Cadles of West Virginia, LLC v. Alvarez

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CADLES OF WEST VIRGINIA, LLC, Case No.: 20-CV-2534 TWR (WVG)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 13 v. PREJUDICE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO FILE EXHIBITS 14 MARIO ALVAREZ, et al., UNDER SEAL IN SUPPORT OF 15 Defendants. THEIR CONSOLIDATED CROSS- MOTION AND OPPOSITION TO 16 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 17 (ECF No. 96) 18 19 Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to File Under Seal Certain Exhibits 20 in Support of (1) Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the 21 Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment; and (2) Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, 22 or in the Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 96, “Mot.”). For the reasons 23 set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion. 24 “[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public 25 records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner 26 Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). “Unless a particular court record is one 27 ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” 28 Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Foltz 1 v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). A party seeking 2 to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming this strong presumption of access. 3 Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. 4 The showing required to seal a judicial record depends upon whether the documents 5 to be sealed relate to a motion that is “more than tangentially related to the merits of the 6 case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1102 (9th Cir. 2016). 7 Where the underlying motion is more than tangentially related to the merits of the case, the 8 stringent “compelling reasons” standard applies. Id. at 1096–98. Where the underlying 9 motion does not surpass the tangential relevance threshold, the less exacting “good cause” 10 standard applies. Id. The decision to seal documents is “one best left to the sound 11 discretion of the trial court” upon consideration of “the relevant facts and circumstances of 12 the particular case.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599. 13 Defendants seek leave to file the following documents under seal in support of their 14 consolidated Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion: 15 (1) Exhibit 7: The Alvarez & Alvarez Irrevocable Trust Dated January 31, 2001; (2) Exhibit 16 15: Grant Deed from Kenneth Waggoner to Hobbs as Trustee Of 16919 Going My Way 17 Trust; (3) Exhibit 16: Certificate of Trust of 16919 Going My Way Trust; and (4) Exhibit 18 17: Limited Liability Company Operating Agreement Of 16919 Going My Way, a 19 Delaware Limited Liability Company. (See Mot. at 2; see also ECF No. 98.) Because a 20 motion for summary judgment is a dispositive motion that requires the court to determine 21 whether there is a “genuine dispute as to any material fact,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), the 22 motion is necessarily more than tangentially related to the merits of the case; accordingly, 23 the more exacting “compelling reasons” standard applies. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135–36. 24 “Examples [of compelling reasons] include when a court record might be used to 25 ‘gratify private spite or promote public scandal,’ to circulate ‘libelous’ statements, or ‘as 26 sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.’” Ctr. 27 for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1097 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598–99). “The existence of 28 a stipulated protected order is not enough, standing alone, to justify sealing under the [more 1 || permissive] ‘good cause’ standard.” Signal Hill Serv., Inc. v. Macquarie Bank Ltd., No. 2 || CV1101IS39MMMJEMX, 2013 WL 12244287, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2013) (citing 3 || Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Ferrero 4 || Litig., No. 11-CV-205 H(CAB), 2011 WL 3360443, *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011)). 5 Here, Defendants have filed their Motion “so as to not be in technical non- 6 compliance with the Protective Order previously entered in this case,” (Mot. at 2), which 7 ||requires any party filing material designated as “confidential” to first “seek permission of 8 ||the Court to file the material under seal,” (see ECF No. 46 4 11). Defendants have not 9 provided any other justification for sealing. (See generally Mot.) In fact, they have 10 || indicated that the Parties are preparing a joint motion seeking modification of the Protective 11 ||Order and permission to publicly file documents designated as “confidential.” (See Mot. 12 2.) Therefore, Defendants have not provided “compelling reasons” to file the lodged 13 ||documents under seal. 14 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE 15 || Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 96). Defendants SHALL PUBLICLY FILE the sealed 16 || lodged documents (ECF No. 98) within seven (7) days of the electronic docketing of this 17 || Order. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 || Dated: March 29, 2023 —_—— 20 | od (2 re 1 Honorable Todd W. Robinson United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28