gno.law

Cecil v. Macomber

District Court, S.D. California · 3:23-cv-00560 · 2023-05-08 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Cynthia Ann Bashant (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T22:02Z · confidence high

The court reviewed a pro se prisoner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and found that the plaintiff had accumulated three prior dismissals constituting 'strikes' under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The court denied the IFP motion, dismissed the action without prejudice for failure to pay the filing fee, and certified that an appeal would be frivolous.

What the court decidedThe model
Denial of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
“Because Plaintiff is subject to the “three strike” rule enunciated at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), his IFP Application is DENIED and this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
agree with court
The court correctly identified that the plaintiff had three prior dismissals for failure to state a claim, which constitute 'strikes' under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The court also correctly applied the 'imminent danger' exception, finding that the plaintiff's allegations regarding ADA violations and lack of supplies did not demonstrate a threat of serious physical injury that was 'ready to take place.' The denial follows from the statutory text and the cited Ninth Circuit precedent.
Dismissal of Action Without Prejudice
“DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE this civil action based on failure to pay the full statutory and administrative $402 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (a);”
agree with court
Because the plaintiff was denied IFP status due to the three-strikes rule, he was required to pay the full filing fee to proceed. His failure to do so necessitates dismissal. Dismissing without prejudice is the standard procedural outcome when a case is dismissed for failure to pay fees, allowing the plaintiff to refile if they can pay the fee or qualify for IFP in the future (though currently barred).
Certification of Frivolous Appeal
“CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3);”
agree with court
The court applied 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) to certify that an appeal would be frivolous. Given the clear application of the three-strikes rule and the lack of imminent danger, an appeal challenging the denial of IFP status is unlikely to succeed, making the certification appropriate under the statute.

The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the three prior dismissals as strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) by relying on established Ninth Circuit precedent regarding the substantive nature of the dismissals. It correctly applies the 'imminent danger' exception, finding that the plaintiff's ADA-related claims do not constitute a threat of serious physical injury. The dismissal without prejudice for failure to pay the fee is the standard procedural consequence of denying IFP status to a prisoner barred by the three-strikes rule. The certification of a frivolous appeal is also appropriate given the clear statutory bar.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GARY CECIL, Case No. 3:23-cv-00560-BAS-BGS CDCR #AF5647, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 vs. (1) DENYING MOTION TO 14 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 15 AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) JEFFREY MACOMBER, Secretary, [ECF No. 2]; and 16 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 17 (2) DISMISSING ACTION Defendant. WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 18 FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 19 REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 20 21 Gary Cecil (“Plaintiff” or “Cecil”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at R.J. 22 Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”), is proceeding pro se and has filed a civil rights 23 Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff did not 24 prepay the civil filing fee required to commence a civil action at the time he filed his 25 Complaint; instead, he seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 26 § 1915(a). (IFP App., ECF No. 2.) Because Plaintiff is subject to the “three strike” rule 27 enunciated at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), his IFP Application is DENIED and this action is 28 DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 1 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 2 Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, “face 3 an additional hurdle.” Id. 4 To further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal 5 court,” the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), § 804(g), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), 6 provides that prisoners with “three strikes” or more cannot proceed IFP. Tierney v. Kupers, 7 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). A prisoner has three strikes if 8 on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, [the prisoner] brought an action or appeal in a court 9 of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is 10 frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . . 11 12 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 13 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style 14 of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is 15 whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a 16 claim.’” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. 17 Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). Thus, prior cases or appeals are considered 18 strikes “even if the district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s 19 application to file the action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 20 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is 21 prohibited by Section 1915(g) from proceeding IFP in federal court unless he can show he 22 is facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see Andrews 23 v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Cervantes”). 24 Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence demonstrating a 25 prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, but “in some instances, the district court docket may 26 be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 27 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119–20. 28 Upon reviewing its docket, and the dockets of the Central and Northern Districts of 1 California, the Court finds that Plaintiff, identified under CDCR No. AF5647, while 2 incarcerated, has had three prior prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds 3 that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 4 granted. See United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that a court 5 may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases, as well as other courts’ records). 6 Specifically, Plaintiff’s three strikes under Section 1915(g) are: 7 (1) Cecil v. Allen, et al., Civil Case No. 1:00-cv-07110-AWI-HBG (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2001) (Order Dismissing Case for Failing to State a Claim) (ECF 8 No. 13) (strike one); 9 (2) Cecil v. Paramo, et al., Civil Case No. 3:15-cv-02137-GPC-NLS (S.D. 10 Cal. Dec. 16, 2015) (Order Granting Motion to Proceed IFP and Dismissing 11 Complaint for Failing to State a Claim) (ECF No. 15) (strike two); and 12 (3) Cecil v. Bustilos, et al., Civil Case No. 5:22-cv-03523-EJD (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2022 (Order Dismissing Complaint for Failing to State a Claim) 13 (ECF No. 17) (strike three). 14 15 These dismissals render Plaintiff ineligible to proceed IFP unless he can show he 16 meets the “imminent danger” exception, which Plaintiff fails to demonstrate. The 17 imminent danger exception under Section 1915(g) requires that the pleadings contain a 18 “plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ 19 at the time of filing.” See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 20 “Imminent danger” requires an allegation that a harm is “ready to take place,” or “hanging 21 threateningly over one’s head,” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1056, and “cannot be triggered 22 solely by complaints of past injury or generalized fears of possible future harm,” 23 Hernandez v. Williams, No. 21cv347-MMA-KSC, 2021 WL 1317376, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 24 Apr. 8, 2021) (citing Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1053). 25 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has violated the ADA by denying him access to “low 26 vision” items, such as a light magnifier and a large print dictionary. (Collection of Exs, to 27 Compl., ECF No. 3 at 6–9.) He further alleges the ADA program at RJD is “broken and 28 needs federal hands-on review,” and that “[t]he ADA coordinator flat out denies and | ||refuses supplies for prisoners, even when it costs them nothing.” (/d. at 7.) Because 2 || Plaintiff fails to demonstrate he faced at the time he commenced this action—or that he 3 || continues to face—a harm that is “ready to take place” or “hanging threateningly over [his] 4 ||head,” the “imminent danger” exception to the three strikes rule is inapplicable here. 5 || Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 6 Accordingly, the Court: 7 (1) DENIES Plaintiffs IFP Application (ECF No. 2) as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 8 || 1915(g); 9 (2) DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE this civil action based on □□□□□□□□□□□ 10 || failure to pay the full statutory and administrative $402 civil filing fee required by 28 11 |/U.S.C. § 1914 (a); 12 (3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and 13 therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and 14 (4) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the case. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. / , 16 || DATED: May 8, 2023 Lin 4 (Bashan. 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -4-