J.G. v. San Diego Unified School District

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 J.G., a minor by Aaron Goulding his Case No.: 22-cv-01605-AJB-MSB guardian, 12 ORDER: 13 Plaintiff, GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST 14 v. TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT, 15 SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL REMANDING THE ACTION TO 16 DISTRICT, et al., STATE COURT, and 17 Defendants. DENYING AS MOOT ALL PENDING 18 MOTIONS 19 (Doc. Nos. 5, 17) 20 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 This is a civil action brought by Plaintiff J.G. against Defendants San Diego Unified 23 District and members of its staff, seeking various forms of relief based on Plaintiff’s time 24 at Torrey Pines Elementary School. (Doc. No. 1-2.) Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the San 25 Diego Superior Court. (Id.) The Complaint lists eight causes of action, two of which 26 specifically reference federal statutes. (Id. at 1, 20–25.) Defendants removed the action 27 based on federal question jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1.) 28 1 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to remand for lack of subject matter 2 jurisdiction and Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The motions are 3 fully briefed. In his moving papers, Plaintiff requests leave to dismiss the federal claims 4 from his Complaint. As more fully set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to 5 amend, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims, 6 remands the action to state court, and denies as moot all pending motions. 7 II. DISCUSSION 8 To begin, the Court finds that at the time of removal, it had original jurisdiction over 9 this case. The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, allows defendants to remove an action 10 when a case originally filed in state court presents a federal question, or is between citizens 11 of different states and involves an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000. See 28 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), (b); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). The presence of federal-question 13 jurisdiction “is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal 14 jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s 15 properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 16 Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint makes apparent that his fifth and sixth causes of action 17 present federal questions because in pleading those claims, he invokes the following federal 18 statutes: 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 19 (“IDEA”); and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil action provision for deprivation of rights, 20 respectively. (Doc. Nos. 1-2 at 1, 20–25.) As the Complaint presents claims arising out of 21 federal law, the Court had, at the time of removal, federal question jurisdiction over the 22 action. 23 Plaintiff, however, has since requested leave to amend his Complaint to dismiss his 24 IDEA and Section 1983 claims. (Doc. No. 21 at 7 (“Plaintiff seeks leave to amend to 25 dismiss the cause of action for Violation of FAPE as moot, and to amend the Violation of 26 Civil Rights to exclude federal claims”). According to Plaintiff, he seeks dismissal of his 27 IDEA claim because he has since moved schools and obtained an Individualized Education 28 Plan evaluation, thereby obviating the need to pursue this claim. (Id. at 8–9.) Plaintiff also 1 no longer wants to pursue his Section 1983 claims and “seeks leave to amend the sixth 2 cause of action for violation of civil rights based only on the California Constitution and 3 statutes already stated in the Complaint.” (Id. at 10–11.) 4 Whether leave to amend a pleading should be granted is governed by Federal Rules 5 of Civil Procedure 15, which provides that courts should freely grant leave to amend “when 6 justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit has instructed that this 7 policy is “to be applied with extreme liberality.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 8 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). Courts consider the 9 following factors in determining whether to grant leave to amend: (1) whether the party 10 seeking the amendment has acted in bad faith; (2) whether undue delay will result from 11 amendment; (3) whether the opposing party will be unduly prejudiced; and (4) whether 12 amendment would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); accord Smith v. 13 Pac. Prop. Dev. Co., 358 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, courts may also 14 consider whether the party seeking leave to amend has previously amended the pleading at 15 issue. Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2004). These factors, however, are 16 not weighed equally. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th 17 Cir. 2013). Instead, the consideration of undue prejudice to the opposing party carries the 18 greatest weight. Id. “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing” of the remaining factors, there 19 exists a “presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id. 20 Here, the Court finds: (1) this matter is in its infancy, (2) Plaintiff has not previously 21 sought leave to amend, (3) Plaintiff does not appear to have acted in bad faith, (4) 22 amendment would not be futile, and (5) granting leave to amend is unlikely to prejudice 23 Defendants. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. Defendants have not disputed otherwise. 24 Moreover, there being no showing of prejudice or a strong showing of the other factors, 25 the Court adheres to the “presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to 26 amend.” Eminence Capital, LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052. Thus, the Court grants Plaintiff leave 27 to amend his Complaint. 28 // 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff's request to amend his 3 ||Complaint and HEREBY STRIKES the fifth cause of action pursuant to the IDEA and 4 ||sixth cause of action pursuant to Section 1983. Having dismissed all claims over which it 5 || has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 6 ||remaining state law claims. Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 7 ||2010) (“A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has 8 dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, the Court 9 || directs the Clerk of Court to remand this action to San Diego Superior Court and terminate 10 all pending motions as moot. 1] IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 || Dated: April 28, 2023 © 13 Hon, Anthony J.Battaglia 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28