Nguyen v. Tulare County Superior Court Judge
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a pro se complaint filed in forma pauperis that alleged a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation against a state judge for a speeding conviction. The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and denied the IFP application as moot.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Complaint dismissed“In light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(G)-(ii1)” | agree with court The dismissal is supported by multiple independent grounds. First, the defendant is a judge acting in an official capacity, who is absolutely immune from damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Second, under Heck v. Humphrey, a § 1983 claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction is barred until the conviction is overturned. Third, venue is improper as the events did not occur in the district. Any one of these grounds is sufficient to dismiss the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). |
Application to proceed in forma pauperis denied as moot“the application to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED AS MOOT” | agree with court Because the complaint was dismissed, there is no pending action for which IFP status is required. Denying the IFP motion as moot is the standard procedural consequence of a dismissal. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies that the plaintiff is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) despite not being a prisoner. It correctly applies the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity to bar the damages claim against the judge. It correctly applies Heck v. Humphrey to bar the claim because success would imply the invalidity of the speeding conviction. It also correctly notes the lack of proper venue. The reasoning is sound and supported by binding Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court authority.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 PETER NGUYEN, Case No.: 22-cv-1504-CAB-AGS 9 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING CASE AND 10 v. DENYING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 11 TULARE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT AS MOOT JUDGE, 12 Defendants. 13 [Doc. No. 2] 14 15 On October 3, 2022, Plaintiff Peter Nguyen filed a complaint that purports to state a 16 claim for “violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” but in reality appears to be little more than a 17 misguided appeal of a Tulare County Superior Court’s decision finding him guilty of a 18 vehicular speeding violation. Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fees required by 28 19 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma 20 Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [Doc. No. 2.] 21 A complaint filed by any person seeking to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 22 1915(a) is subject to sua sponte dismissal if it is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to 23 state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a 24 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 25 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not 26 limited to prisoners.”); see also Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 27 2016) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)(B) “mandates dismissal—even if dismissal comes before 28 the defendants are served”). Congress enacted this safeguard because “a litigant whose 1 || filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an 2 ||economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” 3 || Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 4 (1989)). 5 Here, Plaintiff brings suit for monetary damages against an unnamed judge of the 6 || Superior Court of Tulare County. [Doc. No. 1.] However, “[j]udges and those performing 7 || judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in 8 || their official capacities.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). 9 || Moreover, because a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 10 || conviction for speeding, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), bars Plaintiff 11 bringing his § 1983 claim until his conviction is overturned. See Cabrera v. City of 12 || Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir.1998) (per curiam). Finally, Plaintiff lives in 13 || Garden Grove, California, while Defendant is in Tulare County, California, and the events 14 || alleged in the complaint did not occur in this district, so even if Plaintiff could somehow 15 || overcome the other hurdles to state a claim that is properly in federal court, venue is not 16 || properly in this district. 17 In light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED 18 || pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(G)-(ii1), and the application to proceed in forma 19 || pauperis is DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this case. No further 20 || filings will be accepted. 21 It is SO ORDERED. 22 ||Dated: October 5, 2022 € 23 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28