Thompson v. Citibank, N.A.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BONNIE THOMPSON, Case No.: 23-CV-1179 TWR (DEB)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART 13 v. AND DENYING IN PART JOINT MOTION TO STAY ACTION AND 14 CITIBANK, N.A., ARBITRATE CLAIMS, AND 15 Defendant. (2) DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE THIS ACTION IN ITS 16 ENTIRETY 17 (ECF No. 3) 18 19 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Bonnie Thompson and Defendant Citibank, 20 N.A.’s Joint Motion to Stay Action and Arbitrate Claims (“Joint Mot.,” ECF No. 3), in 21 which the Parties “have agreed to stipulate to stay this action in its entirety pending the 22 completion of arbitration pursuant to the terms of the arbitration provision contained in the 23 credit card agreement(s) and the rules of the [American Arbitration Association 24 (“AAA”)].” (See id. at 1.) Having carefully reviewed the record and the relevant law, the 25 Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Joint Motion, as follows. 26 A court’s power to stay proceedings is incidental to its inherent power “to control 27 the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 28 counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). Such power 1 is “firmly imbedded in our judicial system.” Scripps-Howard Radio v. F.C.C., 316 U.S. 4, 2 13 (1942). Moreover, “[a] stay is not a matter of right” but rather “an exercise of judicial 3 discretion . . . dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Virginian Ry. Co. 4 v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672–73 (1926). Accordingly, any party seeking a stay 5 “bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of [the court’s] 6 discretion.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433–34 (2009) (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 7 U.S. 681, 798 (1997); Landis, 299 U.S. at 255). 8 The court’s discretion to stay or permit judicial proceedings is circumscribed by the 9 parties’ right to arbitrate. See 9 U.S.C. § 3. Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act 10 (“FAA”), contractual provisions through which parties agree to arbitrate any controversy 11 arising out of their contract are generally “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” See 9 12 U.S.C. § 2. A party may seek a court order compelling arbitration under such an agreement, 13 see 9 U.S.C. § 4, or the parties may jointly stipulate to binding arbitration, see, e.g., Van 14 Waters & Rogers Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 913 F.2d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 1990); 15 Plasterers Loc. Union No. 346 v. Wyland Enters. Inc., 819 F.2d 217, 218 (9th Cir. 1987). 16 If a court determines that a suit or proceeding may be referred to arbitration under 17 the FAA, it “shall” issue a stay pending the completion of arbitration upon a motion from 18 either party. See 9 U.S.C. § 3. Although “Congress’s use of ‘shall’ appears to require 19 courts to stay litigation that is subject to mandatory arbitration,” the Ninth Circuit “has long 20 carved out an exception if all claims are subject to arbitration.” Forrest v. Spizzirri, 62 21 F.4th 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 2023). “[N]otwithstanding the language of § 3, a district court 22 may either stay the action or dismiss it outright when . . . the court determines that all of 23 the claims raised in the action are subject to arbitration.” Johnmohammadi v. 24 Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Sparling v. Hoffman 25 Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir.1988)); see also Forrest, 62 F.4th at 1204–05; 26 Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsys., Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004); 27 Martin Marietta Aluminum, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 586 F.2d 143, 147 (9th Cir. 1978). 28 / / / 1 Here, Plaintiff asserts two claims against Defendant for violations of the Rosenthal 2 Debt Collection Practices Act (“RFDCPA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788—-1788.33, and 3 Telephone Consumer Protection Act (““TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227. (See generally ECF 4 ||No. 1.) Through the Joint Motion, the Parties have agreed “to stay this action and submit 5 || Plaintiff's claims to binding individual arbitration.” (See Joint Mot. at 1.) Because it 6 || appears that both of Plaintiff's claims are subject to arbitration, this Court has discretion to 7 || dismiss the action. See, e.g., Forrest, 62 F. 4th at 1204-05; Johnmohammadi, 755 F.3d at 8 1073-74. The Parties have not provided any justification for staying the action, (see 9 || generally Joint Mot.), and the Court finds no reason why this matter should languish on its 10 ||docket when there are no claims left to adjudicate. The Court therefore concludes that a 11 would not serve the interests of justice or judicial economy. 12 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Parties’ 13 Motion. Specifically, the Court GRANTS the request to arbitrate all claims, 14 || DENIES the Parties’ request to stay, and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE this 15 |} action in its entirety. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 || Dated: July 24, 2023 — 18 [ odd (2 re 19 Honorable Todd W. Robinson United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28