Griffin v. Hodges
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Daniel E. Butcher (author)
Analysis
Plaintiff Harold Griffin, a pro se litigant, filed a second motion for the appointment of counsel, arguing that the complexity of the case and his inability to retain an attorney justified the appointment. The Court denied the motion, finding that the circumstances had not changed from the first denial and that the plaintiff had not demonstrated the requisite exceptional circumstances.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Plaintiff's Second Motion for Appointment of Counsel“The Court, therefore, again DENIES Plaintiffs Motion.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard from the Ninth Circuit that there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in civil cases and that appointment is only warranted in exceptional circumstances. The court relied on its prior findings that the claims were straightforward and the plaintiff was able to articulate the facts, which supports the conclusion that no exceptional circumstances exist. The denial is consistent with the cited authorities. |
The order itself: sound — The order is concise and relies on established Ninth Circuit precedent regarding the high bar for appointing counsel in civil cases. It correctly notes that the plaintiff's arguments (complexity, merit, inability to retain) do not meet the 'exceptional circumstances' standard, particularly given the court's prior finding that the case is straightforward. The reasoning is sufficient for a procedural order of this nature.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HAROLD GRIFFIN, Case No.: 21-cv-01474-MMA-DEB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 14 J. HODGES, et. al., 15 [DKT. NO. 18] Defendants.
17 18 Before the Court is Plaintiff Harold Griffin’s second Motion for Appointment of 19 Counsel (“Motion”). Dkt. No. 18. Plaintiff requests the Court appoint counsel on his behalf 20 because he is “unable to proceed with the assertion of [his] claims . . . without the assistance 21 of counsel” and asserts he “qualif[ies] for the appointment of counsel from the Civil Pro 22 Bono Panel.” Dkt. No. 18. 23 In his first Request for Appointment of Counsel (“Request”), Plaintiff claimed he 24 was: (1) “incarcerated”; (2) “indigent”; and (3) “unable to afford counsel.” Dkt. No. 15. 25 The Court denied Plaintiff’s first Request as unsupported by exceptional circumstances, 26 which is the showing required to obtain appointed counsel. Dkt. No. 16 (citing Terrell v. 27 Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 28 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding courts have the authority to “request” an 1 || attorney represent an indigent person under “exceptional circumstances.”); Myers v. Basto, 2 || No. 18-cv-2239-DMS-BLM, 2019 WL 265134, at *1-2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2019) (finding 3 plaintiff failed to allege the requisite “exceptional circumstances” warranting the 4 ||appointment of counsel, where the plaintiff argued he was unable to afford counsel, had 5 || “very limited” access to law library, and “imprisonment [would] greatly limit his ability to 6 || litigate properly.’’). 7 In this second Motion, Plaintiff claims the following weigh in favor of appointing 8 ||}counsel: (1) “the complexity of the action”; (2) “the potential merit of the claims or 9 || defenses of the represented defendant party”; (3) his “inability to retain an attorney by other 10 means”; and (4) “the degree to which the interest of justice, including the benefits to the 11 |}court, will be served by appointment of counsel.” Dkt. No. 18. However, as the Court 12 previously found in denying Plaintiff's first Request, “Plaintiff has not demonstrated a 13 || likelihood of success on the merits,” and “has demonstrated the ability to articulate the 14 ||essential facts supporting his claim[s], which appear relatively straight-forward and 15 uncomplicated.” Dkt. No. 16 at 2. 16 The circumstances compelling the Court’s denial of Plaintiff's first Request have not 17 ||changed. The Court, therefore, again DENIES Plaintiffs Motion. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: September 23, 2022 = x Dando oa 71 Honorable Daniel E. Butcher United States Magistrate Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28