Cleveland v. The Behemoth

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT CLEVELAND, an individual, Case No.: 3:19-cv-00672-RBM-BGS 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF 13 v. ROBERT CLEVELAND’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 2 TO REQUIRE 14 THE BEHEMOTH, a California THE USE OF “EMPLOYER” AND corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, 15 “EMPLOYEE” TO DESCRIBE THE Defendants. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 16 BEHEMOTH AND PLAINTIFF 17 18 [Doc. 68] 19 20 On March 4, 2022, Plaintiff Robert Cleveland (“Plaintiff”) filed a Motion in Limine 21 to Require the Use of “Employer” and “Employee” to Describe the Relationship Between 22 The Behemoth and Plaintiff (“Motion”). (Doc. 68–2.) On March 18, 2022, Defendant The 23 Behemoth (“Defendant”) filed an opposition to the Motion (“Opposition”). (Doc. 82.) In 24 the Motion, Plaintiff requests the Court exclude “testimony or argument characterizing 25 [Defendant] as a ‘joint employer’ or Plaintiff as a ‘contractor’ or ‘contingent worker’ of 26 [Defendant] and requiring the use of ‘employer’ and ‘employee’ to describe the 27 relationship between [Defendant] to Plaintiff.” (Doc. 68–2 at 7.) Defendant counters that 28 whether Defendant was Plaintiff’s employer is a factual dispute that should not be resolved 1 in a motion in limine. (Doc. 82 at 5.) For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s Motion 2 is DENIED. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 Plaintiff is a former quality assurance specialist at Defendant, a video game 5 development company headquartered in San Diego. (Doc 1–2 at 4.) On February 20, 2019, 6 Plaintiff filed the instant action alleging that from March 2016 to February 2018, 7 “Defendant[] subjected Plaintiff to systemic employment discrimination based on his 8 gender” and “engendered, endorsed, and/or ratified a hostile work environment violative 9 of state and federal law.” (Id. at 4, 7.) 10 In particular, Plaintiff brings claims for: (1) hostile work environment/sexual 11 harassment in violation of California Fair Employment and Housing Act, (2) retaliation in 12 violation of California Fair Employment and Housing Act, (3) wrongful termination in 13 violation of public policy, (4) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 14 17200, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) negligent infliction of emotional 15 distress, (7) failure to prevent harassment, (8) hostile work environment/sexual harassment 16 in violation of Title VII [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq.], and (9) retaliation in violation of 17 Title VII [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq.]. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff’s complaint has requested 18 general, compensatory, and/or special damages in any amount to be proven at trial. (Id. at 19 21.) The complaint also requests punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish and 20 deter Defendant from harming other employees. (Id.) 21 II. DISCUSSION 22 This dispute centers around the fact that Plaintiff was assigned to Defendant through 23 a staffing agency. (Doc. 68–2 at 5; Doc 82 at 2.) Accordingly, Plaintiff makes several 24 arguments to support his position that the Court should require the use of “employer” and 25 “employee” to describe the relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant (collectively, the 26 “Parties”). (See Doc. 68–2.) First, Plaintiff states Defendant is the employer of the workers 27 supplied through the staffing agency because Defendant exercises control and discretion 28 over those workers, regardless of how they are characterized for tax or payroll purposes. 1 (Id. at 4.) Moreover, in advance of submitting the joint pretrial order, Defendant’s counsel 2 initially agreed to stipulate to Defendant being Plaintiff’s employer then struck the 3 stipulation prior to lodging the order with the Court. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff also explains that 4 Defendant proposed being characterized as a “joint employer” or “co-employer,” but 5 Plaintiff thinks this terminology is likely to confuse a jury since the staffing agency is not 6 a defendant in this action. (Id. at 5–6.) 7 Defendant counters that “to prove his claims at trial, Plaintiff must show he was an 8 employee of [D]efendant . . . and Defendant was his employer.” (Doc. 82 at 2.) By 9 requiring the use of “employer” and “employee” to describe the relationship, “Plaintiff 10 seeks in effect a dispositive ruling on an employment status.” (Id.) Defendant argues 11 “[t]his is not an appropriate use of a motion in limine, especially where, as here, Defendant 12 has asserted an affirmative defense of no employment relationship.” (Id.) Defendant 13 believes it would be inappropriate for the Court to decide, as a matter of law, whether an 14 employment relationship existed between the Parties because Plaintiff may not 15 “circumvent” his duty to prove an employment relationship. (Id. at 2, 5.) To determine 16 whether there was an employment relationship between the Parties, the Court would have 17 to analyze a myriad of facts and law, and “[a] motion in limine is not the proper vehicle.” 18 (Id. at 8.) 19 The Court emphasizes that a motion in limine is a procedural mechanism used to 20 limit in advance the scope of evidence that will be permitted at trial. See United States v. 21 Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Tamares Las Vegas Properties, LLC 22 v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 216CV02933JADNJK, 2022 WL 476093, at *1 (D. Nev. Feb. 23 16, 2022). Whether Defendant is Plaintiff’s employer is an issue for trial, and the Court is 24 not inclined to make such a determination in a motion in limine. See Tamares Las Vegas 25 Properties, LLC, 2022 WL 476093, at *1 (citing Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 735 F.3d 26 1158 (9th Cir. 2013), aff'd, 574 U.S. 418 (2015) (“[a] motion in limine is not the proper 27 vehicle for seeking a dispositive ruling on a claim”)). Rather, the Court concludes that this 28 is a question reserved for the jury. See Angelotti v. The Walt Disney Co., 192 Cal. App. 1 || 4th 1394, 1404 (2011) (“[t]he existence of an employment relationship is a question for the 2 || trier of fact, but can be decided by the court as a matter of law if the evidence supports only 3 || one reasonable conclusion’’); see also Bowerman v. Field Asset Servs., Inc., 39 F.4th 652, 4 ||666 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[t]he existence of an employment relationship is a question for the 5 of fact”); Brassinga vy. City of Mountain View, 66 Cal. App. 4th 195, 210 (1998) 6 || (emphasizing that the question of whether an employment relationship exists is generally 7 reserved for the trier of fact). 8 Hil. CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 || DATE: October 6, 2022 12 13 —_ Fat Ean Hf ortirye 14 HON. RUTH BERMUBEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28