Cleveland v. The Behemoth
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- On appeal
- Robert Cleveland v. the Behemoth (2024-05-02) — reversed in part — the Ninth Circuit's later ruling on this docket
- Panel
- Ruth Bermudez Montenegro (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a motion in limine filed by the defendant to exclude evidence regarding racism, public parking, and building conditions in an employment discrimination case. The court granted the motion in part, excluding evidence of parking and building conditions, but denied the motion in part, allowing evidence of workplace racism to be admitted subject to the court's discretion.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion in Limine granted in part regarding the exclusion of evidence relating to bathroom conditions, building conditions, and parking.“Considering Defendant’s arguments and the fact that Plaintiff “does not oppose the exclusion of . . . testimony or evidence relating to his office bathroom, building conditions, and parking and street safety,” such evidence will be excluded from trial. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART as to these categories of evidence.” | agree with court The court relied on the plaintiff's explicit concession in the opposition brief that they did not oppose the exclusion of this evidence. In civil litigation, a party's concession that evidence is irrelevant or inadmissible is generally binding on the court, making the exclusion a logical and procedurally sound outcome. |
Motion in Limine denied in part regarding the exclusion of evidence relating to racism.“The Court finds that evidence of racism in the workplace may be relevant to several of Plaintiff's claims including allegations of hostile work environment and discriminatory conduct. See Kishaba y. Hilton Hotels Corp., 737 F. Supp. 549, 554 (D. Haw. 1990), aff'd, 936 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[e]ven if Plaintiff herself was never the object of racial harassment, she might nevertheless have a Title VII claim if she were forced to work in an atmosphere in which such harassment was pervasive’); see also Woods y. Graphic Commc'ns, 925 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that work environment was hostile when the plaintiff “was surrounded by racial hostility”). Thus, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED IN PART. The Court will not outrightly exclude evidence relating to racism. However, such evidence may be limited in scope, subject to the Court’s discretion.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the principle that evidence of a hostile work environment based on one protected class (race) is relevant to a claim of a hostile work environment based on another protected class (gender) because it demonstrates a pervasive atmosphere of discrimination. The cited Ninth Circuit authority supports the proposition that a plaintiff can be subjected to a hostile environment by observing or being surrounded by harassment directed at others. The court appropriately balanced the relevance against potential prejudice by reserving the right to limit the scope of the evidence. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound and legally defensible. It correctly identifies the plaintiff's concession regarding the parking and building conditions, leading to their exclusion. For the racism evidence, the court correctly applies Ninth Circuit precedent establishing that evidence of a pervasive atmosphere of discrimination based on one protected class is relevant to a hostile work environment claim based on another. The court appropriately exercises its discretion to allow the evidence while reserving the right to limit its scope to prevent undue prejudice, which is the standard approach for such motions in limine.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT CLEVELAND, an individual, Case No.: 3:19-cv-00672-RBM-BGS 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 13 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT THE BEHEMOTH’S MOTION IN 14 THE BEHEMOTH, a California LIMINE TO EXCLUDE corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, 15 EXTRANEOUS COMMENTS Defendants. REGARDING RACISM, PUBLIC 16 PARKING, AND BUILDING 17 CONDITIONS 18 [Doc. 60] 19 20 On March 4, 2022, Defendant The Behemoth (“Defendant”) filed a Motion in 21 Limine to Exclude Extraneous Comments Regarding Racism, Public Parking, and Building 22 Conditions (“Motion”). (Doc. 60.) On March 18, 2022, Plaintiff Robert Cleveland 23 (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition to the Motion (“Opposition”). (Doc. 75.) In the Motion, 24 Defendant states that evidence of the aforementioned categories should be excluded from 25 trial because they are irrelevant to Plaintiff’s causes of action, highly prejudicial, and 26 confusing to jurors. (Doc. 60 at 2.) For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Motion 27 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 28 / / / 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff is a former quality assurance specialist at Defendant, a video game 3 development company headquartered in San Diego. (Doc 1–2 at 4.) On February 20, 2019, 4 Plaintiff filed the instant action alleging that from March 2016 to February 2018, 5 “Defendant[] subjected Plaintiff to systemic employment discrimination based on his 6 gender” and “engendered, endorsed, and/or ratified a hostile work environment violative 7 of state and federal law.” (Id. at 4, 7.) 8 In particular, Plaintiff brings claims for: (1) hostile work environment/sexual 9 harassment in violation of California Fair Employment and Housing Act, (2) retaliation in 10 violation of California Fair Employment and Housing Act, (3) wrongful termination in 11 violation of public policy, (4) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 12 17200, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) negligent infliction of emotional 13 distress, (7) failure to prevent harassment, (8) hostile work environment/sexual harassment 14 in violation of Title VII [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq.], and (9) retaliation in violation of 15 Title VII [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq.]. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff’s complaint has requested 16 general, compensatory, and/or special damages in any amount to be proven at trial. (Id. at 17 21.) The complaint also requests punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish and 18 deter Defendant from harming other employees. (Id.) 19 In the instant Motion, Defendant agues that evidence regarding racist acts or 20 comments, workplace bathroom conditions, workplace building conditions, and 21 insufficient parking should be excluded from trial because such evidence is irrelevant and 22 prejudicial. (Doc. 60 at 10.) Plaintiff does not oppose the exclusion of evidence relating 23 to bathroom conditions, building conditions, or parking. (Doc. 75 at 1.) However, Plaintiff 24 does oppose the exclusion of “testimony, argument, and evidence relating to racist 25 comments by employees, agents, contractors, and/or founders of [Defendant], past or 26 present.” (Id.) 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 A. Bathroom Conditions, Building Conditions, and Parking 3 Considering Defendant’s arguments and the fact that Plaintiff “does not oppose the 4 exclusion of . . . testimony or evidence relating to his office bathroom, building conditions, 5 and parking and street safety,” such evidence will be excluded from trial. Therefore, 6 Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART as to these categories of evidence. 7 B. Evidence Relating to Racism 8 Defendant argues that Plaintiff may attempt to introduce “instances of perceived 9 racism that are unrelated to his claims or any defense.” (Doc. 60 at 3.) In particular, 10 Defendant believes Plaintiff may introduce comments from Dan Paladin (the co-founder 11 of Defendant), William Stamper, and others in the workplace. (Id.) Defendant contends 12 such “incidents and Plaintiff’s characterization of them as racist are unrelated to the 13 underlying claims and should be excluded as irrelevant, confusing, prejudicial and 14 misleading.” (Id. at 4.) Defendant states that “race is immaterial to any cause of action, 15 and because of the irreversible prejudice such evidence will stir, race-related evidence 16 should be excluded in full.” (Id. at 6.) 17 Plaintiff opposes the exclusion of “testimony, argument, and evidence relating to 18 racist comments by employees, agents, contractors, and/or founders of [Defendant], past 19 or present.” (Doc. 75 at 1.) Plaintiff argues that evidence of alleged racism is probative of 20 discriminatory animus in general and that such evidence is relevant to his emotional 21 distress, retaliation, and wrongful termination claims. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff states that “[i]n 22 the Ninth Circuit, evidence of discriminatory conduct towards others based on different 23 protected categories is relevant to discriminatory animus in general.” (Doc. 75 at 3 (citing 24 Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994).) It is Plaintiff’s 25 position that the alleged racist comments made by employees, agents, contractors, and/or 26 founders of Defendant contributed to his emotional distress and Defendant’s generally 27 hostile work environment. (Doc. 75 at 3–4.) Finally, Plaintiff complained to his supervisor 28 about the work environment and cited a range of behavior including derogatory remarks 1 ||against minorities and regarding pedophilia. (/d. at 4.) Plaintiff argues that, in order to 2 ||prove Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff, Plaintiff only need to prove that his 3 ||““opposition and reporting were a substantial motivating reason for his firing. He is not 4 || required to prove discrimination or harassment actually occurred.” (/d.) 5 The Court finds that evidence of racism in the workplace may be relevant to several 6 || of Plaintiff's claims including allegations of hostile work environment and discriminatory 7 |{conduct. See Kishaba y. Hilton Hotels Corp., 737 F. Supp. 549, 554 (D. Haw. 8 1990), aff'd, 936 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[e]ven if Plaintiff herself was never the object 9 ||of racial harassment, she might nevertheless have a Title VII claim if she were forced to 10 || work in an atmosphere in which such harassment was pervasive’); see also Woods y. 11 || Graphic Commc'ns, 925 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that work environment 12 || was hostile when the plaintiff “was surrounded by racial hostility”). Thus, Defendant’s 13 || Motion is DENIED IN PART. The Court will not outrightly exclude evidence relating to 14 ||racism. However, such evidence may be limited in scope, subject to the Court’s discretion. 15 HI. CONCLUSION 16 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART and 17 || DENIED IN PART. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 ||DATE: October 6, 2022 20 Eaarnasls, dota 7] HON. RUTH BERMUBEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28