Beltran v. United States of America

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 George BELTRAN and Maria L. Estrada Case No.: 22-cv-1915-AGS 4 for M.E., ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS 5 Plaintiffs, (ECF 2) 6 v. 7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., 8 Defendant. 9 10 Plaintiffs, the parents of a minor suing on her behalf, move to proceed in forma 11 pauperis (IFP). Plaintiffs qualify to proceed without paying the initial filing fee, and the 12 complaint sufficiently states a claim for relief. So, the Court grants plaintiffs’ motion. 13 I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 14 Typically, parties instituting a civil action in a United States district court must pay 15 a filing fee of $402. 1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). But if granted the right to proceed in forma 16 pauperis, a plaintiff can proceed without paying the fee. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 17 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 18 Here, plaintiffs own no assets and have $5 cash on hand. (ECF 2, at 2.) They have a 19 current monthly income of $1,442 from unemployment benefits and other public 20 assistance, which they claim will cease shortly. (Id. at 2.) Their monthly expenses total 21 $1,246. (Id. at 5.) The Court finds that plaintiffs have sufficiently shown an inability to pay 22 the initial $402 fee. See Blount v. Saul, No. 21-CV-0679-BLM, 2021 WL 1561453, at *1 23 24 25 26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay a $52 administrative 27 fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (effective Dec. 1, 2020). 28 1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2021) (“It is well-settled that a party need not be completely destitute 2 to proceed IFP.”). 3 II. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) Screening 4 When reviewing an IFP motion, the court must screen the complaint and dismiss it 5 if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim,” or seeks monetary relief from a 6 defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 7 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000). In this Social Security case, plaintiffs’ claim is somewhat 8 different than a run-of-the-mill benefits appeal. Plaintiffs claim that the Commissioner’s 9 failure to provide any response to a letter requesting reinstatement of a minor’s benefits 10 violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. (See ECF 1, at 3–12.) Although 11 unclear, it appears on initial review that the Court may have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C 12 § 405(g) notwithstanding the lack of a final opinion or hearing. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 13 424 U.S. 319, 330–31 (1976) (finding jurisdiction after a denial of reconsideration in part 14 because the “constitutional challenge is entirely collateral to” the disability determination); 15 Brown v. City of N.Y., 476 U.S. 467, 484–85 (1986) (discussing whether the “final 16 decision” requirement should be considered “waived” in various contexts, although 17 warning that the “holding” “does not suggest that exhaustion [as part of the final decision 18 requirement] is to be excused whenever a claimant alleges an irregularity in the agency 19 proceedings”). 20 And the complaint appears to state a claim, at least sufficiently to survive the “low 21 threshold” for proceeding past the § 1915(e) screening. See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 22 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012). “[T]he interest of an individual in continued receipt of 23 [disability] benefits is a statutorily created ‘property’ interest protected by the Fifth 24 Amendment.” Matthews, 424 U.S. at 332. Plaintiffs claim their minor daughter M.E. was 25 found disabled by the Social Security Administration from birth but that her benefits were 26 reduced to $0 a month beginning in November 2017 because “her parent[’s]” “estimated 27 wages” “increased” thereby rendering her ineligible for payment. (See ECF 1, at 25 28 (September 30, 2017 Letter from the Social Security Administration).) In 2020, the | |}household income dropped because plaintiff George Beltran “got injured” and then “in 2 2021” “suffered a COVID-19 episode.” (ECF 1, at 10.) So in 2021, plaintiffs sent the 3 ||Commissioner a letter detailing the reduction in household income and requesting that their 4 || minor child’s disability benefits be reinstated.” (/d.) The Commissioner never responded. 5 || dd.) It is plausible that, if the minor was in fact found to be entitled to benefits subject only 6 ||to her parents’ earnings and the Commissioner ignored a request to reinstate them after 7 ||those earnings changed, procedural due process may be implicated. See Matthews, 424 8 at 332-33. 9 Because the issue on jurisdiction is unclear and may be assisted by having the 10 |}Commissioner’s response but the complaint otherwise states a claim, the Court declines to 11 dismiss the complaint at this time. This ruling is without prejudice to the Commissioner’s 12 to raise these, or any other, issues. 13 II. Conclusion 14 For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants plaintiffs’ IFP Motion. 15 Dated: December 27, 2022 16 7 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler United States Magistrate Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 ? Although the letter plaintiffs sent the Commissioner is described in the complaint, it is not attached. Instead, they attach another letter to Congressman Darrell Issa requesting 25 || assistance with the same issue. (See ECF 1, at 23.) Nevertheless, the Court will construe 26 the pro se plaintiffs’ complaint liberally, as it is required to do, and accept the representations of what was in the letter for the purposes of screening. See Horrod v. 27 || Comm Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 6:15-cv-00698-HZ, 2015 WL 9308263, at *2 (D. Or. Dec. 28 21, 2015) (explaining that the district court has “a duty to liberally construe” a Social Security claimant's “pro se brief[s]” (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007))).