gno.law

Simon v. Superior Court of California

District Court, S.D. California · 3:23-cv-00889 · 2023-07-20 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Ruth Bermudez Montenegro (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T21:55Z · confidence high

Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion to stay state court family law proceedings regarding a property issue and a Domestic Violence Restraining Order (DVRO) pending the resolution of his federal motion to vacate the DVRO. The Court denied the motion without prejudice, finding that the request did not fall within any exception to the Anti-Injunction Act and that the motion failed to comply with local rules regarding ex parte filings.

What the court decidedThe model
Denial of Plaintiff's ex parte motion to stay state court proceedings
“Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the Anti-Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. § 2283), which generally prohibits federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings. The court analyzed the three statutory exceptions: (1) express congressional authorization (none found); (2) protection/effectuation of federal judgments (none existed as the federal motion was pending); and (3) aid of jurisdiction. Regarding the 'aid of jurisdiction' exception, the court correctly noted that the state court had first acquired jurisdiction over the res (property), barring the federal court from interfering under the *Alton Box Board* doctrine. Furthermore, the court correctly identified that the 'aid of jurisdiction' exception for *in personam* matters (like the DVRO) is extremely narrow and requires a threat to render federal jurisdiction nugatory, which the plaintiff did not demonstrate. The denial without prejudice is appropriate given the procedural deficiencies (failure to meet and confer) and the substantive legal bar.

The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the Anti-Injunction Act as the primary barrier to the requested relief. It systematically eliminates each of the three statutory exceptions based on the facts presented (no congressional authorization, no prior federal judgment, and no 'aid of jurisdiction' because the state court had first jurisdiction over the property res and the DVRO issue did not threaten to render federal jurisdiction nugatory). The court also correctly noted the procedural failure to comply with local rules for ex parte motions. The reliance on Ninth Circuit precedent (*Sandpiper*, *Alton Box Board*, *Bennett*) is appropriate and correctly applied.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PHILLIP W. SIMON, Case No.: 3:23-cv-00889-RBM-AHG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING EX PARTE 13 v. MOTION TO STAY FAMILY LAW CASE RE: PROPERTY ISSUE 14 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, NORTH 15 COUNTY FAMILY DIVISION [Doc. 10] 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Phillip W. Simon’s (“Plaintiff”) ex parte 20 motion to stay family law case re: property issue (“Motion”). (Doc. 10.) Defendant 21 Superior Court of California, County of San Diego (“Defendant”)1 filed its opposition to 22 Plaintiff’s Motion on July 17, 2023 (“Opposition”). (Doc. 11.) 23 In the Motion, Plaintiff requests that this Court stay a state court proceeding 24 pertaining to a property issue and a Domestic Violence Restraining Order (“DVRO”), the 25 26 27 1 In its Opposition, Defendant notified the Court that Defendant was erroneously sued as Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, North County Family Division. (Doc. 28 1 former of which is set for trial in the state court proceeding beginning on July 27, 2023. 2 (See Doc. 10.) Plaintiff requests this Court stay the state court proceeding until this Court 3 resolves Plaintiff’s pending motion for fraud on the court to vacate/set aside/terminate 4 DVRO against Phillip W. Simon (“Motion to Vacate”). (See id.; Doc. 1.) In its Opposition, 5 Defendant contends that (i) this Court lacks jurisdiction to stay the state court proceedings 6 under the Anti-Injunction Act, (ii) Plaintiff failed to comply with the Civil Local Rules and 7 this Court’s Civil Chamber Rules, and (iii) Plaintiff failed to establish entitlement to 8 preliminary injunctive relief. (See Doc. 11.) 9 For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE 10 Plaintiff’s Motion. 11 I. LEGAL STANDARD 12 The Anti-Injunction Act “prevents a federal court from enjoining the ‘proceedings 13 in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in 14 aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.’” Sandpiper Village Condo. 15 Ass’n., Inc. v. Louisiana-P. Corp., 428 F.3d 831, 842 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 16 § 2283). “Rooted firmly in constitutional principles, the Act is designed to prevent friction 17 between federal and state courts by barring federal intervention in all but the narrowest of 18 circumstances.” Id. “Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state 19 court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed in 20 an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy.” Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. 21 of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 297 (1970). 22 II. DISCUSSION 23 Plaintiff has not asserted nor is the Court aware of any express authorization by 24 Congress to enjoin family law proceedings in state court. There is also no judgment by 25 this Court that needs protecting or effectuating as this Court has not yet ruled on Plaintiff’s 26 Motion to Vacate. Thus, the only remaining question is whether granting the Motion is 27 “necessary in aid of [this Court’s] jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. 28 “The second exception to the Anti–Injunction Act authorizes injunctive relief to 1 prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court’s consideration or disposition 2 of a case as to seriously impair the federal court’s flexibility and authority to decide that 3 case.” Sandpiper Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 428 F.3d at 843 (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 4 398 U.S. at 295) (internal quotation marks omitted). This exception “arose from the settled 5 rule that if an action is in rem, the court first obtaining jurisdiction over the res may proceed 6 without interference from actions in other courts involving the same res.” Alton Box Bd. 7 Co. v. Esprit de Corp., 682 F.2d 1267, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982). The exception has expanded 8 to cover some in personam actions only where the state court proceeding “threatens to 9 render the exercise of the federal court’s jurisdiction nugatory.” Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 10 285 F.3d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 11 Plaintiff’s contention concerning a “property issue” in family law court does not fall 12 under the “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act because 13 the state court first exercised jurisdiction over any rem at issue.2 (See Doc. 1 at 2–3, 7–9; 14 Doc. 10 at 1–2.) See Alton Box Bd. Co., 682 F.2d at 1272; Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 15 225, 235 (1972) (noting the in rem exception allows “a federal court to enjoin a state court 16 proceeding in order to protect its jurisdiction of a res over which it had first acquired 17 jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added); see also Michener v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No. C 18 12-2003 PJH, 2012 WL 3027538, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2012) (“A party to an action in 19 state court litigating possession of real property or the right to tenancy does not implicate 20 this exception simply by filing, as here, an action purporting to litigate title to said property 21 in federal court.”). 22 Neither does Plaintiff’s argument concerning the DVRO fall under the “necessary 23 in aid of its jurisdiction” exception, which for in personam actions is “very limited.” 24 Bennett, 285 F.3d at 806 (“[T]here are only very limited circumstances where such a threat 25 exists in personam cases. See e.g. Flanagan v. Arnaiz, 143 F.3d 540, 545 (9th Cir.1998) 26 27 2 The Court notes that it has yet to decide the question of subject-matter jurisdiction over 28 1 (injunction necessary to effectuate a settlement agreement over which federal court had 2 retained jurisdiction); Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache, 54 F.3d 535, 540 (9th 3 Cir.1994) (injunction necessary to preserve integrity of exclusive federal jurisdiction); 4 Swann v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 501 F.2d 383, 383–384 (4th Cir. [1974]) 5 (invoking Act in school desegregation case)[.]” Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion does not fall 6 under any of the three exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. 7 In addition, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s Motion fails to comply with Civil Local 8 Rule 83.3(g)(2) and this Court’s Civil Chamber Rules, Rule VI. Civil Local Rule 9 83.3(g)(2) provides that “[a] motion for an order must not be made ex parte unless it 10 appears by affidavit or declaration (1) that within a reasonable time before the motion the 11 party informed the opposing party or the opposing party’s attorney when and where the 12 motion would be made; or (2) that the party in good faith attempted to inform the opposing 13 party and the opposing party’s attorney but was unable to do so, specifying the efforts made 14 to inform them; or (3) that for reasons specified the party should not be required to inform 15 the opposing party or the opposing party’s attorney.” This Court’s Civil Chamber Rules, 16 Rule VI provides that “[b]efore filing any ex parte application, counsel must contact the 17 opposing party to meet and confer regarding the subject of the ex parte application” and 18 “comply with Civil Local Rule 83.3(g)[.]” Plaintiff’s Motion fails to mention or assert that 19 Plaintiff complied with any of these procedures prior to filing the Motion. Defendant 20 asserts that Plaintiff did not comply with these procedures. (See Doc. 11 at 4–5.) The 21 Parties are advised to strictly comply with the Civil Local Rules and this Court’s Civil 22 Chamber Rules. 23 In light of the Court’s denying Plaintiff’s Motion for the reasons set forth above, the 24 Court need reach the Parties’ remaining contentions. 25 III. CONCLUSION 26 Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 27 The Clerk of Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Plaintiff at his home 28 address of 2862 Rancho Cortes, Carlsbad, CA 92009. Defendant is additionally 1 ORDERED to send a copy of this Order to Plaintiff at his personal email address. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 DATE: July 20, 2023 4 _____________________________________ HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Cites, in this corpus