundbys allege Fidelity acted wrongfully “falls squarely within the 12 litigation privilege” of California Civil Code section 47(b) such that, even if true, Fidelity 13 could not be held liable. Id. at 15–18.2 Second, Fidelity argues that the Sundbys are third 14 parties that “cannot sue an insurer based on its claims handling done on behalf of its 15 insured.” Id. at 18–19. Third, Fidelity argues that the issue of whether the foreclosure was 16 wrongful was sufficiently litigated in Case No. 19-cv-390 so as to be final, subject to 17 collateral estoppel, and precluded from further litigation. Id. at 19–20. Fourth and Fifth, 18 Fidelity argues that the Sundbys, as non-lawyers, cannot represent the Trust pro se, and 19 that they lack standing to sue in their individual capacity. Id. at 20–22. 20 The Sundbys opposed the motion to dismiss, ECF No. 37, but in July 2023, after 21 the case was transferred from the Central District of California to the Southern District of 22 California, the Sundbys moved for leave to file a first amended complaint, ECF No. 70; 23 see ECF No. 65 (Central District order transferring case). 24 25 26 2 Page numbers are based on CM/ECF pagination. 27 1 Fidelity opposes the motion to amend the complaint. Fidelity argues that the 2 proposed amendments to the complaint would be futile in light of its pending motion to 3 dismiss; that the amendments would result in undue prejudice; that the motion constitutes 4 a “dilatory ploy intended to delay” proceedings; and that the motion fails to establish the 5 grounds for leave to amend. ECF No. 75 at 4–5. Indeed, Fidelity argues that the proposed 6 amended complaint does not appear to make any substantive changes to the facts or causes 7 of action, instead adding defendant parties—whose names were presumably known at the 8 time of filing given the proceedings in Case No. 19-cv-390—and removing the Sundbys 9 as plaintiffs in their capacity as trustees. See ECF No. 70-4. 10 C. Sundbys’ Motion To Disqualify The Honorable Gonzalo P. Curiel 11 Dale Sundby has filed a motion to disqualify the Honorable Gonzalo P. Curiel from 12 any further proceedings in the above-titled case. ECF No. 79. He describes seven fact sets 13 which he argues “might cause a reasonable person to question Judge Curiel’s impartiality.” 14 Id. at 28 (emphasis removed). Four of the fact sets appear to be identical to those raised in 15 a similar motion to disqualify from Case No. 19-cv-390. Compare ECF No. 79 at 10–21 16 (fact sets 1 through 4), with Sundby v. Marquee Funding Grp., No. 19-cv-0390, 2023 WL 17 4281729, at *4–8 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2023) (Order describing facts sets and denying motion 18 to disqualify). 19 D. Case Nos. 19-cv-390 and 21-cv-2013: Dismissals And Appeals 20 In Case No. 19-cv-390, concerning the refinancing of the La Jolla property which is 21 also the subject of the dispute in the above-captioned matter, Dale Sundby appeared pro se 22 on behalf of the Trust. Sundby v. Marquee Funding Grp., No. 21-55504, No. 21-55582, 23 2022 WL 4826445, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 3, 2022). The Ninth Circuit addressed an issue 24 raised for the first time on appeal from the Court’s summary judgment orders: whether 25 Dale Sundby could represent the Trust pro se. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that “[a]s Sundby, 26 in his capacity as trustee, purports to represent a trust pro se, such representation is not 27 1 permitted.” Id. It then vacated and remanded the Court’s orders “to afford the trust an 2 opportunity to obtain legal representation and to develop facts to determine in the first 3 instance whether Sundby is the beneficial owner of the trust or whether the trust transferred 4 any interests to Sundby.” Id. 5 On remand, the Court gave Dale Sundby many opportunities to obtain counsel on 6 behalf of the Trust, which he declined to do. See Sundby v. Marquee Funding Grp., No. 7 19-cv-0390, 2023 WL 4686445, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 21, 2023) (citing to orders mandating 8 that legal counsel be retained). On July 21, 2023, more than nine months after the Ninth 9 Circuit vacated and remanded the proceedings, the Court dismissed Case No. 19-cv-390 10 due to Dale Sundby’s failure to retain counsel for the Trust. Id. The Court also dismissed 11 related case 21-cv-2013—which arose from issues concerning the 2017 mortgage on the 12 La Jolla property but was brought pro se by Dale Sundby the individual and trustee—both 13 for failing to retain counsel on behalf of the Trust and because Dale Sundby the individual 14 lacked standing. Id. at *2. 15 Dale Sundby has filed a notice of appeal as to the July 21, 2023 Order. Case No. 16 19-cv-390 ECF No. 369. 17 II. LEGAL STANDARD 18 A district court may stay “an action before it . . . pending resolution of independent 19 proceedings which bear upon the case,” even when the issues in the other proceedings are 20 not “necessarily controlling of the action before the court.” Levya v. Certified Grocers of 21 Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863–64 (9th Cir. 1979). However, “[o]nly in rare circumstances 22 will a litigant in one cause be compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles 23 the rule of law that will define the rights of both.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 24 (1936). 25 A federal court’s “power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in 26 every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and 27 1 effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Id. at 254. Deciding whether to stay the 2 proceedings “calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interest and 3 maintain an even balance.” Id. at 254–55. The competing interests which the Court must 4 weigh include: (1) “the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay”; 5 (2) “the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward”; 6 and (3) “the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating 7 of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.” 8 Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 9 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)). “[S]tays should not be indefinite in nature,” 10 Dependable Highway Express, Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 11 2007), but should be granted only when “it appears likely the other proceedings will be 12 concluded within a reasonable time,” Levya, 593 F.2d at 864. 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 On balance, the competing interests at issue favor staying the proceedings. First, 15 given that the subject of the litigation in the above-captioned matter is a home that has 16 already been foreclosed upon, there is minimal risk of any additional damage to the parties 17 while the case is stayed. Cf. Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1112 (comparing higher risk of damage 18 associated with forward-looking injunctive relief with damages for past harm). 19 Second, given the interconnectedness of the pending motions, as well as the likely 20 issues on appeal in Case No. 19-cv-390, a stay of proceedings pending appeal will simplify 21 the issues and questions of law raised in this case. As such, a stay will further the orderly 22 administration of justice and the efficient use of the parties’ and the Court’s time and effort. 23 On appeal, Dale Sundby is presumptively going to challenge whether it was proper for this 24 Court to have dismissed Case Nos. 19-cv-390 and 21-cv-2013 for failing to retain counsel 25 for the Trust and for his lack of standing to bring the same claims in his individual capacity. 26 See Sundby v. Marquee Funding Grp., No. 19-cv-0390, 2023 WL 4686445, at *1 (S.D. 27 1 Cal. July 21, 2023). The question of whether Dale and Edith Sundby can represent the 2 Trust pro se or have standing to appear as individuals has already been raised by Fidelity 3 in its motion to dismiss in this litigation. See ECF No. 29 at 20–22. The Sundbys, in their 4 proposed amended complaint, appear to attempt to rectify the unauthorized practice of law 5 issue by appearing only in their individual capacity, though they do not address the issue 6 of whether they have standing to bring causes of action for injuries purportedly suffered by 7 the Trust. See ECF No. 70-4. 8 Third, the stay is likely to be reasonably short given the narrow scope of the issues 9 likely to be raised on appeal. 10 Finally, to avoid the appearance of impropriety, the Court is inclined to avoid ruling 11 on any substantive motions until the Sundbys’ motion to disqualify has been fully briefed 12 and taken under submission. Taken together, both the parties and the Court will be in a 13 better position to focus on the substantive issues in the above-captioned proceeding once 14 the appeal has been concluded in Case Nos. 19-cv-390 and 21-cv-2013. 15 IV. CONCLUSION 16 For the reasons explained above, the Court concludes that the balance of competing 17 interests favors a stay of the proceedings in the above-captioned matter pending the 18 outcome of the appeal to the Ninth Circuit from Case Nos. 19-cv-390 and 21-cv-2013. It 19 is hereby ordered that the proceedings in Case No. 23-cv-1239 shall be stayed pending 20 resolution of the appeal to the Ninth Circuit in Case No. 23-55659. Any pending briefing 21 schedules and hearing dates are hereby VACATED and the Court DENIES the motion to 22 dismiss and motion to amend the complaint without prejudice to refiling once the Ninth 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 27 1 || Circuit issues its decision, ECF Nos. 29, 70. Upon resolution of the pending appeal, the 2 || Court will issue a new briefing schedule for Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify, ECF No. 79. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ||Dated: September 19, 2023 2 5 Hon. athe Cae 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 23-cv-1239-GPC(AHG)
Cites, in this corpus
- Cmax, Inc. v. Hall No. 17517 · 1962-03-19