Fahr v. City of San Diego, California

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMES FAHR, et al., Case No. 21-cv-1676-BAS-BGS 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING JOINT MOTION 14 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 15 Defendants. (ECF No. 31); AND 16 (2) TERMINATING AS MOOT 17 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 18 DISMISS (ECF No. 22)

21 At issue in the above-captioned lawsuit is the legality of Section 53.18 of Chapter 22 5 of the San Diego Municipal Code (“Section 53.18”), referred to by both parties 23 colloquially as San Diego’s “Ghost Gun Ban.” In essence, Section 53.18 renders it 24 unlawful for any person within the City of San Diego to “possess,” “purchase,” 25 “transport,” “receive,” “sell,” “transfer,” or “offer to transfer an unfinished frame or 26 receiver”—gun components that are necessary to self-manufacture an operable firearm— 27 unless those components are serialized. SDMC § 53.18(c)(1), (2). Plaintiffs challenge 28 1 Section 53.18 as violative of both the Second Amendment and the Fifth Amendment 2 “Takings” clause. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) 3 On October 20, 2021, this Court denied Plaintiffs’ request to preliminarily enjoin 4 enforcement of Section 53.18 pending resolution of this action. (Order Denying Pls.’ 5 Apps. for a Temporary Restraining Order and Prelim. Inj. (“P.I. Denial”), ECF No. 21.) 6 As to likelihood on the merits of Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claim, this Court 7 assumed arguendo that the Second Amendment offers some degree of protection the right 8 to privately manufacture firearms as collateral to the “right to bear arms” and, applying 9 then-prevailing Ninth Circuit precedent, concluded Section 53.18 passed Second 10 Amendment scrutiny. (P.I. Denial at 5 (citing Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 11 2021) (en banc) (finding intermediate scrutiny applies, and determining Section 53.18 is a 12 reasonable fit to the important government objectives of safety and criminal 13 investigations).) In so holding, this Court “found instructive” the decision of the 14 Honorable Miranda M. Du of the District of Nevada denying a request for preliminary 15 injunction against a “substantially similar Nevada law” based upon a practically 16 “identical constitutional challenge.” (P.I. Order at 7 n.10 (citing Roger Palmer, et al. v. 17 Stephen Sisolak, et al., 3:21-cv-02680-MMD-CSD (D. Nev.) (“Palmer”), ECF No. 51).) 18 Shortly thereafter, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. 19 (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 22.) While that Motion has been pending, this Court sought 20 two rounds of supplemental briefing: one to address the effect of new Department of 21 Justice regulations requiring serialization of unfinished frames and unfinished receivers 22 on Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claims and the other to address intervening authority in 23 New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022) (“Bruen”). (ECF 24 Nos. 27, 30.) 25 On July 21, 2022, the parties jointly moved for a stay of the instant proceeding 26 pending the Ninth Circuit’s resolution of the appeal of District Judge Miranda Du’s order 27 dismissing the complaint in Palmer, see id., 2022 WL 960594, at *1 (D. Nev. Mar. 29, 28 2022), which is based upon substantially the same ground as her previous order denying 1 preliminary relief, discussed above. (Joint Mot., ECF No. 31.) The parties agree that the 2 most efficient path forward is for this Court to wait and see how Bruen influences the 3 Ninth Circuit’s standard for assessing Second Amendment claims and whether the Ninth 4 Circuit agrees with District Judge Du’s disposition of Palmer. (Joint Mot. at 2–3.) 5 “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court 6 to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for 7 itself, for counsel and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). 8 This power to stay proceedings includes the discretion to grant stays “pending resolution 9 of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.” Leyva v. Certified Grocers of 10 Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979). “‘This rule applies whether the separate 11 proceedings are judicial, administrative, or arbitral in character, and does not require that 12 the issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling of the action before the court.” 13 I.K. ex rel. E.K. v. Sylvan Union Sch. Dist., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1190 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 14 The core issues presented in Palmer and this case are practically identical. Both 15 courts must decide whether the Second Amendment protects the right to privately 16 manufacture firearms for self-defense purposes and, if so, whether a law restricting the 17 possession, transfer, and sale of unserialized components necessary for the private 18 manufacture of a firearm is incompatible with the Second Amendment. If the Ninth 19 Circuit reverses or affirms the lower court’s decision in Palmer, or if the Ninth Circuit 20 enunciates a new standard for assessing the sufficiency of Second Amendment claims 21 following Bruen and remands the action back to the district court, this Court’s decision 22 regarding Defendants’ pending Motion, too, may be impacted. See Leyva, 593 F.2d at 23 863–64 (instructing a stay of proceedings is warranted if “pending resolution of 24 independent proceedings . . . bear upon the case”); Johnson v. Five Points Ctr., LLC, No. 25 18-cv-5551-JSC, 2019 WL 3503045, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2019) (granting motion 26 for stay “pending disposition of two appeals in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 27 addressing the exact same issue regarding Defendant Starbucks’s counter practices as are 28 at issue here”). Thus, it is in the interest of economy of time and effort for this Court, 1 ||counsel, and the parties to stay this proceeding until the Ninth Circuit has resolved the 2 appeal in Palmer, rather than risk potential re-trial of the issues. 3 For these reasons, and because the parties jointly applied for a stay of proceedings, 4 Court GRANTS the Joint Motion (ECF No. 31) and STAYS for ninety days from 5 ||when this Order is electronically docketed. The Court therefore TERMINATES AS 6 || MOOT Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 22) and VACATES all deadlines until 7 || further order of the Court. The parties SHALL FILE a joint status report by no later 8 October 17, 2022, seven days prior to the conclusion of the 90-day stay. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 A , 11 DATED: July 25, 2022 Lin A (Lyphaa. 6 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 _A.