Titi v. City of San Diego Municipality
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Dana M. Sabraw (author)
Analysis
The court considered Plaintiff's motion to set aside a sua sponte dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, where Plaintiff argued the court had federal question jurisdiction based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell claims. The court denied the motion and denied leave to amend, finding that the complaint did not plausibly allege a constitutional violation and that the claims sounded in negligence, which is not a basis for federal jurisdiction.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal“The Court disagrees and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.” | agree with court The court correctly identified that the plaintiff's attempt to invoke federal jurisdiction via § 1983 was unsupported by the pleadings. Because the complaint did not allege a constitutional violation, and the underlying facts described negligence, the court was correct to find that federal question jurisdiction was lacking. The denial of leave to amend as futile is supported by the court's finding that the plaintiff could not plausibly allege a constitutional violation based on the record provided. |
Denial of Leave to File an Amended Complaint“Therefore, the Court DENIES the present Motion and denies leave for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint.” | agree with court The court applied the futility standard, noting that the plaintiff's claims sounded in negligence and did not identify a specific constitutional violation. Given that negligence is not actionable under § 1983 and the plaintiff failed to specify a constitutional right, the court's determination that amendment would be futile is legally sound based on the recited facts. |
The order itself: sound — The order is logically consistent and relies on binding Ninth Circuit precedent to support its conclusion that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for federal question jurisdiction. It correctly identifies that the plaintiff's allegations of negligence do not constitute a constitutional violation under § 1983. The court properly treats the motion as one for relief from judgment under Rule 60 and denies it based on the futility of amendment.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No.: 22-cv-01561-DMS KATHRYN M. TITI, 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 12 v. MOTION TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL 13 CITY OF SAN DIEGO MUNICIPALITY, 14 Defendant. 15 16 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to set aside dismissal (“Pl.’s Mot.”). 17 (ECF No. 14.) On May 11, 2023, the Court determined that it lacked subject matter 18 jurisdiction over this claim and ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this claim should not 19 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (ECF No. 11.) On May 31, 2023, the Court dismissed 20 the Action sua sponte without prejudice so that Plaintiff may bring her claim in a court of 21 competent jurisdiction. (ECF No. 13.) In the present motion, Plaintiff seeks relief from 22 the Court’s Order dated May 31, 2023, and asserts that the Court has federal question 23 jurisdiction to hear her claims because Plaintiff’s claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 24 the standard set by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The 25 Court treats the motion as a motion for relief from a judgment or order brought under 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. The Court disagrees and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion. 27 Plaintiff’s complaint never mentions 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Monell and leave to amend 28 would be futile because Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege constitutional violation. To 1 |}establish municipal liability under Monell, Plaintiff must prove that (1) she was deprived 2 ||of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to 3 || deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving 4 || force behind the constitutional violation. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 5 || (9th Cir. 2011). “Monell claims . . . require a plaintiff to show an underlying constitutional 6 || violation.” Lockett v. County of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020). Plaintiff 7 specifies no constitutional violation in her Motion. Plaintiff explains that the City’s 8 ||negligence “clearly demonstrates ... unconstitutional action,” (PI.’s Mot. at 6) but Plaintiff 9 || says nothing further about what the constitutional violation actually is. “Mere negligence 10 |/in training or supervision . . . does not give rise to a Monell claim.” Dougherty, 654 F.3d 11 900 (9th Cir. 2011). 12 The Court concludes that Plaintiff cannot plausibly raise a Section 1983 Monell 13 ||/claim because she cannot plausibly allege a constitutional violation. The injury Plaintiff 14 |/alleges sounds in negligence, and the Court reaffirms that it lacks subject matter 15 |/jurisdiction over such a claim for the reasons explained in its Order dated May 11, 2023 16 ||(ECF No. 11). Therefore, the Court DENIES the present Motion and denies leave for 17 || Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. 18 The proper forum for this negligence claim is San Diego County Superior Court. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 21 || Dated: July 11, 2023 gf J 22 . 23 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw, Chief Judge United States District Court 24 25 26 27 28