gno.law

Wilson v. Edmonson

District Court, S.D. California · 3:23-cv-00605 · 2023-07-13 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Andrew G. Schopler (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T21:56Z · confidence high

The court considered a prisoner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and motions to amend, finding the plaintiff barred from IFP status under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) due to three prior dismissals. The court denied the IFP motion, denied the motions to amend as moot, and dismissed the complaint without prejudice for failure to pay the filing fee.

What the court decidedThe model
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF 2) Denied
“Thus, Wilson’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 2) is DENIED as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).”
agree with court
The court correctly applied 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which bars prisoners with three prior dismissals for frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim from proceeding IFP unless they are in imminent danger of serious physical injury. The court identified three specific prior cases that constitute 'strikes' and correctly determined that the plaintiff's allegations of malicious prosecution did not meet the high bar for the 'imminent danger' exception. The reliance on judicial notice of court records is standard practice in this context.
Motions for Leave to Amend (ECF 4 & 5) Denied as Moot
“Wilson’s motions for leave to amend (ECF 4 & 5) are DENIED AS MOOT.”
agree with court
Because the plaintiff is barred from proceeding IFP and the case is being dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee, there is no pending case to amend. Denying the motions as moot is the procedurally correct response when the underlying action is dismissed for a procedural defect (failure to pay fees) rather than on the merits.
Complaint Dismissed Without Prejudice
“And the action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to pay the statutory and administrative $402 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).”
agree with court
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), if a prisoner is denied IFP status, the court must dismiss the action if the plaintiff fails to pay the filing fee. Dismissing without prejudice is the standard remedy, allowing the plaintiff to refile if they can pay the fee or if the PLRA bar is lifted (e.g., by a change in status or if the 'imminent danger' exception is met in a new filing, though the latter is rare for the same claims).
Certification of Frivolous Appeal
“The Court also “certifies in writing” that an in forma pauperis appeal of this Order would be frivolous and “not taken in good faith.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).”
agree with court
The court has the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) to certify that an IFP appeal would be frivolous. Given the clear application of the PLRA's three-strike rule and the lack of merit in the imminent danger claim, this certification is appropriate.

The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally and substantively sound. It correctly identifies the legal standard under the PLRA, applies it to the specific facts (three prior dismissals), and correctly rejects the 'imminent danger' exception based on the nature of the plaintiff's claims (malicious prosecution). The use of judicial notice to establish the prior strikes is appropriate and supported by Ninth Circuit precedent. The dismissal without prejudice is the correct remedy for failure to pay fees after IFP denial.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 Teddy LeRoy WILSON, Jr., Case No. 23-cv-0605-AGS-MSB 5 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 6 v. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (ECF 2), DENYING MOTIONS TO 7 AMEND AS MOOT (ECF 4 & 5), Amanda EDMONSON, et al., 8 AND DISMISSING THE Defendants. COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY 9 10 11 Teddy LeRoy Wilson, Jr., an inmate suing defendants for civil-rights violations 12 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, moves to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons below, that 13 motion is denied, his motions for leave to amend are denied as moot, and the complaint is 14 dismissed without prejudice. 15 DISCUSSION 16 Typically, parties instituting a civil action in a United States district court must pay 17 filing fees of $402.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). But if granted the right to proceed in forma 18 pauperis, a plaintiff need not pay those fees. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 19 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners like Wilson, however, “face an additional hurdle.” Moore v. 20 Maricopa Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). To further “the 21 congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court,” prisoners 22 cannot proceed IFP once they “have, while incarcerated, on 3 or more prior occasions had 23 claims dismissed due to their frivolity, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim.” Tierney 24 25 26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay a $52 administrative 27 fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (effective Dec. 1, 2020). 28 1 v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997) (cleaned up); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 2 (“In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action under this [IFP] section . . . if the prisoner 3 has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought 4 an action . . . that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 5 state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent 6 danger of serious physical injury.”). 7 When courts review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as one of these three 8 strikes, “the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial” because “the 9 central question is whether the dismissal rang the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act] 10 bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 11 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Prior cases are considered strikes, then, “even if 12 the district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the 13 action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 14 (9th Cir. 2008). Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 15 demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP for having three strikes, but “in 16 some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 17 satisfies at least one of the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” 18 Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005). 19 Wilson, while incarcerated, has had three prior prisoner civil actions dismissed on 20 the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief 21 may be granted, rendering him ineligible to proceed IFP. See United States v. Wilson, 22 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that “a court may take judicial notice of its own 23 records in other cases, as well as the records of [different courts] in other cases”); see also 24 Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (“The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to 25 reasonable dispute because it can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 26 accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”). Those three strikes are: (1) Wilson v. 27 Andrews, et al., No. 2:10-cv-02664-UA-RZ, slip op. at 1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2010) 28 (dismissing case as frivolous and for failing to state a claim); (2) Wilson v. CDCR, No. 1 || 3:23-cv-00344-MMA-BLM, slip op. at 2-3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2023) (dismissing case as 2 || frivolous); and (3) Wilson v. Cardenas, et al., No. 3:23-cv-00278-JLS-LR, slip op. at 3-7 3 ||(S.D. Cal. May 24, 2023) (dismissing case for failing to state a claim). 4 Nor does Wilson meet the “imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception 5 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Imminent danger requires an allegation that a harm is “ready 6 || to take place” or “hanging threateningly over one’s head.” Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 7 || 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). It “cannot be triggered solely by complaints of 8 ||past injury or generalized fears of possible future harm.” Hernandez v. Williams, No. 9 ||21cv347-MMA-KSC, 2021 WL 1317376, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2021) (cleaned up). 10 |} Wilson alleges he has been subjected to malicious prosecution for which he seeks to hold 11 liable the judges of the San Diego County Superior Court, his public defender, and the 12 ||San Diego district attorney. (ECF 1-2, at 1.) Nothing in his complaint satisfies the 13 imminent-danger exception. 14 CONCLUSION 15 Thus, Wilson’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 2) is DENIED as barred 16 || by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Wilson’s motions for leave to amend (ECF 4 & 5) are DENIED 17 || AS MOOT. And the action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to pay 18 || the statutory and administrative $402 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The 19 || Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. The Court also “certifies in writing” that an in 20 || forma pauperis appeal of this Order would be frivolous and “not taken in good faith.” 21 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). 22 ||Dated: July 13, 2023 23 Andrew G. Schopler United States District Judge 25 26 27 28 3 oe