Walker v. United States of America

Opinion

5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN ERIC WALKER, Case No: 20-CV-31-DMS-AGS 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 v. REOPEN CASE AND MOTION TO FILE 14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; AMENDED COMPLAINT; AND THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED 15 And All Actors, Agents and Elected COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE FOR Officials Thereof, and Does 1 FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 16 through 100, Respectively, 17 Defendants.

18 19 On October 17, 2022, Defendant Steven Walker filed a “Request to Reopen Case 20 Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60” and a “Request to File Amended 21 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief; Breach of Contract; Facial Challenge to 22 Unconstitutional Laws.” (ECF Nos. 14, 15.) The Court construes these requests as a motion 23 to reopen his case and a motion to file an amended complaint, respectively. Defendant also 24 submitted an “Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief; Breach of 25 Contract; General Challenge to Unconstitutional Laws; Request for Class Action 26 Certification” as part of his motion to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 15.) 27 1 Plaintiff’s motions to reopen his case and bring an amended complaint rely on the 2 Supreme Court’s recent decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 3 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). Based on Bruen, Plaintiff requests declaratory judgment, injunctive 4 relief, and class certification. (ECF No. 15, First Amended Complaint, 52.) Defendant’s 5 motion to reopen his case and motion to file an amended complaint are hereby GRANTED. 6 The Court accepts the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), as filed as part of his motion. 7 (ECF No. 15.) 8 I. 9 BACKGROUND 10 Plaintiff is a non-prisoner proceeding pro se. On January 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed a 11 Complaint against the United States, State of California, “And All Actors, Agents, and 12 Elected Officials Thereof; And Does 1 Through 100” and a motion to proceed In Forma 13 Pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in In Forma 14 Pauperis and dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 3.) On May 15 18, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a motion for reconsideration of summary dismissal of the 16 Complaint, which the Court denied. (ECF Nos. 6, 11.) Plaintiff appealed the Court’s denial, 17 and on July 19, 2021, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the Court. (ECF No 13.) 18 The matter presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, which 19 contains the same or substantially similar allegations as those Plaintiff had brought in his 20 original Complaint. As an initial matter, considering Plaintiff’s IFP status, the Court 21 conducts a sua sponte screening of the FAC, per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 22 II. 23 DISCUSSION 24 Notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, a complaint filed by 25 any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to a mandatory and 26 sua sponte review and dismissal by the court to the extent it is frivolous, malicious, fails to 27 state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 1 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 2 prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Prior to its 3 amendment by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted 4 sua sponte dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Id. at 1130. 28 U.S.C. § 5 1915(e)(2), however, mandates that the court reviewing a complaint filed pursuant to the 6 IFP provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing 7 that the complaint be served by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2). Lopez, 8 203 F.3d 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss 9 an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 10 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting the “the language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 11 parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”).1 12 In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges violations of his rights under the 13 Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, and breaches of purported contracts implied by the 14 same amendments and constitutional oaths taken by various government officials. Plaintiff 15 argues that “when a person earns their freedom from confinement or is discharged (cleared) 16 from the penalty imposed for a previous conviction of crime . . . they have constitutionally 17 satisfied their debt to society” and “are no longer ‘criminals’ or ‘felons.’” (ECF No. 15, 18 First Amended Complaint, ¶ 13.) Plaintiff argues that Defendants, “when enforcing 19 weapons control laws, have exercised powers which are not delegated by the Constitution 20 and, in doing so, have breached their contractual obligations under the Constitution, and 21 encroached upon, denied, or disparaged the constitutionally secured powers and rights of 22 the people.” (ECF No. 15, First Amended Complaint, ¶ 15.) 23 24 25 1 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted if a plaintiff’s complaint fails 26 to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 27 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 1 Plaintiff describes himself as a “free, law-abiding, ordinary, tax-paying citizen of the 2 State of California and United States of America,” who “does not currently own a firearm 3 (weapon), but seeks to acquire a weapon to keep and bear for in-home and personal self- 4 defense and security, and other lawful purposes of personal safety.” (ECF No. 15, First 5 Amended Complaint, ¶ 22.) He continues, “[b]ut for California’s and the Federal 6 Governments’ encroachments and chilling restrictions on weapons and his reasonable fear 7 of criminal prosecution and penalties for exercising his fundamental right to self-security 8 and safety,” he would “immediately acquire and continuously possess a weapon for lawful 9 purposes, including in-home personal security, personal safety, and self-defense.” (ECF 10 No. 15, First Amended Complaint, ¶ 22.) Plaintiff seeks to represent a “very large class of 11 citizens (approximately 330 million people) who are subject to the same encroachments, 12 infringements, penalties, and chilling restrictions alleged herein.” (ECF No. 15, First 13 Amended Complaint, ¶ 22.) 14 Plaintiff neglects to plead standing in the FAC. Notwithstanding, the Court is 15 familiar with Plaintiff’s criminal history and status as a felon, which he had raised himself 16 in the original Complaint and which the Court discussed in its prior Order Dismissing the 17 Complaint. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff was convicted by a jury for the criminal offense of 18 premeditated attempted murder, with use of a firearm. In the FAC, Plaintiff requests that 19 the Court address his “facial challenge to the constitutional validity of the laws in question,” 20 divorced from his status as a felon.2 (ECF No. 15, Motion to File Amended Complaint, 2.) 21 Plaintiff claims the Court did not previously address his more general challenge in its prior 22 order, but he is incorrect. Both in its Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 3) 23 and its Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 11), the Court 24 addressed Plaintiff’s general claims regarding the validity of all firearms laws and his 25 request to restore the right not of felons, but law-abiding citizens more generally, to bear 26 27 1 arms. (ECF No. 3 at 3; ECF No. 11 at 5.) The Court made clear that the distinction does 2 not assist Plaintiff. 3 Today, Plaintiff essentially sets forth the same arguments. He contends that the 4 Constitution guarantees his right to bear arms, and congressionally enacted laws or court 5 decisions which limit this right are unconstitutional. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that 6 Bruen “brings to question the continued validity of this court’s summary dismissal and sole 7 reliance on unsubstantiated dicta to support its reasoning, which impermissibly relieved the 8 defendants of their constitutional burden to demonstrate how their overreaching regulations 9 as applied generally, or even to plaintiffs current law-abiding conduct, are historically 10 justified.” (ECF No. 15, Motion to File Amended Complaint, 2-3.) Plaintiff’s arguments 11 ultimately amount to the same claims he raised, and which the Court previously dismissed, 12 in the original Complaint. Plaintiff again seeks to vindicate the constitutional right for 13 himself to bear arms, even though he is a felon, and for individuals, including but not limited 14 to individuals with a felony conviction. 15 In support of his argument today, Plaintiff argues that Bruen should change the result 16 of the Court’s prior dismissal. Plaintiff misinterprets Bruen. Unfortunately for Plaintiff, 17 Bruen still focuses on the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms for self- 18 defense. 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2118 (2022) (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. at 19 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Pp. 2129 - 2131. While Plaintiff alleges he is presently law-abiding, 20 his status as a felon precludes him from possessing a firearm. Furthermore, Bruen neither 21 overturns a long line of precedent nor offers blanket protection for any and all individuals, 22 irrespective of criminal history, against laws and statutes that restrict the Second 23 Amendment. Plaintiff also suggests that the Second Amendment does not limit the right to 24 bear arms to citizens who are law-abiding. (ECF No. 15, First Amended Complaint, ¶ 33, 25 n. 24.) The Court rejects this argument. Both D.C. v. Heller and Bruen make clear that the 26 right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited and longstanding prohibitions on 27 the possession of firearms by felons are not only lawful, but constitutional. See 554 U.S. 1 570, 626, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816 (2008); see also 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2162 (2022) (Kavanaugh, 2 J., concurring). 3 Finally, courts in this District have considered the same or similar arguments raised 4 by Plaintiff and have arrived at the same outcome. For example, Plaintiff’s FAC sets forth 5 similar arguments to those raised in a motion filed in this District by Defendant David 6 Lemont Hill, in U.S. v. Hill, Case No. 21cr0107-WHQ, 2022 WL 4361917 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7 20, 2022). There, Judge William Q. Hayes denied defendant Hill’s motion in an order 8 issued September 20, 2022. Having considered Plaintiff’s arguments in his motion to file 9 an amended complaint and First Amended Complaint, the Court adopts the thorough and 10 well-reasoned analysis and conclusion issued by Judge Hayes in the Hill case, which 11 determined that binding Ninth Circuit precedent was not overruled by Bruen, and that the 12 federal felon-in-possession law does not violate the Second Amendment. 2022 WL 13 4361917, at *2-3. 14 The Court also directs Plaintiff to its prior Order Dismissing the Complaint and Order 15 Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration. (ECF No. 11.) There is still no dispute 16 that Plaintiff has suffered a felony conviction and individuals who have a prior felony 17 conviction like Plaintiff’s, cannot restore their Second Amendment rights under existing 18 law, except in limited circumstances not present here, even if they become law-abiding 19 citizens.3 20 II. 21 CONCLUSION 22 The crux of Plaintiff’s FAC has not changed. Plaintiff claims that state and federal 23 governments improperly deny his right to bear arms under the Second Amendment because 24 of his status as a felon and that convicted felons who abide by the law post-conviction have 25 the right to possess firearms. The Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court have both 26 27 3 Generally, a person sentenced to prison on a felony cannot restore their right to bear arms 1 || recognized the validity of laws curtailing the right of a felon to possess firearms and □□□□□ 2 not changed the result. Consequently, the FAC is hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice 3 failure to state a claim, and Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory judgment, clas 4 || certification, and injunctive relief are DENIED as moot. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 || Dated: October 28, 2022 2» J \ 7 rn Yn - g Hon. Dana M. Sabraw, Chief Judge 9 United States District Court 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28