Schneider v. Molina
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
Plaintiff Julie Schneider filed a complaint, a motion for a temporary restraining order, and a motion for default judgment regarding a foreclosure, along with an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The court denied the IFP application without prejudice due to lack of credibility and particularity, and denied the TRO and default judgment motions as moot, granting the plaintiff until December 9, 2022, to pay fees or file a renewed IFP application.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP) denied without prejudice“Therefore, Plaintiff's application to proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2] is DENIED without prejudice” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard that an IFP affidavit must allege poverty with particularity and definiteness. The plaintiff's claim of having no income or expenses was deemed not credible, satisfying the requirement for denial under the cited Ninth Circuit precedent. |
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) denied as moot“the Motion for the Temporary Restraining Order [Doc. No. 3] against Defendants’ foreclosure is DENIED AS MOOT” | agree with court Because the IFP application was denied and the plaintiff had not paid the filing fee, the case was not properly commenced. Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the TRO, making the motion moot in the context of the pending fee deficiency. |
Motion for Default Judgment denied as moot“and the Motion for Default Judgment [Doc. No. 4] is also DENIED AS MOOT” | agree with court Similar to the TRO, the motion for default judgment cannot be granted because the action has not been properly initiated due to the failure to pay fees or obtain IFP status. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the statutory requirements for IFP status and applies the relevant Ninth Circuit case law regarding the specificity and credibility of the affidavit. The denial of the TRO and default judgment as moot is a logical consequence of the failure to properly commence the action due to fee deficiencies. The footnote regarding the failure to state a claim is advisory and does not affect the immediate rulings.
Opinion
1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4 5 JULIE C. SCHNEIDER, Case No.: 22-cv-1666-CAB-DDL 6 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING APPLICATION 7 v. FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DENYING 8 ALICIA MOLINA; LAW OFFICES OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING MOLINA & MOLINA; AMERISAVE; 9 ORDER AND MOTION FOR FREEDOM MORTGAGE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS MOOT 10 CORPORATION; NESTOR TRUSTEE SERVICES; AND SUPREME 11 [Doc. Nos. 2, 3, 4] LENDING, 12 Defendants. 13 14 On October 27, 2022, Plaintiff Julie Schneider filed a Complaint [Doc. No. 1], a 15 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [Doc. No. 3], and a Motion for Default 16 Judgment [Doc. No. 4] against various Defendants. Each filing is related to Defendants’ 17 standing to foreclose on property located at 9272 Brookside Circle, Spring Valley, 18 California 91977 (“the Property”). Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fees required by 19 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead, she filed a Motion to Proceed in Forma 20 Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [Doc. No. 2]. 21 Generally, all parties instituting a civil action in this court must pay a filing fee. See 22 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); CivLR 4.5(a). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the court may 23 authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit without payment of fees 24 if the plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement of all his or her assets, showing 25 that he or she is unable to pay filing fees or costs. “An affidavit in support of an IFP 26 application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still 27 afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). 28 1 || plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness 2 certainty.” Jd. (internal quotation marks omitted). The granting or denial of leave to 3 || proceed IFP in civil cases is within the sound discretion of the district court. Venerable v. 4 || Meyers, 500 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). 5 In Plaintiff’s IFP application, Plaintiff fails to answer most of the questions and 6 claims to have no income or expenses of any kind. It is simply not credible to assume that 7 || Plaintiff has no income or expenses. Based on the lack of “particularity, definiteness and 8 certainty” in the information provided, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff lacks the 9 || funds to pay the filing fee and “‘still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 10 || 1234. Therefore, Plaintiff's application to proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2] is DENIED without 11 prejudice, the Motion for the Temporary Restraining Order [Doc. No. 3] against 12 || Defendants’ foreclosure is DENIED AS MOOT, and the Motion for Default Judgment 13 [Doc. No. 4] is also DENIED AS MOOT. 14 Plaintiff shall have until December 9, 2022, to pay the entire filing fee or file a 15 |}renewed application to proceed IFP that provides complete and accurate information 16 || concerning Plaintiff's income, assets, and expenses, and is signed by Plaintiff. Failure to 17 || pay the filing fee or file a renewed application to proceed IFP will result in this case being 18 || closed without further order from the court.' 19 It is SO ORDERED. 20 21 ||Dated: October 28, 2022 € ZL 22 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 23 United States District Judge 24 2 26 ||! Plaintiff is advised that even if she files a renewed application to proceed IFP, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and will be subject to dismissal sua sponte by the Court. 27 || Accordingly, if Plaintiff intends to proceed with this action, whether by IFP or by paying the filing fee, 3g ||she should file an amended complaint that (1) alleges the specific, relevant facts giving rise to her claims, and (2) specifies causes of action supported by those facts.