Cohen v. United States Coast Guard

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JONATHAN COHEN, Case No.: 23-CV-912 JLS (KSC)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION ON 13 v. ISSUE OF RECUSAL 14 UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, (ECF No. 7) 15 Defendant. 16 17 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Jonathan Cohen’s Motion on Issue of Recusal 18 (“Mot.,” ECF No. 7). Plaintiff requests that the undersigned be recused from this action 19 because “Plaintiff has an immediate family member who held an externship position” in 20 the undersigned’s chambers “several years ago.” Mot. at 4. 21 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455, “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United 22 States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably 23 be questioned.” See also Harper v. Lugbauer, No. C 11-01306 JW, 2012 WL 734167, at 24 *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2012) (“[R]ecusal is appropriate where ‘a reasonable person with 25 knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably 26 be questioned.’” (quoting Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1993))). 27 “The alleged prejudice must result from an extrajudicial source.” United States v. Studley, 28 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986). “Since a federal judge is presumed to be impartial, the 1 party seeking disqualification bears a substantial burden to show that the judge is biased.” 2 Torres v. Chrysler Fin. Co., No. C 07-00915 JW, 2007 WL 3165665, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3 25, 2007). An “unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice” does not warrant 4 recusal. United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2008). 5 Here, Plaintiff’s relationship to an unidentified former extern of the undersigned 6 does not reasonably call into question the undersigned’s impartiality. According to 7 Plaintiff, the unidentified former extern is not involved in this action, and “Plaintiff has 8 never discussed the externship position with” the unidentified former extern. Mot. at 4. 9 Even if the former extern were involved in this action, their former employment by the 10 undersigned would not constitute grounds for recusal. See Omni Innovations, LLC v. 11 Smartbargains.com LP, No. C06-1129JCC, 2009 WL 3248084, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 6, 12 2009) (“A rule barring former law clerks and externs, much less their entire law firms, from 13 appearing in a particular court would be unreasonable and unjustified.”); In re Wisdom, 14 No. 11-01135-JDP, 2014 WL 2175148, at *3 (Bankr. D. Idaho May 23, 2014) (“Several 15 courts have determined that the presiding judge need not recuse when a former law clerk 16 appears as an attorney in the case, even when the clerkship terminated only a short time 17 before.”), aff’d, No. 1:14-CV-00497-EJL, 2015 WL 2371489 (D. Idaho May 18, 2015). 18 Plaintiff cites 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5) as grounds for the undersigned’s recusal from 19 this action. That statute requires recusal where “a person within the third degree of 20 relationship” to a judge “[i]s a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of 21 a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i). Because the undersigned knows the unidentified former 22 extern, and the unidentified former extern is related to Plaintiff, the undersigned must 23 recuse from this action, according to Plaintiff. But § 455(b)(5) refers to degrees of familial 24 relations. See Perpich v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 927 F. Supp. 226, 232 (E.D. Mich. 25 1996) (“As [§ 455(d)(2)] provides, the degree of relationship is to be determined according 26 to the civil law system. Under the civil law system, the following persons are within the 27 third degree of relationship: children; grandchildren; great-grandchildren; parents; 28 grandparents; great-grandparents; uncles; aunts; brothers; sisters; nephews; and nieces.” 1 || (internal citation omitted)); U.S. ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., No. CV06- 2 || 1381IPHX-NVW, 2008 WL 169636, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 16, 2008) (noting § 455(b)(5) 3 || refers to “familial relationship[s]”’); Si/ver State Intell. Techs., Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 214- 4 || CV-00662-RCJ-VCF, 2014 WL 5017874, at *2 (D. Nev. Oct. 6, 2014) (“[B]rothers-in-law 5 || are considered to be within the third degree of relationship under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5).””); 6 || Conroy on behalf of Aflac, Inc. v. Amos, 785 F. App’x 751, 755 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Plaintiffs 7 |\identify no relative of Chief Judge Land who falls within the third degree of relationship. 8 || Accordingly, there was no reason for Chief Judge Land to recuse himself in this case.”’); 9 || United States v. Quinones, 201 F. Supp. 3d 789, 794 (S.D.W. Va. 2016) (discussing 10 || § 455(b)(S)’s mandated “disqualification based on familial relationship”). Plaintiff has 11 |}adduced no facts demonstrating that the undersigned is related to the unidentified former 12 || extern; therefore, § 455(b)(5)’s mandate is inapplicable here. 13 In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion on Issue of Recusal 14 || (ECF No. 7). 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 |I Dated: July 17, 2023 tt 17 jen Janis L. Sammartino 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28