(PS) Montue v. County of San Diego Sheriff's Department
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Dana M. Sabraw (author)
Analysis
Plaintiff John Montue, proceeding pro se, filed a motion for appointment of counsel in his civil action against the City of San Diego and others. The court denied the motion, finding no exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion for appointment of counsel denied“Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard from Palmer v. Valdez and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), which requires a showing of exceptional circumstances, likelihood of success, and inability to articulate claims pro se. The court concluded that no such circumstances existed. While the order is brief and does not detail the specific factual findings regarding the complexity of the case or the plaintiff's ability to litigate, the denial is a discretionary decision that is generally upheld unless an abuse of discretion is shown. The legal framework cited is correct for the Ninth Circuit. |
The order itself: sound with gaps — The order is procedurally correct and cites the appropriate binding Ninth Circuit authority (Palmer v. Valdez) and statute (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)) for the standard of review. However, it is a 'sound with gaps' decision because it provides no factual analysis or specific reasoning as to why the plaintiff's case did not meet the 'exceptional circumstances' threshold, merely stating that they do not exist. It does not address the specific merits or complexity of the plaintiff's claims, which are part of the required analysis under Weygandt v. Look.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No.: 22cv0586 DMS (DEB) JOHN MONTUE, 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 12 v. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 13 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 17 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel. In 18 general, there is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 19 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 20 1981)). In “exceptional circumstances,” however, a court may exercise its discretion and 21 “request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 22 1915(e)(1); Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970. The court must consider both “‘the likelihood of 23 success on the merits as well as the ability of the [Plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se 24 in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970 (quoting 25 Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)). At this point, there are no 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 ||exceptional circumstances warranting appointment of counsel. Accordingly, the Court 2 || denies Plaintiff's motion. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ||Dated: September 12, 2023 em Dh 5 a Yn. Hon. Dana M. Sabraw, Chief Judge 6 United States District Court 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28